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Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Vernon L. Smith
Vernon L. Smith*
Affiliation:
Professor of Economics and Law, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, Truland Building 400-J, 3330 Washington blvd, Arlington Virginia
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Abstract

The methodological ideal of experimentalists, E, is easily stated: derive a testable hypothesis, H, from a well-specified theory, T; implement experiments with a design; implicitly in the latter are auxiliary hypotheses, A, that surface in the review/discussion of completed research reports (payoffs are ‘adequate,’ Ss are ‘relevant,’ instructions, context are ‘clear,’ etc.). We want to be able to conclude, if statistical test outcomes support not-H, that T is ‘falsified.’ But this is not what we do; rather we ask if there is a flaw in the test, i.e. not-A is supported, and we do more experiments. This is good practice—much better than the statistical rhetoric of falsificationism. Undesigned social processes allow E to accumulate technical and instrumental knowledge that drive the reduction of experimental error and constitute a more coherent methodology than falsificationism.

Keywords

experimental economicssciencemethodology

JEL classification

B4: Economic Methodology C90: General

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , October 2002 , pp. 91 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 Economic Science Association

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