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Morally monotonic choice in public good games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

James C. Cox*
Affiliation:
Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Vjollca Sadiraj*
Affiliation:
Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Susan Xu Tang*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

Abstract

Rational choice theory, including models of social preferences, is challenged by decades of robust data from public good games. Provision of public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, does not crowd out private provision on a one-for-one basis. Provision games elicit more of a public good than payoff-equivalent appropriation games. This paper offers a morally monotonic choice theory that incorporates observable moral reference points and is consistent with the two empirical findings. The model has idiosyncratic features that motivate a new experimental design. Data from our new experiment and three previous experiments favor moral monotonicity over alternative models including rational choice theory, prominent belief-based models of kindness, and popular reference-dependent models with loss aversion.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2023.

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