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Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Klaus Abbink and
Heike Hennig-Schmidt
Klaus Abbink*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, The University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom
Heike Hennig-Schmidt*
Affiliation:
Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Bonn University, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
*
e-mail: klaus.abbink@nottingham.ac.uk
e-mail: hschmidt@uni-bonn.de
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Abstract

This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences with our 18 independent observations per treatment. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task.

Keywords

CorruptionContextFramingValenceExperimental InstructionsLaboratoryTrustReciprocityEthical BehaviourSocial Norms

JEL classification

D62: ExternalitiesD73: Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • CorruptionK42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of LawC91: Laboratory, Individual BehaviorD72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , June 2006, pp. 103 - 121
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Economic Science Association

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