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A note on peer effects between teams

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Rupert Sausgruber
Rupert Sausgruber*
Affiliation:
Department of Public Economics, University of Innsbruck, Universitätsstr. 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen, Denmark
*
e-mail: Rupert.Sausgruber@uibk.ac.at
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Abstract

We run an experiment to test for peer effects between teams. The subjects perform a team-work task in pairs of payoff-independent teams. They receive feedback about the outcome of their own and the paired team. Consistent with peer effects, we find that this feedback induces substantial correlation of effort choices between teams. The correlation translates into the variation of outcomes within and across pairs of teams.

Keywords

Peer effectsOrganization of workPublic good experiments

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods J2: Demand and Supply of Labor C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , June 2009 , pp. 193 - 201
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2008

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9209-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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