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Participatory incentives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Francesco BripiOpen the ORCID record for Francesco Bripi[Opens in a new window] and
Daniela GriecoOpen the ORCID record for Daniela Grieco[Opens in a new window]
Francesco Bripi
Affiliation:
Bank of Italy, Milan, Italy
Daniela Grieco*
Affiliation:
Department of Law Cesare Beccaria, University of Milano, Milan, Italy
*
daniela.grieco@unimi.it
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Abstract

We design a lab-in-the-field experiment involving naturally occurring groups operating in three South-African townships. We introduce an incentives-based mechanism named “participatory incentives” consisting of monetary incentives that are awarded conditional on the group reaching a threshold of minimum level of joint contribution to a common project or good. We show that participatory incentives significantly raise average contribution levels (from 29 to 62% of the endowment) and are even more effective in the presence of highly deprived people. We complement the reduced form estimations of the experimental data with a structural model that sheds light on the role of subjects’ beliefs and responsiveness to a social norm of high cooperation.

Keywords

Artefactual field experimentCooperationIncentivesStructural estimationSocial norm

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and MeasurementO12: Microeconomic Analyses of Economic DevelopmentH41: Public GoodsC92: Laboratory, Group BehaviorD71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , September 2023, pp. 813 - 849
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2023.

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Footnotes

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09798-7.

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