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Playing the trust game with other people’s money

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ola Kvaløy*
Affiliation:
University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway
Miguel Luzuriaga
Affiliation:
University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway

Abstract

We experimentally investigate to what extent people trust and honor trust when they are playing with other people’s money (OPM). We adopt the well-known trust game by Berg et al. (in Games Econ. Behav. 10:122–142, 1995), with the difference that the trustor (sender) who sends money to the trustee (receiver) does this on behalf of a third party. We find that senders who make decisions on behalf of others do not behave significantly different from senders in our baseline trust game who manage their own money. But receivers return significantly less money when senders send a third party’s money. As a result, trust is only profitable in the baseline trust game, but not in the OPM treatment. The treatment effect among the receivers is gender specific. Women return significantly less money in OPM than in baseline, while there is no such treatment effect among men. Moreover, women return significantly less than men in the OPM treatment.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

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