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Randomized double auctions: gains from trade, trader roles, and price discovery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Katerina Sherstyuk*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA
Krit Phankitnirundorn*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA
Michael J. Roberts*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Sea Grant College Program, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA

Abstract

Experimental double-auction commodity markets are known to exhibit robust convergence to competitive equilibria under stable or cyclical supply and demand conditions, but little is known about their performance in truly random environments. We provide a comprehensive study of double auctions in a stochastic setting where the equilibrium prices, trading volumes and gains from trade are highly variable across periods, and with commodity traders who may buy or sell their goods depending on market conditions and their individual outcomes. We find that performance in this stochastic environment is sensitive to underlying market conditions. Efficiency is higher and convergence to the competitive equilibrium stronger when the potential gains from trade are high and when the equilibrium spans a wide range of quantities, implying a large number of marginal trades. Speculative re-trading is prevalent, especially among those who have little to gain under equilibrium pricing. Those with the largest expected gains typically earn far less than predicted, while those with little or no predicted earnings gain modestly from speculation, leading to some redistribution of gains from high to low expected earners. Excessive trading volumes are associated with negative efficiencies in markets with low gains from trade, but not in the high-gains markets, where zero-sum trading and re-trading appear to enforce efficiency and near-equilibrium pricing. Buyers earn more relative to their competitive equilibrium benchmark than sellers do. Introducing trader specialization leads to fewer trading errors and higher market efficiency, but it does not eliminate zero-sum trading and re-trading.

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Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 Economic Science Association

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Online Supplementary Materials S1: Experimental Instructions
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Sherstyuk et al. supplementary material

Online Supplementary Materials S2 and S3
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