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Reciprocity in the workplace

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Abigail Barr and
Pieter Serneels
Abigail Barr
Affiliation:
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Pieter Serneels*
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia, University Campus, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
*
e-mail: p.serneels@uea.ac.uk
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Abstract

Using combined experimental and survey data, this paper provides empirical evidence that firm productivity is related to worker's pro-social behavior in the workplace. At the firm level, we find a strong positive relationship between firm productivity and reciprocating behavior among workers. Investigating workers’ individual behavior we find a similar, strong relationship when regressing earnings, a proxy for productivity, on reciprocity. To address simultaneity we use an instrumental variable approach and find that the initial estimate was upwards biased, presumably because it did not take into account the positive feedback from earnings to reciprocity. The new coefficient remains substantially above zero, but it is statistically insignificant.

Keywords

WagesReciprocityField experiment

JEL classification

J31: Wage Level and Structure • Wage DifferentialsC93: Field ExperimentsZ13: Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology • Language • Social and Economic Stratification

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2009, pp. 99 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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