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Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Brit Grosskopf*
Affiliation:
Harvard Business School, 174 Baker Library, Soldier's Field Road, Boston, MA 02163, USA

Abstract

Demands in the Ultimatum Game in its traditional form with one proposer and one responder are compared with demands in an Ultimatum Game with responder competition. In this modified form one proposer faces three responders who can accept or reject the split of the pie. Initial demands in both ultimatum games are quite similar, however in the course of the experiment, demands in the ultimatum game with responder competition are significantly higher than in the traditional case with repeated random matching. Individual round-to-round changes of choices that are consistent with directional learning are the driving forces behind the differences between the two learning curves and cannot be tracked by an adjustment process in response to accumulated reinforcements. The importance of combining reinforcement and directional learning is addressed. Moreover, learning transfer between the two ultimatum games is analyzed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 Economic Science Association

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