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Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

David J. Cooper
Affiliation:
Case Western Reserve University
Nick Feltovich
Affiliation:
University of Houston
Alvin E. Roth
Affiliation:
Harvard University
Rami Zwick
Affiliation:
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Abstract

Learning models predict that the relative speed at which players in a game adjust their behavior has a critical influence on long term behavior. In an ultimatum game, the prediction is that proposers learn not to make small offers faster than responders learn not to reject them. We experimentally test whether relative speed of learning has the predicted effect, by manipulating the amount of experience accumulated by proposers and responders. The experiment allows the predicted learning by responders to be observed, for the first time.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 Economic Science Association

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