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Self-interest and fairness: self-serving choices of justice principles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ismael Rodriguez-Lara*
Affiliation:
Dpto. Analisis Economico, ERI-CES Universidad de Valencia, Campus Dels Tarongers, Avda. de los Naranjos s/n, 46011 Valencia, Spain
Luis Moreno-Garrido
Affiliation:
Dpto. Fundamentos del Analisis Economico, Universidad de Alicante, Carretera San Vicente s/n, San Vicente del Raspeig, 03690 Alicante, Spain

Abstract

We introduce non-enforceable property rights over a bargaining surplus in a dictator game with production, where the agent's effort is differentially rewarded and subsequently determines the size of the surplus. Using experimental data, we elicit individual preferences over the egalitarian, accountability and libertarian principles and provide evidence to support the inability of these justice principles to individually account for the observed behavior. We show that the justice principle that can be used to explain dictators’ choices depends on whether dictators are paid more or less than recipients for their effort. Our findings suggest that dictators do employ justice principles in self-serving ways and choose in each context the justice principle that maximizes their financial payoffs.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Economic Science Association

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