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Social approval, competition and cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Xiaofei Pan and
Daniel Houser
Xiaofei Pan*
Affiliation:
University of the South, Sewanee, USA
Daniel Houser
Affiliation:
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, USA
*
xpan@sewanee.edu
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Abstract

Non-monetary rewards are frequently used to promote pro-social behaviors, and these behaviors often result in approval from one’s peers. Nevertheless, we know little about how peer-approval, and particularly competition for peer-approval, influences people’s decisions to cooperate. This paper provides experimental evidence suggesting that people in peer-approval competitions value social approval more when it leads to unique and durable rewards. Our evidence suggests that such rewards act as a signaling mechanism, thereby contributing to the value of approval. We show that this signaling mechanism generates cooperation at least as effectively as cash rewards. Our findings point to the potential value of developing new mechanisms that rely on small non-monetary rewards to promote generosity in groups.

Keywords

Peer approvalCompetitionCooperation

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational TransfersD02: Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and ImpactH4: Publicly Provided Goods

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2017, pp. 309 - 332
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-016-9485-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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