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Social communication and discrimination: a video experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ben Greiner,
Werner Güth and
Ro’i Zultan
Ben Greiner
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Werner Güth
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany
Ro’i Zultan*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
*
zultan@bgu.ac.il
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Abstract

We report on an experiment using video technology to study effects of communication on donations to and discrimination between potential receivers. The experimental design eliminates strategic factors by allowing two receivers to unilaterally communicate with an anonymous dictator before the latter decides on her gifts. Through the use of three communication setups (none, audio, and audio-visual) we analyze purely social effects of communication. A silent video channel leads to discrimination between potential receivers based on impression formation, but does not affect average levels of donations. When the auditory channel is added, average donations increase. The social processes invoked by the visual and audio channels are heterogeneous and communicator-specific but not unsystematic.

Keywords

BargainingCommunicationDiscriminationn-Person dictator gameVideo experiment

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational TransfersC91: Laboratory, Individual BehaviorC72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , September 2012, pp. 398 - 417
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9305-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

An earlier version of this paper had the title “Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments”. We thank two anonymous reviewers for constructive helpful advice inspiring major revisions, and seminar participants at Jena, Jerusalem, Erfurt, Berlin, Würzburg, and Mannheim for helpful discussions. Financial support from the Max Planck Society is gratefully acknowledged.

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