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Social learning in coordination games: does status matter?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Catherine C. Eckel and
Rick K. Wilson
Catherine C. Eckel*
Affiliation:
School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, USA
Rick K. Wilson*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
*
e-mail: eckelc@utdallas.edu
e-mail: rkw@rice.edu
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Abstract

We report the results of experiments designed to test the impact of social status on learning in a coordination game. In the experiment, all subjects observe the play of an agent who either has high status or low status. In one treatment the agent is another player in the game; in the other the agent is a simulated player. Status is assigned within the experiment based on answers to a trivia quiz. The coordination game has two equilibria: one is payoff-dominant but risky, and the other is risk-dominant. The latter is most commonly chosen in experiments where there is no coordination device. We find that a commonly observed agent enhances coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium more often when the agent has high status.

Keywords

Coordination gamePayoff dominanceRisk dominanceStatus

JEL classification

C7: Game Theory and Bargaining TheoryC92: Laboratory, Group BehaviorZ13: Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology • Language • Social and Economic Stratification

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 10 , Issue 3: Special issue of Experimental Economics in honor of Raymond C. Battalio: Coordination Games , September 2007, pp. 317 - 329
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

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