Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T10:44:31.351Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Solving coordination failure with “all-or-none” group-level incentives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

John Hamman
Affiliation:
Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
Scott Rick
Affiliation:
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
Roberto A. Weber*
Affiliation:
Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA

Abstract

Coordinating activity among members is an important problem faced by organizations. When firms, or units within firms, are stuck in bad equilibria, managers may turn to the temporary use of simple incentives—flat punishments or rewards—in an attempt to transition the firm or unit to a more efficient equilibrium. We investigate the use of incentives in the context of the “minimum-effort,” or “weak-link,” coordination game. We allow groups to reach the inefficient equilibrium and then implement temporary, flat, “all-or-none” incentives to encourage coordination on more efficient equilibria. We vary whether incentives are positive (rewards) or negative (penalties), whether they have substantial or nominal monetary value, and whether they are targeted to a specific outcome (the efficient equilibrium) or untargeted (apply to more than one outcome). Overall, incentives of all kinds are effective at improving coordination while they are in place, but there is little long-term persistent benefit of incentives—once incentives are removed, groups tend to return to the inefficient outcome. We find some differences between different kinds of incentives. Finally, we contrast our results to other recent work demonstrating greater long-term effectiveness of temporary incentives.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable