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Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Marco Castillo*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, USA
Ahrash Dianat*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Abstract

We present experimental evidence on the interplay between strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms. In particular, we apply a version of risk-dominance to compare the riskiness of “truncation” against other strategies that secure against remaining unmatched. By keeping subjects’ ordinal preferences fixed while changing their cardinal representation, our experimental treatments vary the risk-dominant prediction. We find that both truth-telling and truncation are played more often when they are risk-dominant. In both treatments, however, truncation strategies are played more often in later rounds of the experiment. Our results also shed light on several open questions in market design.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 Economic Science Association

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