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Time and uncertainty in resource dilemmas: equilibrium solutions and experimental results

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Anabela Botelho
Affiliation:
University of Minho and NIMA, Braga, Portugal
Ariel Dinar*
Affiliation:
Water Science and Policy Center, Department of Environmental Sciences, University of California, Riverside, USA
Lígia M. Costa Pinto
Affiliation:
University of Minho and NIMA, Braga, Portugal
Amnon Rapoport
Affiliation:
A. Gary Anderson School of Business Administration, University of California, Riverside, USA

Abstract

Most common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas share two features: they evolve over time and they are managed under environmental uncertainties. We propose a stylized dynamic model that integrates these two dimensions. A distinguishing feature of our model is that the duration of the game is determined endogenously by the users’ collective decisions. In the proposed model, if the resource stock level below which the irreversible event occurs is known in advance, then the optimal resource use coincides with a unique symmetric equilibrium that guarantees survival of the resource. As the uncertainty about the threshold level increases, resource use increases if users adopt decision strategies that quickly deplete the resource stock, but decreases if they adopt path strategies guaranteeing that the unknown threshold level is never exceeded. We show that under relatively high uncertainty about resource size, CPR users frequently implement decision strategies that terminate the game immediately. When this uncertainty is reduced, they maintain a positive resource level for longer durations.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Economic Science Association

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