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Responsive Constitutionalism in Australia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Rosalind DixonOpen the ORCID record for Rosalind Dixon[Opens in a new window]
Rosalind Dixon*
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UNSW Sydney
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Abstract

Responsive constitutionalism is a theory of constitutionalism that starts from the idea that democracy involves two overlapping commitments — to a relatively thin ‘minimum core’ set of norms and institutions and thicker, more contestable set of rights and deliberative commitments. It then proceeds to affirm a commitment both to legal and political constitutionalism. This article explores the relevance of this theory for Australian constitutionalism and suggests that it in fact has strong resonance with the Australian constitutional tradition. First, the capital ‘C’ Constitution gives strong legal protection to the ‘minimum core’ of democracy in ss 7, 24 and the High Court’s decisions on the implied freedom of political communication and access to the franchise. Second, the small ‘c’ constitution adopts norms that help protect the democratic minimum core and advance a responsive approach to thicker democratic commitments to rights. Third, there are important connections between the idea of responsive constitutionalism and limits on the scope legal constitutionalism and judicial review in Australia. Yet, there are also ways in which a responsive approach points to potential reforms of the Australian constitutional model — to include more robust rights-based constitutional protections, albeit in ways that are premised on a notion of shared legal and political authority and enforcement, and therefore involve a ‘weak-form’ national rights charter or extended principle of legality.

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Type
Special Issue: Positive Democratic Constitutionalism in Australia
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 52 , Issue 3: Special Issue: Positive Democratic Constitutionalism in Australia , September 2024, pp. 359 - 383
Copyright
Copyright © 2024 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

The author thanks Will Bateman, Lynsey Blayden, Lisa Burton Crawford, Brendam Lim, Ashleigh Barnes and Will Partlett for helpful comments on previous versions of the article, and Hayden Clift for outstanding research assistance. The author also thanks the Australian Research Council for research (FT210100667) support. The article is dedicated to Sir Anthony Mason, a great friend, and exemplar of a market responsive approach to constitutionalism and judicial review.

References

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3. On fit, see Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) ch 4.Google Scholar In the context of debates about Australian constitutional law and the principle of legality, see also Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (2016) 261 CLR 28; Lim, Brendan, ‘The Normativity of the Principle of Legality’ (2013) 37(2) University of Melbourne Law Review 372Google Scholar (‘Normativity’).

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5. See, eg, Malcolm Langford, Responsive Courts and Complex Cases (forthcoming); Dixon, Rosalind, Responsive Judicial Review: Democracy and Dysfunction in the Modern Age (Oxford University Press, 2023)10.1093/oso/9780192865779.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar ('Responsive Judicial Review’); Rosalind Dixon, ‘The New Responsive Constitutionalism’ The Modern Law Review (advance).

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8. See Dixon, Rosalind and Loughland, Amelia, ‘Comparative Constitutional Adaptation: Democracy and Distrust in the High Court of Australia’ (2021) 19(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 455;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Loughland, Amelia, ‘Taking Process-Based Theory Seriously: Could ‘Discrete and Insular Minorities’ Be Protected under the Australian Constitution?’ (2020) 48(3) Federal Law Review 32410.1177/0067205X20927813CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘Taking Process-based Theory Seriously’).

9. (1992) 177 CLR 106 (‘ACTV’). On the evolution and influence, see Dixon and Loughland (n 8).

10. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

11. Dixon, ‘The New Responsive Constitutionalism’ (n 5). See also Dixon, Rosalind and Landau, David, ‘Competitive Democracy and the Constitutional Minimum Core’ in Ginsburg, Tom and Huq, Aziz (eds), Assessing Constitutional Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 268.10.1017/CBO9781316651018.010CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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15. Cf Stone (n 14). In this sense, responsive constitutionalism splits the difference between Stone and Jeffrey Goldsworthy on the scope for some forms of structural constitutional review to evade or at least substantially avoid the argument from reasonable disagreement: see Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘Structural Judicial Review and the Objection from Democracy’ (2010) 60(1) University of Toronto Law Journal 137.10.3138/utlj.60.1.137CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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18. Waldron, ‘Core of the Case’ (n 14).

19. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

20. Ibid; Dixon, The New Responsive Constitutionalism (n 5).

21. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5). Cf Lim, Normativity (n 3) 404.

22. On this duty to supervise in a US context, but with more general conceptual application, see, eg, Metzger, Gillian E, ‘The Constitutional Duty to Supervise’ (2015) 124(6) Yale Law Journal 1836.Google Scholar

23. Dixon, Rosalind, ‘Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited’ (2007) 5(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 391CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

24. For a definition, see Tushnet, Mark, The New Fourth Branch: Institutions for Protecting Constitutional Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2021)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Guarantor Institutions’ (2021) 16(S1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law S40. For exploration of the role of the Australian Electoral Commission and equivalent state commissions, see Paul Kildea and Sarah Murray, ‘Democratic Constitutions, Electoral Commissions and Legitimacy: The Example of Australia’ (2021) 16(S1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law S117. For the role of human rights and equality commissions in comparative perspective, see Dixon, Rosalind and Tushnet, Mark, ‘Democratic Constitutions, Poverty and Economic Inequality: Redress Through the Fourth Branch Institutions?’ (2023) 51(3) Federal Law Review 285.10.1177/0067205X231188640CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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28. This does not mean that civilian courts cannot engage in responsive forms of judicial review. Indeed, they can. It simply means that the scope and extent to which they can do so may be more limited than for some common law courts, or at least require some degree of institutional adaptation. For a very useful and thoughtful exploration of these questions, see Rosalind Dixon, ‘Responsive Judicial Review in Central & Eastern Europe’ (2023) 48(3–4) Review of Central and East European Law 375 (‘RJR in Europe’); Samo Bardutzky, ‘What Kind of Judicial Review for a Small, Post-Communist European Constitutional Democracy? Thoughts on the Proposal for the Slovenian Constitutional Court to Adopt a Responsive Approach to Judicial Review’ (2023) 48 (3–4) Review of Central and East European Law 403; Ivo Gruev, ‘Responsive Judicial Review in Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Impeding Effects of Limited Standing and Formalism’ (2023) 48 (3–4) Review of Central and East European Law 426; David Kosař and Sarah Ouředníčková, ‘Responsive Judicial Review ‘Light’ in Central and Eastern Europe – A New Sheriff in Town?’ (2023) 48 (3–4) Review of Central and East European Law 445; Kriszta Kovács and Gábor Attila Tóth, ‘Constitutional Review as a Democratic Instrument’ (2023) 48 (3–4) Review of Central and East European Law 473; Ivana Krstic, ‘Serbian Constitutional Court – (In)dependent Protector of the Rule of Law and Human Rights?’ (2023) 48 (3–4) Review of Central and East European Law 490; Silvia Suteu, ‘Between Dialogue, Conflict, and Competition: The Limits of Responsive Judicial Review in the Case of the Romanian Constitutional Court’ (2023) 48 (3–4) Review of Central and East European Law 519.

29. Other scholars have argued for the sharing of constitutional authority in the Australian context, including by drawing attention to the important role played by legislative and executive actors in processes of constitutional construction. See, eg, Appleby, Gabrielle, MacDonnell, Vanessa and Synot, Eddie, ‘The Pervasive Constitution: The Constitution outside the Courts’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30. Gardbaum, Stephen, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘New Commonwealth Model’).

31. On political constitutionalism, see Richard Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and Populism’ (2023) 50(1) Journal of Law and Society S7; Bellamy, Richard, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)10.1017/CBO9780511490187CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tomkins, Adam, ‘The Role of the Courts in the Political Constitution’ (2010) 60(1) University of Toronto Law Journal 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32. Tribe, Laurence H, ‘The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories’ (1980) 89(6) Yale Law Journal 1063.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

34. Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Comparative Political Process Theory’ (2020) 18(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1429.

35. Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US (1 Cranch) 137.

36. See discussion in Williams, George and Hume, David, People Power: How Australian Referendums are Lost and Won (University of New South Wales Press, 2nd ed, 2024).Google Scholar

37. Dixon, Rosalind and Stone, Adrienne, ‘Constitutional Amendment and Political Constitutionalism: A Philosophical and Comparative Reflection’ in Dyzenhaus, David and Thorburn, Malcolm (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2016)Google Scholar; Dixon, Rosalind, ‘Weak-Form Judicial Review and American Exceptionalism’ (2012) 32(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 48710.1093/ojls/gqs015CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dixon, Rosalind, ‘The Forms, Functions, and Varieties of Weak(ened) Judicial Review’ (2019) 17(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 90410.1093/icon/moz059CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘Forms and Functions’). See also Lutz, Scott D, ‘Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment’ (1994) 88(2) American Political Science Review 355.10.2307/2944709CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38. Dixon, ‘Forms and Functions’ (n 36); Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

39. Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model (n 28).

40. Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) s 4(6) (‘HRA’).

41. Mark Tushnet calls this the problem of ‘democratic debilitation’: Tushnet, Mark, ‘Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty’ (1995) 94(2) Michigan Law Review 245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Landau, David, ‘A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role’ (2014) 55(5) Boston College Law Review 1501Google Scholar; Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

42. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5). See also Gardbaum, Stephen, ‘Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing for New Democracies?’ (2015) 53(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 285.Google Scholar

43. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (n 6). Note that Ely does not oppose weaker forms of review, but simply does not seek to theorize them or put them at the centre of his theory. See also discussion in Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5) 56–8.

44. Dixon, Rosalind and Issacharoff, Samuel, ‘Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial Deferral in Defense of Democracy’ (2016) 2016(4) Wisconsin Law Review 683Google Scholar; Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

45. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

46. See Dixon, Rosalind and Gauja, Anika, ‘Australia’s Non-Populist Democracy?: The Role of Structure and Policy’ in Graber, Mark A, Levinson, Sanford and Tushnet, Mark (eds), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press, 2018) 423.Google Scholar See also Holden, Richard and Dixon, Rosalind, From Free to Fair Markets: Liberalism after Covid (Oxford University Press, 2022).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47. For discussion, see Stone, More than a Rule Book (n 7).

48. Cf Holden and Dixon (n 45); Dixon, Rosalind, ‘Fair Market Constitutionalism: From Neo-liberal to Democratic Liberal Economic Governance’ (2023) 43(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 221.10.1093/ojls/gqac029CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Nussbaum, Martha C, ‘Political Liberalism and Global Justice’ (2015) 11(1) Journal of Global Ethics 68.10.1080/17449626.2015.1015081CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49. See, eg, Baccini, Leonardo and Weymouth, Stephen, ‘Gone for Good: Deindustrialization, White Voter Backlash, and US Presidential Voting’ (2021) 115(2) American Political Science Review 55010.1017/S0003055421000022CrossRefGoogle Scholar; O'Reilly, Jacqueline et al, ‘Brexit: Understanding the Socio-economic Origins and Consequences’ (2016) 14(4) Socio-economic Review 807.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. See, eg, Dixon, Rosalind, ‘The Functional Constitution: Re-reading the 2014 High Court Constitutional Term’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 445CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Australian Constitution s 51(xxiiiA); Williams v The Commonwealth (No 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416.

51. See, eg, National Health Act 1953 (Cth); Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973 (Cth); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). For discussion, see also, William Partlett, ‘Australian Popular Political Constitutionalism’ (2024) Federal Law Review (forthcoming); Will Bateman, ‘Federalising Socialism without Doctrine’ (2024) 52(3) Federal Law Review (forthcoming); Lynsey Blayden, ‘Active Citizens and an Active State: Uncovering the “Positive” Underpinnings of the Australian Constitution’ (2024) Federal Law Review (forthcoming).

52. CfGageler, Stephen, ‘Judicial Legitimacy’ (2023) 97(1) Australian Law Journal 28.Google Scholar

53. See, eg, R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31.

54. For discussion of these principles, see eg, Stone, More than a Rule Book (n 7). But for earlier criticism of the claim that these principles can be firmly and directly grounded in constitutional text and structure, see Adrienne Stone, n 14.

55. (2007) 233 CLR 162, 173–4 [6], 182 [24] (Gleeson CJ); 198–201 [82]–[91] (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ).

56. Ibid 174–5 [8] (Gleeson CJ).

57. Ibid 198–9 [82]–[83], [85] (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ).

58. (2010) 243 CLR 1, 34–7 [72]–[73] (French CJ); 61 [167] (Gummow and Bell JJ); 120–1 [384] (Crennan J).

59. Ibid 19–21 [22]–[25] (French CJ); 48 [121] (Gummow and Bell JJ); 107 [328]–[330] (Crennan J). Cf 77 [225] (Hayne J); 99–100 [301]–[304] (Heydon J).

60. ACTV (n 9); Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’).

61. Ibid; Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1.

62. McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McLoy’). See discussion in Wesson, Murray, ‘The Reception of Structured Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2021) 49(3) Federal Law Review 35210.1177/0067205X211016581CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chordia, Shipra, Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law (Federation Press, 2020)Google Scholar; Carter, Anne, Proportionality and Facts in Constitutional Adjudication (Hart Publishing, 2022).Google Scholar

63. See, eg, Douek, Evelyn, ‘All Out of Proportion: The Ongoing Disagreement about Structured Proportionality in Australia’ (2019) 47(4) Federal Law Review 55110.1177/0067205X19875010CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dixon, Rosalind, ‘Calibrated Proportionality’ (2020) 48(1) Federal Law Review 92.10.1177/0067205X19890439CrossRefGoogle Scholar

64. See McCloy (n 61); Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530; Unions NSW v New South Wales (2019) 264 CLR 595 (‘Unions II’). For a useful discussion of Unions II, see Wesson, Murray, ‘Unions NSW v New South Wales [No 2]’: Unresolved Issues for the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2019) 23(1) Media and Arts Law Review 93.Google Scholar

65. Dixon, ‘Calibrated Proportionality’ (n 62).

66. Ibid.

67. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

68. Ibid.

69. ACTV (n 9).

70. See, eg, David Crowe and Paul Sakkal, ‘Billionaires Pour Money into Political Parties, Donations Data Reveals’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online, 1 February 2023) <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/billionaires-pour-money-into-political-parties-donations-data-reveals-20230201-p5ch0j.html>.

71. This is one reason both I and other scholars have suggested that courts should combine remedies of this kind with a strong judicially defined default position, designed to encourage a legislative response: see Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5); Landau, David, ‘Aggressive Weak-Form Remedies’ (2013) 5(1) Constitutional Court Review 24410.2989/CCR.2013.0009CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Po Jen Yap, ‘New Democracies and Novel Remedies’ (2017) (January) Public Law 30. See also Rosalind Dixon and Po Jen Yap, ‘Responsive Judicial Remedies’ (2024) Global Constitutionalism (forthcoming).

72. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5). See also McAdam, Richard, The Expressive Powers of Law: Theories and Limits (Harvard University Press, 2017).Google Scholar

73. A remedy of this kind was issued three months earlier in Canada by the Supreme Court of Canada in Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679 (decided 9 July 1992), compared to ACTV (n 9) (decided 30 September 1992).

74. Dixon and Yap, ‘Responsive Judicial Remedies’ (n 70).

75. Cf Loughland, ‘Taking Process-based Theory Seriously’ (n 8).

76. Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1.

77. Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 (‘Coco’).

78. (1992) 177 CLR 292.

79. Leeth v The Queen (1992) 110 ALR 459 (‘Leeth’).

80. (1998) 195 CLR 337.

81. Leeth (n80). For further discussion, see Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5) 116.

82. See Secretary of the Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (1992) 175 CLR 218 (‘Marion’s Case’). In that case, the Mason Court seemed to suggest that the common law in Australia might go further than English law (at least prior to the Human Rights Act) and develop so as to recognize a broader common law right to dignity, but that suggestion has not been developed in subsequent cases, so that (for now at least) Marion’s Case stands as a relatively isolated example of common law, judicial rights protection for the right to dignity in Australia. See, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199.

83. On administrative law, see, eg, Boughey, Janina, Human Rights and Judicial Review in Australia and Canada The Newest Despotism? (Bloomsbury, 2019).Google Scholar

84. See, eg, Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171, and discussion in Scott Stephenson, ‘Dignity and the Australian Constitution’ (2020) 42(4) Sydney Law Review 369 (‘Dignity’). See also Barnes, Ashleigh, ‘Constitutional Dignity’ (2023) 46(3) Melbourne University Law Review 683.Google Scholar

85. On the gaps in current human rights protection in Australia, see also Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Free & Equal’ (n 2) 46. On how these principles play out in the context of the potential indefinite detention of non-citizens, see Dixon, ‘The New Responsive Constitutionalism’ (n 5), and also NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 1005 (relying on Chapter III principles rather than statutory interpretation as a means of limiting arbitrary detention in these circumstances).

86. (2022) 404 ALR 182 (‘Garlett’).

87. Section 26 of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) provides for the making of an order for the ‘control, care, or treatment’ of an offender, but in the context of their ‘continuing detention … in custody’.

88. Tamara Tulich and Sarah Murray, ‘Confronting Race, Chapter III and Preventive (In)justice: Garlett v Western Australia’, Australian Public Law (Blog Post, 4 November 2022) <https://www.auspublaw.org/blog/2022/11/confronting-race-chapter-iii-and-preventive-injustice-garlett-v-western-australia>. For the consideration of the issue, see discussion in Garlett (n 87) 950–1 [273]–[276] (Edelman J).

89. See DLA Piper, Review of the Severe Substance Dependence Treatment Act 2014 (Vic) (Report, vol 2, 2013) <https://www.health.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/migrated/files/collections/research-and-reports/f/final-report-on-review-of-ssdta-vol-2-pdf.pdf>.

90. See ibid. See also Magistrate Jennifer Bowles, ‘Why Can I Lock Kids Up but I Can’t Ensure They Receive Treatment?’, University of Queensland (Blog Post, 12 February 2021) <https://stories.uq.edu.au/policy-futures/2021/the-case-for-effective-mandated-substance-abuse-treatment-for-young-people/index.html>.

91. Tulich and Murray (n 89).

92. Garlett (n 87) 196–8 [57]–[65] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ); 207 [107] (Gageler J).

93. For discussion of this issue, see, eg, ibid 250–1 [273]–[277] (Edelman J); Tulich and Murray (n 89).

94. Garlett (n 87) 217–8 [153]–[160], 221–32 (Gordon J).

95. Ibid 207 [107] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ), 252 [281] (Edelman J), 260–1 [314] (Gleeson J).

96. Alicia Bridges, ‘High Court Decision on WA Law that Allows Indefinite Detention for ‘Serious Offenders’ Shocks Human Rights Lawyers’, ABC News (online, 7 Sep 2022) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-09-07/high-court-denies-challenge-to-serious-offenders-act/101416110>.

97. Garlett (n 87) 252–3 [282] (Edelman J).

98. Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 93 [175] (Gummow J) (suggesting that references to dialogue are ‘apt to mislead’), 207 [534] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ) (labelling the metaphor an ‘inappropriate description of the relations between the Parliament and the courts’).

99. See, eg, Dixon, Rosalind, ‘Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited’ (2007) 5(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 391CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘Creating Dialogue’); Roach, Kent, ‘Dialogic Remedies’ (2019) 17(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 86010.1093/icon/moz056CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Friedman, Barry, ‘Dialogue and Judicial Review’ (1993) 91(4) Michigan Law Review 557CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Po Jen Yap, ‘Defending Dialogue’ [2012] Public Law 527; Po Jen Yap, ‘Dialogue and Subconstitutional Doctrines in Common Law Asia’ [2013] Public Law 779.

100. For an illuminating exploration of the principle in Australia, see Meagher, Dan, ‘The Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation and the Principle of Legality: An Issue of Coherence?’ (2018) 46(3) Federal Law Review 397CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chen, Bruce, ‘The Principle of Legality: Issues of Rationale and Application’ (2015) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 329.Google Scholar

101. Momcilovic (n 99).

102. Ibid. For an earlier discussion of where this line lies, see Spigelman, JJ, ‘The Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 79(12) Australian Law Journal 769.Google Scholar

103. Lim, ‘Normativity’ (n 3).

104. Ibid 386–8.

105. (1908) 7 CLR 277.

106. (1990) 171 CLR 1.

107. (2001) 204 CLR 290.

108. Lim (n 3) 389–94. For a powerful defence of this understanding, see French, Robert, ‘The Principle of Legality and Legislative Intention’ (2019) 40(1) Public Law Journal 40.Google Scholar

109. (1994) 179 CLR 427.

110. For the suggestion that the Court adopts a varied approach in practice, see, eg, Cardell-Oliver, Francis, ‘Parliament, the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights: The Strength of the Principle of Legality’ (2017) 41(1) Melbourne University Law Review 30.Google Scholar

111. See, eg, Meagher, Dan, ‘The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems’ (2014) 36(3) Sydney Law Review 413.Google Scholar

112. Ibid.

113. See Crawford, Lisa Burton, ‘An Institutional Justification for the Principle of Legality Lending Exceptions’ (2022) 45(2) Melbourne University Law Review 511Google Scholar (‘Institutional Justification’).

114. See Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘The Institutional Justification for the Principle of Legality, Revisited’ (2024) Melbourne University Law Review (forthcoming).

115. Lim (n 3) 409–12. For a useful exploration of this same issue, albeit one that ultimately argues against the application of the principle to statutory rights, see Chen, Bruce, ‘The Principle of Legality: Protecting Statutory Rights from Statutory Infringement?’ (2019) 41(1) Sydney Law Review 73.Google Scholar

116. For a helpful exploration of this intersection, see Meagher, Dan, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights’ (2013) 38(4) Alternative Law Journal 20910.1177/1037969X1303800402CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also, Coecke, Alison, ‘The Principle of Legality as Protection for Human Rights’ (2014) 39(4) Alternative Law Journal 249Google Scholar; Murphy (n 6).

117. Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 581–94 [33]–[73] (McHugh J). For the recent reconsideration of reversal of the Al Kateb decision, see Transcript of Proceedings, NZYQ v Minister of Immigration Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs & Anor [2023] HCATrans, 154.

118. See Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Free & Equal’ (n 2) 107–8.

119. This is one answer to the argument that democracy-enhancing accounts of the principle are not sufficiently context-sensitive: see Burton Crawford, ‘Institutional Justification’ (n 114) 519–20.

120. Lim (n 3) 403.

121. Ibid. Cf also Loughland, ‘Taking Process-based Theory Seriously’ (n 8) (making a similar argument drawing even more explicitly on Elyian ideas about the democratic argument for the judicial protection of ‘discrete and insular’ minorities, but in the context of construing capital C constitutional guarantees).

122. Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Free & Equal’ (n 2) 22.

123. On the importance of this kind of consideration of ‘fit’, see Murphy (n 6) 26.

124. Burton Crawford, ‘Institutional Justification’ (n 114) 513.

125. Ibid 522.

126. For the idea that the principle should focus on ‘structural principles and systemic values’, see Murphy (n 6) 27. On the scope and content of Australian constitutional values in this context, see, eg, Dixon, Rosalind, Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018).10.5040/9781509918430CrossRefGoogle Scholar On dignity, see also Stephenson (85); Barnes (n 85).

127. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

128. See Dixon, Rosalind, ‘The Functional Constitution: Re-reading the 2014 High Court Constitutional Term’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 45510.22145/flr.43.3.5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dixon, Australian Constitutional Values (n 127). Cf Dixon, ‘RJR in Europe’ (n 28).

129. Murphy (n 6).

130. Coco (n 78).

131. Burton Crawford, ‘Institutional Justification’ (n 114) 521–2.

132. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (Lord Steyn).

133. Lim, ‘Normativity’ (n 3) 392–3, citing Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [30] (Gleeson CJ); Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [19] (Gleeson CJ); K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501, 520 [47] (French CJ); Attorney-General (South Australia) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 66 [148] (Heydon J); Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196, 310 [313] (Gageler and Keane JJ).

134. Waldron, ‘Core of the Case’ (n 14). But for criticism, see Dixon, Rosalind and Stone, Adrienne, ‘The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective’ in Dixon, Rosalind and Stone, Adrienne (eds), The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 310.1017/9781108277914.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roux, Theunis, ‘In Defence of Empirical Entanglement: The Methodological Flaw in Waldron’s Case against Judicial Review’ in Levy, Ron et al (eds), Defensive Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 203Google Scholar; Issacharoff, Samuel, ‘Judicial Review in Troubled Times: Stabilizing Democracy as a Second-Best World’ (2019) 98(1) North Carolina Law Review 1.Google Scholar

135. See Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review (n 5).

136. I am indebted to Brendan Lim for pressing me on this point. He and Gabrielle Appleby make a similar point about a functionalist approach to constitutional construction: see, eg, Lim, Brendan, ‘The Convergence of Form and Function: Commentary on Dixon’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 50510.22145/flr.43.3.7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Appleby, Gabrielle, ‘Functionalism in Constitutional Interpretation: Factual and Participatory Challenges’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 49310.22145/flr.43.3.6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dixon, Rosalind, ‘Response to Commentators’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 517.10.22145/flr.43.3.9CrossRefGoogle Scholar

137. See ibid. Gageler, Stephen, ‘Judicial Legitimacy’ (2023) 97(1) Australian Law Journal 28Google Scholar; Dixon and Loughland (n 8); Loughland, ‘Taking Process-based Theory Seriously’ (n 8).