Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T19:48:31.988Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Constitutional (In)Validity of Religious Vilification Laws: Implications for their Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Nicholas Aroney*
Affiliation:
Centre for Public, International and Comparative Law, and School of Law, The University of Queensland

Extract

In this article, I address the question whether religious vilification laws are contrary to the implied freedom of political communication affirmed in the High Court's decision in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation. I will focus on three key issues. First, can the implied freedom extend, in principle, to religious speech, meaning speech that is motivated by religious belief as well as speech that simply deals with religion or religious topics? Secondly, do religious vilification laws place a relevant burden upon communication about political or governmental matters? Thirdly, are religious vilification laws reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate objective in a manner which is compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government? The latter two questions derive directly from the test formulated by the High Court in Lange for determining whether a law is contrary to the implied freedom of political communication.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 The Australian National University

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable