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The Separation of Powers and Legislative Interference with Judicial Functions in Pending Cases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Peter Gerangelos*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of Sydney

Extract

This article shall examine a discrete, though somewhat overlooked, aspect of the relationship between the Commonwealth Parliament and the federal, or ‘Chapter III’, courts which emerges in the scenario where Parliament purports to amend the law that the courts are required to apply in pending cases. This is of particular significance where the Commonwealth is a party to the proceedings, given the obvious advantage to the Commonwealth, as litigant, provided by its power to legislate, and potentially to do so strategically to effect a desirable outcome. This raises the spectre of a significant separation of powers issue. This article will explore the extent to which this principle entrenched as law in the Australian Constitution has been able to limit Parliament's power to protect the independence of the federal courts to interpret and apply the law in an individual adjudication; that is, to protect their ‘decisional independence.’ Its success or otherwise is one measure of the extent to which the separation of powers, as a legal rule, is capable of protecting the independent adjudication of legal disputes by the courts from the vicissitudes of political power and influence.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 The Australian National University

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