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The State of Constitutional Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Leslie Zines
Leslie Zines*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, Australian National University
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Extract

The emphasis given in the Engineers’ case to the express terms of the Constitution, the application ofthe “golden rule” of construction and the exclusion of broad implications (stigmatised as political) had the effect of enhancing national power. This effect was reinforced by the application of the principle referred to by O'Connor J in a now much quoted passage in Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association:

… it must always be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution broad and general in its terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the development of our community must involve.

For that reason, where the question is whether the Constitution has used an expression in the wider or in the narrower sense, the Court should, in my opinion, always lean to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the context or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best carry out its object and purpose.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , June 1984, pp. 277 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © 1984 The Australian National University

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References

1 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.

2 (1908) 6 CLR 309, 367-368.

3 (1983) 47 ALR 225.

4 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625.

5 Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495; ibid 813 per Deane J.

6 This principle received clear affirmation in The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Commonwealth (1966) 115 CLR 418;Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR l; and Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 40 ALR 609 (hereafter referred to as Actors Equity v Fontana Films).

7 Ibid. Statements by Barwick CJ in Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 372-373 (the Payroll Tax case) that seem contrary to this principle have been expressly rejected by Stephen, Mason and Brennan JJ, and impliedly rejected by other judges. In any case, as Stephen J points out in Actors Equity v Fontana Films (1982) 40 ALR 609, 625, the approach of Barwick CJ in that case was probably intended to be confined to issues of intergovernmental immunity.

8 (1983) 46 ALR 625, 814.

9 (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142.

10 (1945) 71 CLR 29, 81 - cited, for example, in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 39 ALR 417, 462per Mason J.

11 Supra n 2.

12 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625, 773.

13 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 396.

14 (1982) 40 ALR 609, 637.

15 (1982) 39 ALR 417.

16 Ibid 463 per Mason J.

17 Ibid.

18 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625, 802.

19 Ibid 805.

20 (1982) 39 ALR 417, 484.

21 Supra n 13.

22 (1983) 46 ALR 625, 773.

23 These views are expressed in such cases as Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 39 ALR 417, 433 per Gibbs CJ; 460 per Mason J; 472 per Murphy J; in R v Coldham; ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union (1983) 47 ALR 225, 236 in the judgment of the majority; and in the Franklin Dam case (1983) 46 ALR 625.

24 (1982) 40 ALR 609.

25 (1982) 39 ALR 417.

26 (1983) 46 ALR 625.

27 (1981) 38 ALR 25 (hereafter referred to as Gazzo).

28 Ibid 35.

29 Ibid 33.

30 Ibid.

31 (1904) I CLR 91.

32 These and other criticisms of Gazzo appear in an unpublished paper delivered by Mr Dennis Rose at a departmental seminar.

33 (1981) 38 ALR 25, 34.

34 It may be that the scope of the decision is more limited if one has regard to another aspect of the reasoning, namely, an emphasis on the fact that the Family Law Act 1975(Cth), and the order made under it, proceeded on the basis that the transfer of propertyshould proceed under State law. It was said by Aickin J that the Commonwealth had to takethe States' systems of land registration as they stood: ( 1981) 38 ALR 25, 66. And paymentof the duty under that system was a precondition of registration: see also ( 1981) 35 ALR25, 33 per Gibbs CJ. If that is a major reason for the judgments, then, while it still involvesa notion of reserved State power, the Commonwealth could possibly provide that the Courtorder should itself operate as a transfer of either legal or equitable interests. In that case there would be no question of using State facilities. However this would, of course, createpractical problems.

35 (1982) 40 ALR 609.

36 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 409-410.

37 (1982) 40 ALR 609, 616. Wilson J agreed.

38 (1983) 46 ALR 625, 852.

39 (1982) 40 ALR 609, 637.

40 RD Lumb, “Problems of Characterization of Federal Powers in the High Court” (1982) AT45.

41 Peterswald v Bartley (1904) I CLR 497; R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 69 per Griffith CJ.

42 (1965) 113 CLR 54, 115 (the Air Lines Case (No 2)).

43 Sawer, G, Modern Federalism (1976) 106.Google Scholar

44 Livingstone, W S, Federalism and Constitutional Change (1956) Ch 1.Google Scholar

45 (1983) 46 ALR 625, 669; also 752 per Wilson J; 842-843 per Dawson J.

46 lbid 694-695.

47 Ibid 767.

48 (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82 (the State Banking case).

49 (1983) 46 ALR 625, 703, citing with approval Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 39 ALR 417, 452 per Stephen J.

50 Ibid 752.

51 (1982) 39 ALR 417, 461.

52 lbid 472.

53 lbid 463.

54 Supra n 40.

55 R v Sutton (1980) 5 CLR 789, 797, 803.

56 Engineers' case (1920) 28 CLR I, 155.

57 R v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608,645; New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 373 per Barwick CJ (the Seas and Submerged Lands case).

58 Seas and Submerged Lands case ibid.

59 Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132, 142-143 per Dixon J.

60 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338 (the Australian Assistance Plan case).

61 R v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608,645; Seas and Submerged Lands case (1975) 135 CLR 337, 373 per Barwick CJ; cf the Franklin Dam case (1983) 46 ALR 625, 858 per Dawson J.

62 Payroll Tax case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 398 per Windeyer J; Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132, 142-143 per Dixon CJ; Engineers' case (1920) 28 CLR I, 155.

63 Supra n 2.

64 (1983) 46 ALR 625, 773.

65 Lumb, RD, “Problems of Characterization of Federal Powers in the High Court” (1982) AT 45, 48.Google Scholar

66 Gazzo v Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) (1981) 38 ALR 25; see also His Honour's remarks in Actors Equity v Fontana Films (1982) 40 ALR 609, esp 615-621.

67 (1971) 124 CLR 468.

68 Zines, L, The High Court and the Constitution (1981) 17.Google Scholar

69 (1935) 54 CLR 262.

70 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR I.

71 (1957) 99 CLR 575 (the Second Uniform Tax case).

72 Ibid 615.

73 (1982) 40 ALR 609.

74 Ibid 639.

75 The paper by Mr Dennis Rose (supra n 32) represents one such trenchant criticism.

76 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625, 841.

77 Ibid 692-693.

78 Comparison may be made here withs 132 of the British North America Act 1867 (UK).

79 (1983) 57 ALJR 731.

80 (1983) 57 ALJR 317.

81 (1983) 57 ALJR 731,746 (italics added).