Until 1967, Indigenous Australians were excluded from being counted as amongst ‘the people’ in the Australian Constitution, by s 127. That section was deleted by referendum. However, s 25 remains in the Constitution, and allows for the reintroduction of such exclusion. This article is a detailed reconsideration of both sections in light of an understanding of ‘the people’ as a reference to the constitutional community represented by the Parliament. Exclusion of Indigenous Australians prior to 1967 is considered, highlighting the way in which s 127 operated. Then, the position post-1967 is addressed to show that the deletion of s 127 did not result in equality because s 25 continues to provide for racial exclusion. This article argues that this ongoing possibility of exclusion by s 25 affects the nature of the Australian constitutional community, by indicating that it can be racially discriminatory.

The Kable doctrine is, and has always been, a difficult legal principle to define. For over a decade, and despite much academic attention, it had little consequence for state power. Until recently, the High Court deftly avoided its application by employing a number of techniques. As the politics of law and order in the states have increased, state Parliaments have felt emboldened by these cases to test the outer limits of their legislative power. In such an environment, federal anti-terrorism measures, introduced as extraordinary responses necessary for the exceptional nature of terrorism, have crept into general state policing and expanded. It is in this arena that the Kable doctrine has emerged once again. The principle is now vital to understanding the very real limits of state power, particularly in the law and order arena. This article traces the Court's approach to the principle in three recent cases involving the states' anti-organised crime measures (International Finance Trust Co v New South Wales Crime Commission, South Australia v Totani, and Wainohu v New South Wales) before offering some conclusions about where the current jurisprudence leaves the states and their perpetual campaign to achieve law and order.

The enactment of uniform companies legislation in 1961-2 was a significant achievement for a country in which, a century earlier, multiple incorporations of the one body was the norm and a court of one colony questioned the existence of corporate personality created by the law of another. After Federation, business interests increasingly sought uniform State laws. They opposed centralised regulation which, in any event, was beset by constitutional difficulties. Commonwealth legislation eventually became the preferred model as shortcomings of uniform and co-operative mechanisms were progressively exposed. Yet fully harmonised corporations legislation still does not exist. In this paper presented to the 2011 Hartnell Colloquium at the Centre for Commercial Law, Australian National University to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Uniform Companies Acts, the author sketches the development of Australian companies legislation over the last 150 years.

‘State courts’ can be understood in at least two ways. Their ‘attributes’ are the characteristics that define them as ‘courts’. Their ‘attribution’ is the extent to which they are regarded as emanations of a ‘state’ in its constitutional conception as a constituent unit of the federation. The principle first articulated in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 ensures the institutional integrity of state courts by protecting from legislative impairment their defining characteristics as ‘courts’. It therefore understands state courts almost exclusively by their ‘attributes’. This article examines the significance to the Kable principle of also understanding state courts by their ‘attribution‘. There are different conceptions of the proper attribution of state courts, coincident with different visions of how to accommodate simultaneous constitutional commitments to autonomous states and integrated courts. Those conceptions influence the content and application of the Kable principle in ways that are insufficiently appreciated. This insight permits a new perspective on the Kable principle as a doctrine of federalism, and its recent applications in International Finance Trust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1; and Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181. It also prompts an analysis of a contemporaneous evolution in the constitutional policy of the Commonwealth, whose Attorney-General typically intervened in Kable cases in support of the states, until recently seeking to extend to them certain Chapter III limitations.

The High Court has long struggled with the constitutional status of military tribunals established to hear disciplinary charges against service personnel. The Court's judgments reveal three distinct theories on this issue. The first view holds that military tribunals exercise judicial power, but not ‘the judicial power of the Commonwealth’ within the meaning of s 71 of the Constitution. The second view holds that the power in question is not judicial power at all for constitutional purposes. The third view holds that the power is ‘the judicial power of the Commonwealth’, but can be exercised by courts martial under a limited exception to the rules set out in Chapter III of the Constitution. The first view dominated the High Court's reasoning until Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230, where the judges endorsed the second view. This article contends that the first and second views pose insuperable difficulties when placed in their broader constitutional context. The authors therefore argue for the third interpretation. They further argue that the constitutional basis for the third view strongly implies that military tribunals may only exercise jurisdiction over offences by military personnel that relate to service discipline.

Judicial reasons often include general statements about the nature and behaviour of people and institutions and the nature of the world and society. These statements might be called social facts (‘SF’) and are made as part of judicial development and general application of law. The presence of SF statements in judicial reasoning in Australian cases has been acknowledged by commentators and judges. However, there has been little empirical examination of this phenomenon. This article discusses a content analysis study of SF in negligence cases in the Australian High Court. This study confirms that judges do refer to SF in their judicial reasoning and that SF play a range of roles in judicial reasoning. This includes predicting social, economic and behavioural consequences of legal rules, as part of setting a context or background to judicial reasons, and as a tool to evaluate adjudicative facts. SF do not generally dominate judicial reasoning. However, they appear to have a significant role to play in certain complex and more important cases. While there were overall commonalities in the way judges used SF, some individual differences between judges emerged. Judges do not use SF in all cases in the same way. Judges referred to SF more in high significance cases, and cases with multiple separate judgments. Judges also referred to SF more in single and dissenting judgments than in joint and majority judgments. Most SF referred to by judges were not sourced or referenced in any way and reference to empirical research was very rare. Where a source or reference for a SF was given by a judge it was usually to a legal source. Most SF appeared to source from judicial ‘common sense’ with the potential dangers this brings to the accuracy and legitimacy of judicial reasoning.

The use of public procurement as a vehicle for achieving public policy objectives can conveniently be traced to the Fair Wages Resolution which was adopted by the British House of Commons in 1891. This technique was subsequently adopted in many jurisdictions, and finds clear expression in the International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’)'s Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention 1949 (No 94) (‘Convention No 94’). This article describes the British model and its international progeny, and then examines a controversial and unusual Australian mutation in the form of the National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry (‘Code’) and the various iterations of the associated Implementation Guidelines (‘Guidelines’) which have been adopted since 1998. It suggests that the Code and Guidelines, especially under the Howard Government, constitute a perversion of the traditional use of public procurement as a vehicle for the implementation of public policy in the industrial context. That is because they were directed to the curtailment of the rights of workers and their organisations rather than protecting employment standards and promoting collective bargaining. The article argues that the Code and Guidelines sit uneasily with accepted notions of the rule of law in a number of respects, and with certain aspects of Australia's obligations in international law. It also discusses the Fair Work Principles (‘FW Principles’) which have applied to all aspects of procurement by the Commonwealth since January 2010, and suggests that they embody an approach to public procurement and the promotion of social objectives which is rather more in keeping with international best practice than that reflected in the Construction Industry Code and Guidelines.

Political controversies in New South Wales and Canada recently have focused public attention on the constitutional practice of proroguing parliament. They have also shone a light on two lingering areas of uncertainty that surround its operation under the Commonwealth Constitution. This article seeks to clarify these two muddy areas of the law concerning prorogation. The first is the effect of prorogation on the Senate and its committees. Since Federation, the Senate has purported to authorise its committees to continue to function notwithstanding a prorogation of the Parliament. However, it is argued that this practice is unsupported by the provisions of the Constitution and the Senate has no such power. Second, the article examines the operation of the conventions that constrain the Governor-General's power to prorogue. Prorogation generally is exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, this article contends that where a Prime Minister seeks to prorogue Parliament to avoid a vote of no confidence, the Governor-General will have a discretion to reject the advice. It may also be open to the Governor-General to reject an advice to prorogue where the purpose is to avoid scrutiny of a fundamental constitutional illegality. In Australia, the uncertainties that surround prorogation, coupled with the now precarious political landscape in Canberra, create the very real possibility of a prorogation crisis at the Commonwealth level. This article provides a response to these uncertainties. In doing so it offers a solution to how a prorogation crisis can be resolved, whilst maintaining the fine balance of power in our constitutional system.

Several recent cases have seen the courts approving ASIC's employment of a ‘stepping stone’ approach that applies directors‘ statutory duty of care as well as their other statutory duties in a novel context. The first ‘stepping stone‘ involves an action against a company for contravention of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The establishment of corporate fault may then step stone to a finding that by exposing their company to the risk of criminal prosecution, civil liability or significant reputational damage, directors contravened one or more of their statutory duties in ss 180-2 of the Corporations Act, particularly their statutory duty of care, with the attendant civil penalty consequences. The effect of the ‘stepping stone’ approach is that directors may face a type of derivative civil liability for corporate fault. In this paper we analyse the stepping stone approach and assess the justification for imposing civil liability on directors for their company's misbehaviour. This paper also examines whether an extension of the stepping stone approach could make directors liable for their company's contraventions of non-Corporations Act laws as well as open the floodgates to make directors personally liable to shareholders, creditors, employees, or others affected by corporate fault.

Under section 128 of the Australian Constitution federal parliamentarians have the power to initiate constitutional amendments. This paper examines the justifications of politicians and public figures for proposing a referendum to introduce an Australian republic. From interviews conducted between 2008 and 2011, three important justifications for proposing change emerged: promoting a new national identity; success in passing a referendum and in re-election; and timeliness. An examination of these justifications raised additional questions, including: what reasons did politicians and public figures think were significant? How did their justifications form and develop? What were the reasons that inspired political action? The reasons for initiation of a referendum for a republic, and recognition of indigenous people in the Australian Constitution are also compared. The paper adds to the literature on formal constitutional change, and also offers a critique of the field.

Capital exporting countries have attempted to protect the overseas investments of their multinational corporations (MNC) against host nation governments expropriating these investments, limiting the right to repatriate profits, or subjecting the withdrawal of their investments to heavy penalties. The aborted Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) of the mid-1990s was an attempt at transferring these concerns to a settled legal framework between nations. Some limited expression of this is found in the provisions of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding, while more substantive assertions are found in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions of bilateral trade and investment agreements entered into between developed and developing economies. However, recent legal challenges and associated public relations campaigns by MNC directed at Public Law and Health measures have caused governments to reassess the situation. A classic example of this has been the challenge by tobacco companies against the plain cigarette packaging legislation introduced by the Canadian and Australian governments. The Australian Government's response to this through its statement of position in respect of future bilateral agreements and its Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) is equally path breaking. This article examines the dramatic turnaround in perspective of States in respect of Investor-State arbitration, and its impact on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) currently being negotiated.

Recent years have seen an increase in the number and scope of non-publication orders and other limits on open justice, an increase in the number of statutes that regulate or threaten open justice and the articulation of an Australian constitutional principle (of institutional integrity) that has the potential to protect some aspects of open justice. The purposes and values of open justice are, however, rarely examined in a comprehensive or theoretically-informed manner. This article provides a theory of open justice which accounts for its heterogeneous nature. Australian judicial approaches to the substance, limits and constitutional dimensions of open justice are analysed in light of the purposes and values of open justice, and a comparison with the much more coherent Canadian approach is supplied. The author concludes that threats to open justice are best managed by an analytical framework which systematically identifies both the benefits of open justice and the countervailing values that are at stake in a given case, and which seeks to provide maximum protection to all of these values on a case-by-case basis.

Although lacking an express mandate, since Federation courts have declared legislation ultra vires if they find it contrary to the Australian Constitution. This article undertakes an historical examination in four parts, to determine whether this judicial review of legislation is legitimate.

First, objections to the institution are identified. Second, the justifications for judicial review of legislation developed in the United States, and expressed in the seminal 1803 decision of Marbury v Madison, are examined. Having identified the twin justifications as the supremacy of the Constitution and the primacy of the judiciary in its interpretation, the third section analyses Australian Federation records to see if these justifications are supported, and whether they rebut the objections raised. Finally, the persistence of these justifications after Federation is demonstrated.

It is concluded that evidence of the supremacy of the Constitution, and the primacy of the judiciary in its interpretation, is sufficient to justify judicial review of legislation under the Australian Constitution.

The Expert Panel on the Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians has recommended the repeal of the ‘race power’ in the Constitution and its replacement with a power to make laws with respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This article analyses that recommendation, the assumptions that underlie it and the way the new provision might be interpreted by the High Court. In doing so, it uses archival material to shed new light on the 1967 referendum and whether it was intended only to permit ‘beneficial’ laws. The article concludes that there is a disjunction between the intention of the Expert Panel and the likely effect of its proposed amendment.

This article provides an analysis of people smuggling prosecutions in Australia from 2008 to 2011. Based on the available case law, the article develops a profile of ‘typical’ people smuggling offenders, examines sentencing trends, and analyses the role of smuggled migrants. The article concludes that current prosecutorial and sentencing practice have had no success in deterring people smuggling and develops a number of recommendations for law reform and policy change.

Members of the executive in Australia and other Westminster nations are traditionally appointed only from the ranks of parliamentarians, ostensibly to protect the principle of responsible government. However, there is a growing international trend in nations such as the United Kingdom for the appointment of ministers from outside of Parliament. This article examines the extent to which Australia's constitutional system can accommodate unelected members of a Commonwealth, State or Territory executive. This question is analysed from the perspective of the principle of responsible government and the text of Australia's various constitutional documents. The article also reviews existing practice in comparative jurisdictions and Australian law and practice in order to determine the form that such appointments might take.