United States-Russia Military to Military Relations

On July 6, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Makarov the Chief of Defense for the Russian Federation signed a new strategic framework for military-to-military engagement between the United States and the Russian Federation. This agreement will enable the resumption of bilateral activities, which have been suspended since August of 2008. This new framework will set conditions that raise military cooperation to a new level and deepen mutual understanding between our respective armed forces.

The Armed Forces of the United States and Russian Federation have agreed in their work plan for 2009 to conduct nearly 20 exchanges and operational events before the end of the year, including a strategic discussion between the U.S. Joint Staff and the Russian General Staff, orientation for Russian military cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, planning for a joint exercise to respond to a hijacked aircraft in national and international airspace, visit of the faculty of the Russian Combined Arms Academy to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, and a naval war game conducted by the Kuznetsov Naval Academy and the U.S. Naval War College. In addition, the U.S. European Command and the Russian Ministry of Defense have agreed to meet to plan a robust and more ambitious work plan for 2010.

As global powers, the United States and Russia have a special responsibility for ensuring peace and stability in the world. Reestablishing our military-to-military bonds will enhance transparency, establish clear paths of communication, and focus our collective efforts on today's global strategic challenges.

President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev delivered these remarks in Moscow, Russia

President Medvedev. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen of the press, colleagues, we have just completed our negotiations with the U.S. President. The first visit of U.S. President Barack Obama in Russia was a very busy one.

We have discussed quite specific problems, and I would like to share some of them with you. We, of course, discussed international subjects. We spoke about such difficult problems as the process of Middle East settlement. We agreed to continue our work, taking into account the visits we had in the Middle East recently, and the plans that we discussed. We discussed the possibility of holding Moscow conference on the Middle East.

We spoke about a very important subject that is extremely—requires the coordination of our activities. This is the problem of Afghanistan. Without our joint work in that area, we would not be able to achieve success in that area, and on that score we have agreed on a special statement.

Our relations will be also consolidated by our links in the humanitarian field, in the field of science. This has to be done by all means, and we'll be dealing with this after this meeting in a very persistent way.

Now, a few specific results of our negotiations. You are aware of them. We have agreed on a very important subject, the new agreement of strategic offensive arms. So this is a basic element of our mutual security. The work was very intensive and I must admit that our teams, our delegations, worked on this subject in a very fruitful way. They have showed reasonable compromise, and I would like to thank everyone who took part in these negotiations or is going to take part in them.

A result of this is that we have reached not only mutual understanding of what— how we should move forward, but also to the basic levels on which we will advance our cooperation in those fields. We agreed on the levels of carriers and warheads, meaning that this is a very concrete subject.

In the mutual understanding, as we have just signed with the President of the United States, it is said that our two countries can have from 500 to 1,100 carriers of strategic arms, and from 1,500 to 1,675 warheads. These are the new parameters within which our dialogue will be going on and where we hope to achieve final agreement that will be part of the new treaty.

We have agreed also that the offensive and defensive systems of both countries should be considered together. We have adopted a joint statement on ABM. And this is also an important result of our work, even taking into account that we have divergences on a number of items. Nevertheless, we managed to sign—to approve a joint document.

We have discussed measures of cooperation in the nuclear field and the most important is that we will continue our cooperation in every area, and a lot depends on our countries. We have signed an agreement on military transit to Afghanistan. We decided to create a presidential commission on cooperation, which will be coordinating relations among various agencies of the United States and the Russian Federation, respectively, in all priority areas, including economic and military areas.

In the military area, these questions will be dealt by the chiefs of staffs that have just signed the document, General Makarov and Mullen.

Soon all these documents will be published and you will be able to familiarize yourself with them. On the whole, by characterizing our first day of work and the results of negotiations that we have had, I would like to say that I view them as a first but very important step in the process of improving full-scale cooperation between our two countries, which should go to the benefit of both states. And if both states benefit by it, that means everybody will benefit by it.

I would like to emphasize in conclusion that our country would like to reach such a level of cooperation with the United States which would be realistically worthy of the 21st century, which will ensure international peace and security. This is in our interest, and we are grateful to our American colleagues for the joint work we have done.

It is true that the solution of many world problems depends on the joint will of the United States and Russia. Thank you.

President Obama. Good afternoon, everybody, and I want to thank President Medvedev and the Russian people for their hospitality. Michelle and I and our children are pleased to be here in Moscow, and to be here so early in my administration.

We've just concluded a very productive meeting. As President Medvedev just indicated, the President and I agreed that the relationship between Russia and the United States has suffered from a sense of drift. We resolved to reset U.S.-Russian relations, so that we can cooperate more effectively in areas of common interest. Today, after less than six months of collaboration, we've done exactly that by taking concrete steps forward on a range of issues, while paving the way for more progress in the future. And I think it's particularly notable that we've addressed the top priorities—these are not second-tier issues, they are fundamental to the security and the prosperity of both countries.

First, we've taken important steps forward to increase nuclear security and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

This starts with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. As the world's two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia must lead by example, and that's what we're doing here today. We have signed a Joint Understanding for a follow-on treaty to the START agreement that will reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery systems by up to a third from our current treaty limitations. This legally binding treaty will be completed this year.

We've also agreed on a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation that will help us achieve the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years—progress that we can build upon later this week at the G8 summit. Together, these are important steps forward in implementing the agenda that I laid out in Prague.

As we keep our commitments, so we must ensure that other nations keep theirs. To that end, we had constructive discussions about North Korea and Iran. North Korea has abandoned its own commitments and violated international law. And that's why I'm pleased that Russia joined us in passing a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for strong steps to block North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program.

Iran also poses a serious challenge through its failure to live up to international obligations. This is not just a problem for the United States. It raises the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which would endanger global security, while Iran's ballistic missile program could also pose a threat to the broader region. That's why I'm pleased that we've agreed on a joint statement on cooperation on missile defense, and a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those posed by Iran and North Korea.

Second, we have taken important steps forward to strengthen our security through greater cooperation.

President Medvedev and I agreed upon the need to combat the threat of violent extremism, particularly from al Qaeda. And today, we've signed an agreement that will allow the transit of lethal military equipment through Russia to Afghanistan. This is a substantial contribution by Russia to our international effort, and it will save the United States time and resources in giving our troops the support that they need.

Thanks to Admiral Mullen and his Russian counterpart, we've also agreed to resume military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Russia. This provides a framework for improved cooperation and interoperability between our armed forces, so that we can better address the threats that we face—from terrorism to privacy. We've also agreed to restore a Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, which will allow our governments to cooperate in our unwavering commitment to our missing servicemen and women.

And third, we've taken important steps forward to broaden our cooperation on a full range of issues that affect the security and prosperity of our people.

President Medvedev and I are creating a U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission to serve as a new foundation for this cooperation. Too often, the United States and Russia only communicate on a narrow range of issues, or let old habits within our bureaucracy stand in the way of progress. And that's why this commission will include working groups on development and the economy; energy and the environment; nuclear energy and security; arms control and international security; defense, foreign policy and counterterrorism; preventing and handling emergencies; civil society; science and technology; space; health; education; and culture. And this work will be coordinated by Secretary Clinton and Minister Lavrov, and Secretary Clinton will travel to Russia this fall to carry this effort forward.

Just to give you one example of this cooperation, is the new Memorandum of Understanding on health. We've learned— most recently with the H1N1 virus—that a disease that emerges anywhere can pose a risk to people everywhere. That's why our Department of Health and Human Services will cooperate with its Russian counterparts to combat infectious, chronic, and non-communicable diseases, while promoting prevention and global health.

Finally, I'm pleased that Russia has taken the important step of lifting some restrictions on imports of U.S. livestock. The cost of these restrictions to American business is over $1.3 billion, and we've now made important progress towards restoring that commerce.

I won't pretend that the United States and Russia agree on every issue. As President Medvedev indicated, we've had some frank discussions, and there are areas where we still disagree. For instance, we had a frank discussion on Russia—on Georgia, and I reiterated my firm belief that Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. Yet even as we work through our disagreements on Georgia's borders, we do agree that no one has an interest in renewed military conflict. And going forward, we must speak candidly to resolve these differences peacefully and constructively.

President Medvedev and I are committed to leaving behind the suspicion and the rivalry of the past so that we can advance the interests that we hold in common. Today, we've made meaningful progress in demonstrating through deeds and words what a more constructive U.S.-Russian relationship can look like in the 21st century. Tomorrow, I look forward to broadening this effort to include business, civil society, and a dialogue among the American and Russian people.

I believe that all of us have an interest in forging a future in which the United States and Russia partner effectively on behalf of our security and prosperity. That's the purpose of resetting our relations, that is the progress we made today, and I once again want to thank President Medvedev and his entire team for being such wonderful hosts and working so effectively with our teams. Thank you.

Q. Thank you, and good evening to both Presidents. President Obama, I'd like to ask you about the issue of trust, after this period of rocky relations between the countries, but also with the agreements that you've just laid out today. Having spent time with President Medvedev, do you feel like you have full trust in him, and have you settled in your mind who is really in charge here in Russia—the President or Prime Minister Putin?

And President Medvedev, I'd like to ask you, polling shows that the American people have some hard feelings about—I'm sorry—that the Russian people have some hard feelings about America. I'm wondering what you think President Obama can do to try to change this?

President Obama. Well, first of all, this is now my second lengthy bilateral meeting with President Medvedev, and we've also had a series of telephone calls and other exchanges. And throughout our interactions, I've found him to be straightforward, professional. He is clear about the interests of the Russian people, but he's also interested in finding out what the interests of the United States are. And we have found I think an ability to work together extremely effectively.

So, yes, I trust President Medvedev to not only listen and to negotiate constructively, but also to follow up—follow through on the agreements that are contained here today. And, again, I'm very appreciative not only of the manner in which he's dealt with me, but also the manner in which our teams have worked together. If you think about the short time frame from our meeting in London to today and the fact that we have essentially accomplished all the goals that we had set in London—and these are not insubstantial achievements—I think it's a good sign for progress in the future.

Tomorrow I'll be having breakfast with Prime Minister Putin. I have not met him before. I'm looking forward to that meeting. My understanding is, is that President Medvedev is the President, Prime Minister Putin is the Prime Minister, and they allocate power in accordance with Russia's form of government in the same way that we allocate power in the United States.

And so my interest is in dealing directly with my counterpart, the President, but also to reach out to Prime Minister Putin and all other influential sectors in Russian society so that I can get a full picture of the needs of the Russian people and the concerns of the Russian people.

And my strong impression is, is that President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin are working very effectively together. And our interest is dealing with the Russian government as a whole in order to achieve the improved bilateral relationship that I think can be accomplished.

President Medvedev. First of all, I would like to thank President Obama for the kind words he has just said about the spirit and the level of openness we enjoy in our personal relationship. I said something about it already, previously. Personal relationship are very important, especially when you speak about the building of interstate relationship. And when the relationship between the governments and personal relationship are on the same level, positive—that's always good for the relationship between countries.

Speaking of the attitude towards the American people, they are friendly. I don't see any negative elements there. But when there are problems between the states, when there are negative signals being sent by the government, then of course these signals reflect on the mood of the ordinary people, and thus the better relationship between the countries are more—the more empathy people have towards each other in different countries.

We touched upon our different tasks between our meeting and the relationship between our countries, new ups and downs. We, during the World War II, saved the world, and there was strategic partnership between us. And now we also have a feeling that a lot depends on our relationship. And the success in delivering on all those expectations, different ones, a lot depends on our efforts, bearing in mind that our people have always had sympathy towards—empathy towards each other.

Q. Thank you. Deep divisions over a proposed U.S. missile shield have contributed greatly to the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations in recent years, and it does not seem that you gentlemen have finally resolved that issue either. President Obama, you have said very clearly that you would not accept the linkage between the missile systems and arms control talks. President Medvedev, you and Prime Minister Putin have said that these issues must be linked. Are either of you gentlemen willing to budge or compromise on this issue? And if not, could this also contribute to a blockage or obstacle to reaching a final START II agreement?

And also, President Obama, I wonder if you could give us your reaction to the Chinese government crackdown in the northwest of the country on rioting and unrest that has killed more than 140 people.

President Obama. With respect to the China situation, unfortunately I've been travelling all night and in meetings all day, so I have not been fully briefed and I don't want to comment until I actually see all the information. But I assure you that our team will get a statement to you as soon as I've been able to do that.

On missile defense, we have agreed that we are going to continue to discuss this critical issue. That is part of the joint statements that we've signed. I also believe that it is entirely legitimate for our discussions to talk not only about offensive weapon systems but also defensive weapon systems.

Part of what got us through the Cold War was a sufficient sense of parity and deterrent capability; that both sides during those very difficult times understood that a first strike, the attempt to use nuclear weapons in a military conflict against the other, could result in a extremely heavy price. And so any discussion of nuclear strategy, security, has to include defensive as well as offensive capabilities.

The difference that we've had has been on the specifics of a missile defense system that the United States views as a priority not to deal with Russia, but to deal with a missile coming in from Iran or North Korea or some other state, and that it's important for the United States and its allies to have the capacity to prevent such a strike. There is no scenario from our perspective in which this missile defense system would provide any protection against a mighty Russian arsenal.

And so, in that sense, we have not thought that it is appropriate to link discussions of a missile defense system designed to deal with an entirely different threat unrelated to the kinds of robust capabilities that Russia possesses.

Now, having said that, President Medvedev has been very clear that this is a point of deep concern and sensitivity to the Russian government. I suspect when I speak with President—Prime Minister Putin tomorrow, he will say the same thing. And what we would like to do is to work with Russia to advance a system that ensures that a stray missile, whether it was one or 10 or a handful of missiles coming from a third source, that we have the capabilities to prevent those from doing damage. I think we can arrive at those kinds of understandings, but it's going to take some hard work because it requires breaking down longstanding suspicions.

With respect to this particular configuration that was proposed several years ago, as you know, we're undergoing a thorough review of whether it works or not, what has been proposed. That review should be completed by the end of the summer and I indicated to President Medvedev that as soon as that review is complete, we will provide the Russian government our assessment of how we think we should proceed, and that will be the subject of extensive negotiations.

So, ultimately, I think the more progress we make on some of the issues that I discussed earlier—non-proliferation, being able to track ballistic missiles coming from other sources—to the extent that we are building deeper cooperation on those fronts, I think the more effectively we're going to be able to resolve this issue. I believe that over time we will end up seeing that the U.S.-Russian positions on these issues can be reconciled and that in fact we have a mutual interest in protecting both of our populations from the kinds of dangers that weapons proliferations is posing today.

President Medvedev. I'll say a couple of words on this subject. Of course anti-ballistic missile defense—not ballistic missile defense, but the problem of the third region area is a difficult subject for our discussion.

But I would like to draw your attention to what President Obama said, and I would like to point it out myself. In our mutual understanding that has just been signed, we talk about the linkage between offensive and defensive weapons, and this already constitutes a step forward. Some time ago, on this question, we had all— only differences. Now this linkage is being stated and this opens up the opportunity of bringing positions closer to each other.

Secondly, nobody is saying that ballistic missile defense is harmful or is posing a danger. It is aimed at resolving a number of practical tasks. The question is of linking this configuration of missile defense with interests of other countries. I would like to point out specially that our American partners, unlike what was happening in recent years, have taken a pause and now are studying this situation. As a result of this, they will formulate their final position.

As at least, this is also a step forward in reaching possible compromise on this fairly difficult subject. Before we just heard that all decisions have been made, they do not concern you, but they present no threat to you. Our position is somewhat different. You're well familiar with it. I'm not going to say it again. Our understanding is that these decisions do concern us and we will have to come to terms on these positions. We realize fully well that the number of threats, including link to the medium-range and ballistic missiles, is not diminishing but is growing in number. So we all have to think about what configuration on the whole the global anti-ballistic missile defense could have. And this, during our limited composition meeting, I mentioned to my colleague.

Moderator. Distinguished colleagues, last question. Channel Number One.

Q. Good evening. The question is to both Presidents. You spoke about your concerns about Afghanistan. Can you be more specific? What do Presidents think about the situation in that country? There is a feeling that the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan is having difficulties. And to what extent cooperation between U.S. and Russia in transit can help to improve the situation, in greater detail, please?

President Medvedev. The subject of U.S.-Russian cooperation in Afghanistan is extremely important. It is for this reason we paid so much attention to the discussion of this problem, and we have just signed an agreement that concerns transit. It's an important subject and we will of course continue cooperation with our American counterparts.

As concerns the current situation, it is— really is not simple. I am not trying to say that it is being worsens, but in many aspects the progress is not available or is insignificant. But we value the efforts that are being made by the United States together with the other countries in order to prevent the terrorist threat that was emanating and still coming from the Afghan soil.

We are prepared in this sense to a full-scale cooperation with our U.S. and other partners, including in transit areas. We are prepared to help in the various aspects. I don't know to what extent—how quickly the situation will improve. It depends to a large extent to the development of the political system in Afghanistan, to what extent the Afghan government will achieve successes in the economy—and it's not a simple task.

Nevertheless we are prepared to continue with our efforts, the consultations with the Afghan side. In Yekaterinburg I met the President of that country and I met the President of Pakistan, because both of these problems have to be resolved together. And if we can join our efforts both in the economic peaceful field, and in terms of support of counterterrorist operation, the success will come sooner or later.

In the final analysis, the success, let me emphasis once again, will depend on the maturity of the Afghan state and the readiness of the Afghan society to change.

President Obama. Well, as you may be aware, as soon as I came into office, we undertook a thorough review of our Afghan strategy to that point, in consultation with not only our NATO allies but all the forces internationally that have contributed to the efforts there. And we concluded that we had not made as much progress as we should have, given the duration in which we've been in Afghanistan, and that we can improve it.

So our approach has been to say that we need to have a strong security system in place for the Afghan elections to be completed. We have to train Afghan nationals for the army and police so that they can effectively secure their own country. We have to combine that with more effective diplomatic efforts. And we have to focus on development so that, for example, the people of Afghanistan don't have to grow poppy, but have other crops and goods that they can make a living with.

Now, we have just begun the implementation of this new strategy, and so I think it's too early to gauge its success so far. I think by the time that we've completed the next election and the—either President Karzai or another candidate has taken his seat, then we will be able to I think do an additional review and see what other efforts we can take in order to improve the situation. I will tell you that Russia's participation and contributions to this effort could be extraordinarily important.

Obviously Russia has its own concerns about extremism and terrorism. Russia also has deep concerns about the drug trade and its infiltration into Russia. And Russia has extraordinary capabilities when it comes to training police forces, training armies. And so our hope is, is that as part of the broader presidential commission structure that we've put in place, that we're going to further discuss both the military efforts in Afghanistan but also the development efforts and the diplomatic efforts so that we can make progress.

And President Medvedev is right that this is important for Afghanistan but it's also important with respect to Pakistan. And we're going to have to think regionally in terms of how we approach these problems. Obviously there are countries along the border of Afghanistan and Central Asia that are of deep strategic importance, and it's very important that we also include them in these conversations about how we can move forward.

But I just want to thank again the Russian government for the agreement for military transit. That will save U.S. troops both time and money. And it's I think a gesture that indicates the degree to which, in the future, Russian-U.S. cooperation can be extraordinarily important in solving a whole host of these very important international issues.

All right, thank you very much, everybody.

Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

We, the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group's Co-Chair countries France, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America affirm our commitment to support the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan as they finalize the Basic Principles for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

We are instructing our mediators to present to the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan an updated version of the Madrid Document of November 2007, the Co-Chairs last articulation of the Basic Principles. We urge the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the few differences remaining between them and finalize their agreement on these Basic Principles, which will outline a comprehensive settlement.

The ministers of the US, France, and Russia presented a preliminary version of the Basic Principles for a settlement to Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2007 in Madrid.

The Basic Principles reflect a reasonable compromise based on the Helsinki Final Act principles of Non-Use of Force, Territorial Integrity, and the Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples.

The Basic Principles call for inter alia:

• —return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control;

• —an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance;

• —a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;

• —future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;

• —the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and

• —international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.

The endorsement of these Basic Principles by Armenia and Azerbaijan will allow the drafting of a comprehensive settlement to ensure a future of peace, stability, and prosperity for Armenia and Azerbaijan and the broader region.

President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

President Obama. Well, let me just make a very brief statement. I am very pleased to have Prime Minister Balkenende here and his delegation. We are about to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Henry Hudson, on behalf of a Dutch company exploring Manhattan and helping to lay the groundwork for the United States. And that's going to be an incredible celebration that we're all looking forward to.

With that history in mind, the United States and the Netherlands have maintained an extraordinarily close friendship for many years now. I wanted to express to the Prime Minister both the American people's appreciation for that friendship generally, but also our admiration for some of the specific international obligations that the Netherlands has taken on and the leadership that it's taken on.

We discussed the critical role that the Netherlands has played in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF operation there. The Dutch military has been one of the most outstanding militaries there, has shown extraordinary not only military capacity, but also insight into the local culture and the local politics. The review that we conducted in Afghanistan that emphasized the 3Ds of development, diplomacy, as well our ability to deploy troops effectively— that really was adopted from some strategies that had already been pursued effectively by the Netherlands.

We discussed a range of international issues that we have been working together on in the G20. And I extended my personal invitation to the Prime Minister to participate in the next G20 summit in Pittsburgh, because we think that the Netherlands not only is one of the world's largest economies and most active internationally, but the Prime Minister has very specific expertise and experience in working with a whole range of world leaders and I think his contribution will be greatly appreciated.

We discussed the issue of Guantanamo and the importance of European countries working with us to assist in that process. And we're grateful for the encouragement that we've received there.

And we discussed the issue of climate change. Obviously the Netherlands has a lot of experience in dealing with the battle against rising oceans, and they've got a deep investment in dealing with this issue. They've also taken terrific strides on issues of clean energy and we think that we can get some good advice there, in terms of how we can work together.

So, overall, we think that this partnership is strong and will continue to grow, and we're grateful to the Dutch people for their extraordinary contributions to international peace and security. And I look forward to seeing you in Pittsburgh.

Prime Minister Balkenende. Thank you very much. Mr. President, I want to thank you very much for receiving us— this delegation and me here in the Oval Office. We've had a good meeting and you already referred to the fact that we are friends for centuries, the United States and the Netherlands, some 400 years ago when Henry Hudson arrived in the area of New York, Manhattan.

And it's good to underline that we share the same values. We talk about freedom and human rights, and we talk about our common responsibilities. We talk about democracy, and we both are acting worldwide.

When you started as President, you brought the message of hope and hope for a new future, and we admire you for that. I want to thank you that you are taking up your responsibilities, domestically but also internationally. We met with each other four times, at several summits, and you played an important role, talking about the issues of today.

And we both are convinced that it's important that we are talking about not only the financial crisis, but also about the Millennium Development goals, about the issue of energy, climate change. So the Copenhagen summit must be successful. And therefore, it's important that we'll have a very successful meeting in Pittsburgh. And I want to thank you very much for the invitation to be there.

I'm convinced that we can only solve the problems worldwide when we are working together. And we also spoke about the issue of public health and the health system. In my country, we've had a lot of discussions and now I know it's now on the agenda here in the United States. So it's an enormous responsibility to change things.

We also talked about the important issue of innovation and several fields of importance that we can do things in another way—innovation in the economic sphere, but also in health issues. We talked about the role of the private sector, issue of corporate social responsibility.

So I'm convinced we have so many things in common, we can work together. You already mentioned our work in Afghanistan, a complicated and dangerous area, but we also think that it's important to work there together.

Mr. President, I wish you all the best with your responsibilities. It's not an easy time to be President, but you show power and authority to change things. And I want to thank you very much for the friendship, and I'm sure, I'm convinced, that we will work together in the right way, in the interest of the people worldwide, in the United States, and in the Netherlands. And of course, you must come to my beautiful country.

Q. Mr. Obama, you mentioned the critical role that the Dutch are playing in Afghanistan. How important is it, do you think, that you will keep playing a role, even after summer next year?

President Obama. Well, as I said, I think Dutch troops have been some of the most effective troops in ISAF. I recognize that participation in the coalition in Afghanistan can be controversial in the Netherlands. It's never easy sending our finest young men and women into a field of battle.

What I shared with the Prime Minister was the hope that even after next summer that there's the ability for the Dutch to continue to apply the leadership and the experience that they've been able to accumulate over these past years.

And I think that all of us want to see an effective exit strategy where increasingly the Afghan army, Afghan police, Afghan courts, Afghan government are taking more responsibility for their own security. And if we can get through a successful election in September and we continue to apply the training approach to the Afghan security forces and we combine that with a much more effective approach to economic development inside Afghanistan, then my hope is, is that we will be able to begin transitioning into a different phase in—in Afghanistan.

The one thing I want to emphasize is that the issue in Afghanistan is not simply an American issue, it is a worldwide issue. And the vulnerabilities to terrorist attack in Europe are at least as high as they are here in the United States. If you look at how al Qaeda has operated, they consider the West to be one undifferentiated set of countries, and they will exploit whatever weaknesses are there.

So I think we have a common interest in dealing with this as effectively as possible. I'm grateful to the Prime Minister and the Dutch people for their extraordinary contribution.

Vice President Joe Biden delivered these remarks in Kyiv, Ukraine

Vice President Biden. Mr. President, thank you very much for your hospitality. And on behalf of President Obama, I want to express our admiration, as well as our thanks—our admiration for what you and your colleagues began in what was an inspiration to other parts of the world and your neighbors, the Orange Revolution, and also thanks for your cooperation and help in the Balkans and Iraq and Afghanistan. And I agree with you, I think we had a very productive meeting.

I come to Kyiv, Mr. President, with one simple, straightforward message that I don't want anyone to misunderstand. That is, the United States is committed to a strong, democratic and prosperous Ukraine.

Your success, Mr. President, we believe will be our success. We in the United States are trying to build a multi-partner world in which we work with like-minded countries to make common cause on common challenges. And quite frankly, the stronger our partners, the more effective that partnership will be.

We worked together to tackle, as I referenced earlier, common security problems—threats in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan—and we meet what President Obama and I believe is one of humanity's greatest challenges, and that is reducing nuclear arsenals and securing nuclear materiel.

We consider, Mr. President, Ukraine to be a vital European partner for advancing stability, prosperity and democracy on the continent. And the President and I agreed that the United States and Ukraine will work together in the months and years to come to strengthen the strategic partnership.

It is not for the United States to dictate what that partnership will be but to reiterate. And President Obama and I have stated clearly that if you choose to be part of Euro-Atlantic integration—which I believe you have—that we strongly support that. We do not recognize—and I want to reiterate it—any sphere of influence. We do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to you or any other country what alliances you will seek to belong to or what relationships you—bilateral relationships you have.

I reaffirmed to the President what I said in Munich, as I said, in the earliest days of our administration, and it's worth repeating again in a brief statement, and that is—and President Obama, I might add, made it clear in his visit to Moscow this month—the United States supports Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and freedom, and to make its own choices—its own choices—including what alliances they choose to belong.

We're working, as you know, Mr. President, to reset our relationship with Russia. But I assure you and all the Ukrainian people that it will not come at Ukraine's expense. To the contrary, I believe it can actually benefit Ukraine. The more substantive relationship we have with Moscow, the more we can defuse the zero-sum thinking about our relations with Russia's neighbors.

We also talked about many important challenges facing Ukraine today, made more difficult by the economic crisis the world is facing. And we discussed ways in which the United States can help Ukraine undertake what are obviously tough reforms needed to build its democracy and economy and to strengthen its energy sector.

To that end, I was pleased to learn that the government has taken the final decision necessary to bring the Overseas Private Investment Corporation back to Ukraine. That will make it easier for American companies to reinvest in Ukraine, and invest in the first place, which will help both our economies in the current downturn.

I know it's hard, I know it's hard, and these are tough decisions that your government has to make. And I also know from experience of being in public life for a long time, it's harder to make tough decisions in election years. It's a difficult time in any democracy. I told the President what I will tell other officials with whom I'll be meeting today, that working together, especially in times of crisis, is not a choice, it's an absolute necessity. And compromise, I might add, is not a sign of weakness, it is evidence of strength.

Ukraine has come a long way in the short time since declaring independence in 1991. And Ukraine's vibrant civil society—and it is vibrant—its engaged and free media, as we witnessed here today— and its lively democracy show the world that Ukraine will continue on its chosen path toward a prosperous future as an integral part of Europe.

The United States, Mr. President, is committing to walking that path with Ukraine to see to it that it becomes a vital part of Europe.

And again, Mr. President, I want to thank you for your hospitality. I look forward to continuing the discussions we had today at a working group level, and I am—I'm confident that Ukraine's democracy will take deep root in the 21st century.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Minister Samuel Zbogar delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Moderator. The Secretary and Foreign Minister Zbogar will now sign Protocols of Exchange of Instruments of Ratification for the U.S.-Slovenian Mutual Legal Assistance Extradition Treaty.

(The agreement was signed.)

Secretary Clinton. I am very pleased to welcome the foreign minister here to the State Department. Many of us remember that the foreign minister was ambassador here to Washington on behalf of Slovenia, and he was a legendary distance runner, I'm told. He told me that he took a run this morning for old time's sake. Well, there was great regret among the diplomatic community when he left, and now we're delighted to welcome you back in your new position.

Slovenia is a valued ally of the United States. We cooperate on a wide range of issues, and our partnership enhances the security and prosperity of both nations. As members of NATO, we are working together to bring stability and peace to Afghanistan and to update our historic alliances to meet the challenges of today. As trading partners, we're working to promote global economic recovery. And as democratic countries, we are working to stand up for responsible governance and human rights.

The minister and I reaffirmed our commitment to those basic values. We had a broad discussion on a number of issues that are of mutual importance. And today, we signed the Protocols of Exchange of Instruments of Ratification for the 2005 U.S.-Slovenia Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties. That's why it took so long to sign, because it's long. And we expect these agreements to enter into force shortly after related agreements between the United States and the European Union take effect.

These agreements between the United States and Slovenia on extradition and mutual legal assistance will give our police and prosecutors state-of-the-art tools to cooperate more effectively and bring criminals to justice on both sides of the Atlantic. They form part of a network of agreements that the United States has reached with countries of the European Union to mutually reinforce our law enforcement obligations.

I look forward to continuing to work closely with the foreign minister, and I am very glad to see him back in Washington.

Foreign Minister Zbogar. Thank you. Thank you very much, Secretary Clinton. I am also very happy to be back in Washington. I had a great time. This is a great city. It's a city of power, and it's always great to be back. And I hope for many happy returns, and I hope for many joint projects that we'll be working together, Slovenia and the United States, for the sake of people, our people, and for the sake of our alliances that we are in and for the sake of international community.

We all remember 1999 as a very important year for Slovenia, when you also had the visit of the first—the first visit of the American President to Slovenia and the First Lady. And I recalled the messages that we got at that time during that visit that we took very seriously, the messages that we should continue reforms to get into NATO and the EU, which we did, and to be more active on the Western Balkans, which we took very seriously, and I think we are as well.

We exchanged views on several issues. I think most importantly, of course, for us is our region, the region of the Western Balkans, where—which we want to see in the European Union, each and every country of the region, and the region that we'll continue to work intensively to try to help them get ready and also to try to—and to work within the European Union to get the EU ready to accept them. So that's the commitment that I can repeat today that we will do even more in the future.

I reconfirmed our commitment to our presence in Afghanistan, and in Kosovo we have many soldiers. We are a small country, but I think we have relatively big number, especially in Kosovo, but we are present also in Afghanistan. We are ready to add some civilian presence, some civilian projects to the military ones that we have in Afghanistan.

We also—you know, as a new minister I'm looking also to some new priorities, and I'm looking toward global warming and what can the small country do about global warming and climate change. And the issue of water, which Slovenia has plenty of but which is the reason for several wars and which is something that will be much less in the future because of global warming, is something that we'll be focused in the future with some of similar countries of our size.

So I want to just reiterate our commitment to work with the United States, with our ally, on all the projects that we mentioned and other projects that we'll be working in the future. Thank you very much for having me here.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you so much, Minister Zbogar. Thank you so much.

Foreign Minister Zbogar. Thank you.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Chief Micheline Calmy-Rey delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Clinton. This is my second meeting with the federal councilor, and I am delighted to welcome her to the State Department. Our first meeting was in Geneva. At that time, we discussed a broad range of issues, and today, we will, of course, be doing the same, both bilateral as well as regional and global.

We're very grateful to the Swiss Government for the role that they play representing us in countries like Iran, serving to mediate longstanding issues between countries like Armenia and Turkey. And so we really welcome the involvement and support that the Swiss Government gives to so many important causes around the world.

And of course, today, it's especially fitting that the federal councilor would be here. There has been an agreement reached in a litigation that was just reported to the court in Florida that confirms there has been an understanding between the Swiss Government and our government over the ongoing litigation concerning UBS. Our governments have worked very hard on this to reach that point, and so we're very pleased that the announcement was made this morning.

Ms. Calmy-Rey. Thank you. I am very happy to be here today and to have the opportunity to discuss with State Secretary Clinton. The United States and the State Department are very important partner for Switzerland, and we are discussing the important international and bilateral issues, and we are very—of course, very satisfied today with the news of—concerning UBS, that an agreement in principle have been reached. So I'm very happy to begin my discussions with her. Thank you.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you so much. Thank you.

Ms. Calmy-Rey. Thank you.

Q. Madame Secretary, do you still have outstanding issues about bank secrecy and tax evasion?

Secretary Clinton. Well, there's been an agreement in principle.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Urmas Paet delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Clinton. Well, I'm delighted to welcome Estonia's foreign minister here. And on behalf of the Obama Administration and our country, we value our relationship with Estonia. We are allies in NATO. And I want to publicly thank Estonia for your contributions and assistance in Afghanistan, for the sacrifice and service of your troops, and for the solidarity you have demonstrated within NATO and on a bilateral basis.

Foreign Minister Paet. Thank you very much. And from Estonia's side, I may say that United States is, for us, very big friend and partner in NATO, but also bilaterally, I'm also glad to make excellent cooperation in Afghanistan. I hope that in foreseeable future, we also can witness great changes and improvements in Afghanistan, and also in the NATO framework. We see at the moment one of the most important issues is to prepare new NATO strategic concept, which also allows work to the most important security issues for all NATO allies.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you. Welcome again.

Foreign Minister Paet. Thank you.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you all very much.

Secretary Robert Gates and General James Cartwright delivered these remarks in Arlington, VA

Secretary Gates. Good morning.

First, before starting on today's announcement, I'd like to acknowledge the loss of six Italian soldiers and a number of civilians in a bombing attack in Kabul. Our condolences go out to the families of those killed and to the Italian and Afghan people.

This week, the president, on the recommendation and advice of his national security team and our senior military leadership, decided to change the architecture of our ballistic missile defense in Europe, a change I believe will enhance our ability to respond to the most immediate threats to the continent, as well as future threats.

First, some background. On December 27th, 2006, I recommended that President Bush initiate a Europe-based, missile-defense system that would put in advanced radar in the Czech Republic and 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. At the time, this was considered the best way to protect the United States and our European allies from the growing threat posed by Iran's development of longer-range ballistic missiles.

Since then, two important developments have prompted a reassessment of our approach in Europe. First, a change in our intelligence community's 2006 view of the Iranian threat: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Shahab-3, is developing more rapidly than previously projected. This poses an increased and more immediate threat to our forces on the European continent, as well as to our allies.

On the other hand, our intelligence assessment also now assesses that the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities has been slower to develop than was estimated in 2006.

The second development relates to our technology. Over the last few years, we have made great strides with missile defense, particularly in our ability to counter short-and-medium-range missiles. We now have proven capabilities to intercept these ballistic missiles with land-and-sea-based interceptors supported by much-improved sensors.

These capabilities offer a variety of options to detect, track and shoot down enemy missiles. This allows us to deploy a distributive sensor network rather than a single fixed site, like the kind slated for the Czech Republic, enabling greater survivability and adaptability.

We have also improved the Standard Missile 3, the SM-3, which has had eight successful flight tests since 2007. These tests have amply demonstrated the SM-3's capability and have given us greater confidence in the system and its future.

Based on these two factors, we have now the opportunity to deploy new sensors and interceptors, in northern and southern Europe, that near-term can provide missile defense coverage against more immediate threats from Iran or others.

In the initial stage, we will deploy Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 interceptors, which provide the flexibility to move interceptors from one region to another if needed.

The second phase, about 2015, will involve fielding upgraded, land-based SM-3s. Consultations have begun with allies, starting with Poland and the Czech Republic, about hosting a land-based version of the SM-3 and other components of the system. Basing some interceptors on land will provide additional coverage and save costs compared to a purely sea-based approach.

Over time, this architecture is designed to continually incorporate new and more effective technologies, as well as more interceptors, expanding the range of coverage, improving our ability to knock down multiple targets and increasing the survivability of the overall system.

This approach also provides us with greater flexibility to adapt to developing threats and evolving technologies. For example, although the Iranian long-range missile threat is not as immediate as we previously thought, this system will allow us to incorporate future defensive capabilities against such threats, as they develop.

Perhaps most important, though, we can now field initial elements of the system to protect our forces in Europe and our allies roughly six to seven years earlier than the previous plan, a fact made more relevant by continued delays in the Czech and Polish ratification processes that have caused repeated slips in the timeline.

I would also note that plans to cover most of Europe and add to the defense of the U.S. homeland will continue on about the same schedule as before. As the president has said very clearly, as long as the Iranian threat persists, we will pursue proven and cost-effective missile defenses.

Today the Department of Defense is briefing the Congress and our NATO allies about this plan. One of our guiding principles for missile defense remains the involvement and support of our allies and partners. We will continue to rely on our allies and work with them to develop a system that most effectively defends against very real and growing threats.

Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misrepresenting the reality of what we are doing. The security of Europe has been a vital national interest of the United States for my entire career. The circumstances, borders and threats may have changed, but that commitment continues. I believe this new approach provides a better missile defense capability for our forces in Europe, for our European allies and eventually for our homeland than the program I recommended almost three years ago. It is more adapted to the threat we see developing and takes advantage of new technical capabilities available to us today.

With that, let me now turn to General Cartwright, who has been deeply involved in the development of this proposal, for a more detailed presentation of it.

General Cartwright. Thank you.

What I'd like to do is kind of step down through some of the elements of this capability and this architecture as it develops and give you a sense of how we're thinking about it.

Most of this work has emanated from the congressionally directed Ballistic Missile Defense Review that is a part of our QDR analysis.

One thing that has not changed is the set of priorities that we started with, which is the defense of the homeland first, defense of our deployed forces, and then friends and allies.

It is consistent with the budget decisions that we took in both '09 and in '10 as we moved forward associated with missile defense and the capabilities that we wanted to have there. And some of these decisions started back in the Bush administration as we started to shift the priority and the weight of our effort towards the deployed forces after we fielded the initial ground-based interceptors up in Alaska and out in California.

The review and the accompanying analysis has moved us, based on the threat, principally, but also on the opportunities that technology has availed to us, to shift the architecture and enhance it. Okay? This is not a moving away of the defense of the homeland and the capabilities of the ground-based interceptor. But what it is is an acknowledgement that there are capabilities out there that are able to, one, address the threat that has really emerged versus the threat that we initially postulated would be what we would call most dangerous, which is the threat to the United States, but the fact that the Iranians are starting to field, as have the South—I'm sorry, North Koreans, capabilities associated with intermediate- and medium- range and short-range ballistic missiles, in numbers that are substantially larger than could be addressed by 40 or 10 ground-based interceptors. We're talking about hundreds. And the ability to go after these raids was one of the driving factors tactically that had to be addressed, both for our deployed forces and for those nations that are threatened by those missiles.

And so this enhanced architecture we put together associated with Europe is also an architecture that is globally deployable and is the same architecture that you would find if you went now to Japan, South Korea, facing the North Korean threat and the ground-based interceptors that defend against that. We're also looking at this architecture with an initial deployment that occurred earlier this year with the ground-based radar that went into Israel.

So this is an architecture that is globally exportable, but we're going to focus today on the European aspect of that architecture.

It is adaptable. In other words, one of the realities of life is the enemy gets a vote. And if they don't emerge the same way that you planned five and 10 years ahead of time, if you can't adapt, you're left disadvantaged. This system gives us a much more significant and robust capability to adapt to the threat as it actually emerges versus what we would like it to emerge as. Okay?

Elements of the system. We generally break them down in three ways. The command and control, which is probably the most leveraging capability we have and gets the least notoriety, so to speak, but the ability to network systems together in a way that makes the whole substantially greater than any one of the elements is at the heart of this command-and-control system.

And I'll talk a little bit more about that as I get into this.

The sensors. One of the key activities here is the rapid advancement of our sensor technologies. And so heretofore when we started with the ground-based interceptor, we were focused on large terrestrial radars that were basically left over from the Cold War, based up in the northern part of the world; that would see.

And if you look at the world from on top, which is the way a missile looks at it, things fly directly across the poles. So these radars were aligned up there in the Cold War to defend us against incoming ICBMs. We modified those radars, updated their processors, so that they—they are still part of the system.

But we've also added mobile and relocatable radars: the X-band radar that is in Japan, the X-band radar that we currently have deployed to Israel, one that will be probably deployed someplace in Europe, to be part of this European lay down. That system has proved to be very, very effective and very capable.

The second is the mobile radars both on Aegis, the organic radar, to the Patriot system and also the sea-based X-band that is currently deployed out in the Pacific. These are all mobile systems that can move, to wherever the threat actually emanates and to wherever it is that we feel we need to defend ourselves. And that's an important aspect.

The one piece that we have not had up until now is the airborne layer. And part of this program is to bring in an airborne layer of sensors that will add to the redundancy, survivability and efficiency of the overall system. And that work is ongoing now, was part of our '09 budget and '10 budget submissions, will likely start to emanate itself in real capability probably in the '12 to '13 time frame.

And it is very promising technology that we're working on. And then we have our space-based sensors. All of this is netted together to give us the adaptability we believe we'll need to have.

The last piece in this triad of capability is the weapons. And everybody pretty much knows the capabilities of the Patriot system. It's been out there. It's well deployed. It's globally deployed.

Many countries have procured it, use it for their defenses. It is a point defense system. You would put this at critical infrastructure, a facility like an airport or a port, to defend that area.

Then there is the SM-3, which has proven itself in the testing and which we are now fielding in larger numbers. It is a more capable area-defense weapon. It is more aligned with trying to take care of a general area like the area from Philadelphia down to Washington, D.C., for an analogy.

And the THAAD—which has just started to finish its testing—its first operational deployments will begin this year to the European theater, and we'll do that operational flash development deployment to make sure that we wring this system out. But it is by all measures successful in its testing, and we're getting ready to move on to deployment of that system.

And then there's the ground-based interceptor, which is the large missile that we've put in the ground in Alaska and in Vandenberg, California, to defend the homeland against ICBM-type threats, sophisticated-type threats.

So all of those three make up the capabilities that we have in the system today. The phases that the secretary introduced that we're going to work our way through will allow us to be adaptable and to allow us to field tested systems when they're needed, where they're needed, rather than a pre-planned lay down that locks us in to any particular capability and threat that may well change over time, because one thing I'm relatively sure of is the threat will change. I mean, we have a thinking adversary, and we have to acknowledge that.

The first phase starts in 2011 and really, actually, has already started. But this is the deployment of the Patriot systems, which are out there today. This is the deployment of the SM-3 system, Block I, Mod A, but this is the system we have today. We've had eight good tests. It is the same system we used to shoot down the satellite. It is a very efficient and a very effective system with a long heritage of R&D and knowledge about it.

That system we have started to deploy to the eastern Mediterranean already, and we will begin to deploy that in larger numbers. When we marry that up with the sensors, that will give us the ability to defend critical infrastructure, defend our four deployed forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean as we move forward. That is scheduled for 2011 to be fully in place, okay?

As we move in to the second phase, which, as the secretary said, is somewhere around the 2015 time frame, we expect to have an upgrade to the SM-3 Block IA, which will be called the SM-3 Block IB. We're a little bit anal about this, but that's the way we laid it out.

That capability, along with better sensors—and the beginning deployment of these airborne sensors, should they manifest themselves in the way we think they will—will allow us to move from a relatively small area—and I talked about Philadelphia to Washington, D.C.—this would be at least three times larger, based on the ability of the missile and the sensor packages to address the threats that are out there.

So we get a much larger deployment capability. And we'll also bring in the first phase of land-based SM-3. And land-based SM-3 is something that we have today. We have the systems at our test facilities. It's no surprise. We do most of our testing on the land anyway. This is not a stretch. But we'll put together the system in a deployable configuration so that we can move it forward to places like Europe. Okay?

In 2018, we expect to see the next iteration, and that's a little bit further out. And what we're looking for in 2018 is the emergence of the SM-3 Block II, a substantially larger, more capable missile that will deploy both on our ships and ashore. And that missile will allow us, in probably no more than three locations, to be able to cover the entire land mass of Europe, okay, against intermediate- and short-range ballistic missiles, okay. And that's a substantial improvement on where we are. That's an R&D effort.

So at the same time, we're continuing the effort that we have ongoing today on the ground-based interceptor, which is to build a two-stage capability. Those tests will—are funded, and will continue. So we'll have two ways to address this threat. We believe the leverage will be in the SM-3 as it emerges, that it will be the more effective killer. But until we know that, we are not abandoning the work that we are doing with the ground-based interceptor. Okay?

The last piece of this—and this is reaching out pretty far into the future, but we're talking 2020—is a land-based SM-3 Block IIA, now B, okay? And B is an even more energetic capability that will have a substantial capability to intercept intercontinental ballistic missile type capabilities emanating from Iran. So this gets at additional coverage beyond the ground-based interceptor of the United States and of Europe against intermediate ballistic missiles or intercontinental ballistic missiles.

That technology is still out there and still to be proven, and we cannot abandon or scrap the capabilities that we have today in the ground-based interceptor; nor do we intend to. But if these new technologies prove out, what they have that the current system doesn't have is the ability to get at what we call raid size. But we built the original system on the idea of a rogue-nation threat: three to five missiles that could come from either North Korea or Iran. The reality is, we're dealing with hundreds of missiles in the IRBM and medium-range capabilities, and the likelihood of more than just four or five has to be considered now as we start to build this system out.

What you can do with an SM-3 in affordability and in deployment and dispersal is substantially greater for larger numbers of missiles than we what we have with a ground-based interceptor. A single Aegis can carry a hundred-plus or minus a few, depending on their mission configuration, of the SM-3. So this is a substantial addressal of the proliferation of the threat that we're seeing emerge. If it doesn't emerge, we don't have to build them all, but if it does, we're ready to basically go after it.

And so we've put in place an architecture here that allows us to be adaptable. It is a global architecture.

Let me cover just a couple more things.

First, cost, one of the questions that gets answered. A Patriot costs you about $3.3 million per missile, okay, and there's other ground pieces to this, et cetera, but the missile itself.

The THAAD missile's about $9 million.

The SM-3 that we're talking about here in the Block I configuration, about $9-1/2, $10 million. We estimate that the newer missiles that we would develop in the future would be in the neighborhood of $13 to $15 million, around.

The ground-based interceptor that's in the ground today is about $70 million.

So you do not want to go after large numbers with the very expensive missiles, unless it's absolutely essential. What we need is an approach that allows us to build the layers in a way that allows us to defend both what we think we're going to have to defend today and what might be fundamentally different as we move to the future.

Second thing: This system allows us to do burden-sharing. The Patriot system is deployed all over the world, to many countries, okay, not owned by the United States; in other words, purchased by those countries. The Aegis system is the same way. Many countries have the Aegis system. So we can modify those systems, upgrade them, keep them up with the technology much cheaper than we can do this buying it ourselves. So we have a capability for burden-sharing.

In the R&D side of the equation, as we look at this SM-3, Block II, we estimate that R&D effort is going to probably cost us about $3-1/2 billion. The Japanese government has already kicked in over a billion dollars towards that investment. And that investment will net us a capability that is far beyond just worrying about the Pacific and the Japanese. This is a significant opportunity to work in a global construct to both field and fund and maintain this capability in a way that we had not been able to do in the past.

The other piece here is the integration. We don't necessarily need to have all American systems. We're right now integrating the Israeli Arrow system into this capability. We are looking at other partners, both in the sensor and the weapons side, because it does not have to be just American weapons and just American sensors.

That's the beauty of this command-and-control suite. And so that gives us the opportunity to leverage our investments, in a way that we did not have with the solely GBI system.

The last piece that I'll talk to here is, like I said when I started, this is consistent with the budgets that we submitted in '09 and '10. We'll have this debate as we submit the '11 budget.

And that's part of the reason for the timing now, is to make sure that that debate is allowed to occur, that we can inform the Congress and the American people and our allies and give them choices, about the way we move forward.

With that, I'll take your questions.

Q. I noticed that neither of you said the word Russia in your opening remarks. Can you say to what extent the hope for a better relationship with Russia and Russia's cooperation, in any future sanctions regime or other attempt to counter the Iranian missile threat, to what extent that was a factor in making this change?

Secretary Gates. I think General Cartwright sat in on all the deputies meetings. I sat in on all the principals meetings and the meetings with the president.

The decisions—the decisions on this were driven, I would say, almost exclusively by the changed intelligence assessment and the enhanced technology. It really was a zero-based look at both the threat and our capability to deal with it.

Now, that said, I think that first of all, the Russians are probably not going to be pleased that we are continuing with missile defense efforts in Europe. But at the same time, there are two changes in this architecture that should allay some of their, what we think, unfounded concerns.

One is their concern that the radar that was going into the Czech Republic looked deep into Russia and actually could monitor the launches of their ICBMs as well. So that's one.

The second is, the Russians believed, despite our best efforts to dissuade them, that the ground-based interceptors in Poland could be fitted with nuclear weapons and become an offensive weapon like a Pershing and a weapon for which they would have virtually no warning time.

The move to the SM-3s, while enhancing our capabilities, that's also a weapon that they simply cannot at least rationally argue bears any kind of a threat to Russia. So those—and we are very interested, as I have talked to the Russians for the last two years—we are very interested in having them partner with us. Their Armavir radar in the southern part of Russia could be integrated into this network and could be very effective in helping us, with respect to giving even greater coverage to potential Iranian missile launches.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the people and governments of Poland and the Czech Republic who invested a lot of political capital in trying to sell the old system to their people, and who are already talking about feeling let down in a certain sense by this change?

Secretary Gates. Well, I—as the president mentioned in his remarks, he's talked to both prime ministers. Michele Flournoy is in Poland and the Czech Republic today, talking to their governments. And I must say, based on the very brief accounts I've gotten, they have been reasonably positive about this.

We are very interested in—as I indicated in my remarks, in continuing to work with the Czech Republic, in terms of a piece of this architecture. And we are eager to go forward with the framework agreement with the Czechs on this, that would allow that. Clearly, what this represents is, if the Poles are interested in going forward, it meets their concerns about having this capability in Poland. And so I think that this is actually an enhanced opportunity for—particularly the Polish government, but it also offers opportunities for the Czech Republic as well.

Q. Well, because you did mention that there could still be the deployment of an X-Band radar in Europe as part of this. Do you know where that would be? Could it still be in the Czech Republic?

General Cartwright. It's probably more likely to be in The Caucasus that we would base that, because it's to get the early tracks. So that likely would be more down in The Caucasus.

Q. A question for you, Mr. Gates, and then for General Cartwright. A lot of people are going to be wondering why should we trust the intelligence assessments that you're laying out today, when the intelligence community got it so wrong in the buildup to the war in Iraq. What can you tell them?

And to General Cartwright, roughly how many Aegis vessels will be deployed to the Mediterranean or the Gulf area on a rotating regular basis?

Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, I think the important thing is to go back to what General Cartwright was saying and what I said in my opening statement. This gives us some capability very soon.

The other alternative gave us no capability until later in the decade. So if there were going to be a breakout scenario, we would have no hedge before 2017, 2018, with the original program that I approved in December of '06. This gives us at least some capability early on and then an increasingly enhanced capability through this entire period. So the notion—I mean, the fact is, this gives us many more options than the original program gave, which is one of the reasons that I felt very strongly in support of it.

General Cartwright. And I think, I mean, along the same lines, I mean, I'm relatively sure that the intelligence estimates will be wrong if we've got a good adversary, so the intent here is to develop a system that sufficient agility to accommodate that. That would be point one.

The second—to your question, our deployment scheme in and around Europe for the Aegis capability in 2011 is really one that meters against the threat, how it emerges. So how many do we need, and in what areas? What's going on in Europe? What is the political situation? In other words, is there a threat against a particular country, et cetera?

But on a day-in, day-out basis, we're looking probably for what we would call a 2.0 presence, maybe a 3.0 presence, so three ships at any given time in and around the Mediterranean and the North Sea, et cetera, to protect areas of interest, and then we would surge additional ships. And part of what's in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.

Secretary Gates. And I would remind you that the FY '10 budget contains the funds to convert six additional ships to Aegis capability.

Q. 24?

Secretary Gates. I don't remember.

General Cartwright. It's somewhere in—24, 27 is where we've done that.

Q. On Afghanistan—

Secretary Gates. Let me—let's do several more on missile defense and then I'll come—if there's time left.

Thom.

Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Israel was mentioned a couple of times earlier.

It's no secret that here in Washington, there is concern that Israel, fearing an existential threat, might attack Iran pre-emptively to stop its nuclear program.

Since we don't really understand the lay down and scope of this, would this system in some way be used, by the administration, to say to Israel, you will be protected, please do not attack Iran.

Secretary Gates. Well, clearly one of the elements of our efforts, with the Israelis, is to enhance their missile defense capabilities principally against the Iranian threat. And clearly the more we do, in this area, we hope that it will reassure them that perhaps there's a little more time here.

We are all concerned about Iran running out the clock on us on their nuclear program. And, but our view is, there is still time for diplomacy and, I might say, sanctions to persuade the Iranians that their security will be diminished, by going down the track of nuclear weapons, rather than enhanced.

General Cartwright. Could I just add on to that? Just because I think the issue here is much broader than just Israel.

I mean, if this system emerges the way we think it is, if the testing bears out, what you really are doing here is providing another form of deterrence, credible deterrence, that is an alternative to an offensive-only capability.

And that's got to register. It has registered in the Pacific, as you've seen by the investments of the South Koreans and the Japanese, in response to North Korea. So this is broader than just Israel, for the same reasons that the secretary talked to.

Q. Can you explain why X-band radar in the Caucasus might be more— less of a threat to Russia than the Czech radar? And what is—by 2011, how many medium-range missiles from Iran could they conceivably launch toward Europe? Is this just one or two? Or are we in the hundreds?

Secretary Gates. On the capabilities of the X-band radar, the history major will defer to the general.

General Cartwright. On the X-band radar, what we're trying to get—the first question really has to do with Russia and their perception of a threat, from the radar that would have been in the Czech Republic.

And that radar is an omni-directional radar. In other words, it sees 360 degrees. And it has a very deep peering capability into Russia.

And the worry would be that we would be able then to see very early the launches if Russia were launching their ICBMs and that could be perceived as destabilizing. The X-band radar is a single directional. In other words, when you put it down, it points in a single direction. And it will be very clear that it is pointing south towards Iran.

What you want to do is get that radar as close as you can to be able to get the initial launches and understand where the missiles are going, whether they are just tests or whether they are threatening. And so the X-band radar gives you that capability very quickly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as we know, the Iranian ballistic missiles pose also a threat to the Gulf, to the Arab countries of—in the Gulf. How this new architecture would affect your defense strategy in the Gulf region?

Secretary Gates. I don't want to get into it in too much detail, but the reality is we are working both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis in the Gulf to establish the same kind of regional missile defense that would protect our facilities out there as well as our friends and allies. I've addressed this issue two years running in Manama, in meetings of defense ministers before the Manama conferences. And I would say—and we already have Patriots out there and we have Aegis ships out there.

So—and we are looking at—we have very strong bilateral relationships in developing missile defense with several of the countries in the Gulf. And now what we're encouraging is to layer on top of that multilateral cooperation as well.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned before that Michele Flournoy will be in Europe as part of this roll-out. Can you talk about when and how Russia was informed of these changes and what their reaction was?

Secretary Gates. I don't know the answer to that.

Q. (Inaudible)—ask a little bit more about the architecture, specifically. You mentioned the SM-3 Block IA and B to start. I'm curious, how many sites will you need to start with the IA and IB? And will Czechoslovakia—or the Czech Republic and Poland be part of that, or will they have to wait till the II comes on board? And is that an optimal location for either of those systems, architecturally?

General Cartwright. Initially—and it's the IB that we would start with, the land-based system, so about the 2015 time frame. And it's actually relatively agnostic to the where. And so the Czech Republic, Poland, are both candidates.

It's certainly something that they have to have a say in, though, as to whether we go there. There are other candidates in that region, and then obviously deeper into Europe, that would be good sites for the SM-3.

So the good news is, it really is not as particular about exactly where it's located. So you've got a wide range of choices. Any of those countries have the opportunity to participate in it. And then, even if we, let's say, had three countries that wanted it, and only needed one, the general construct is, each box will have about eight missiles, so we can move this around and disperse it even more, for greater survivability and for a better assurance of our allies that they are in fact protected.

Okay, we have time for one more on missile defense and then—

Q. Mr. Secretary, the plan you just announced may have sense from the U.S. perspective, but for many people in Poland and for Polish government, the most important part of missile defense program was the presence of U.S. military in Poland. And now you're offering Poland another five, seven years of talks. Polish government invested a lot in promoting missile defense in Poland. It was the U.S. government that pressed Poland to agree to host the missile defense. What would you say to those who invested their lot in this program in Poland? And another question, have you—

Secretary Gates. Well, one at a time—

Q. Have you consulted this new approach with the governments of Poland and Czech Republic—

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Q.—before?

Secretary Gates. Yes. The answer that I would give to Poles asking that question is, we still want to partner with Poland. We still want Poland to go forward with the ratification of the agreements that we have with them, including the SOFA. We would prefer to put the SM-3s in Poland, in place of the GBI—the ground-based interceptors. That will still involve a presence of the U.S.

They may be there earlier than they would have been with the ground-based interceptors, because, as I said, they would not become operational until probably 2017, 2018. We're talking about 2015 now. So I think that there are—all of the same opportunities for partnership between the United States and Poland that existed under the previous program continue to exist under this program.

Q. On Afghanistan and the McChrystal assessment, some are calling for it to be publicly released. It's now classified. I'm told that clearly some parts of that assessment are sensitive. But other parts clearly have been talked about by McChrystal openly in a number of interviews and others.

Can you explain to the American people why they can't get their own assessment from McChrystal about his views on Afghanistan?

Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, I think, there's been a lot of talk this week and the last two or three weeks about Afghanistan. And frankly from my standpoint, everybody ought to take a deep breath.

The president announced at the end of March—when he announced his other decisions on Afghanistan and our strategy, he made very clear that after the elections in Afghanistan, we would reassess where we are and whether the strategy decisions that he made, at that time, continue to fit the situation that we face.

General McChrystal's assessment is part of that re-evaluation. And frankly I believe that the president deserves the right to absorb the assessment himself and have his questions and my questions and others' questions relating to the assessment answered before it's delivered.

It is for all practical purposes a pre-decisional document. And it was briefed on the Hill. And my understanding is, it will be made available on the Hill, if not passed out to everybody, so the people's representatives will have access to it.

And I think we just—we need to understand that the decisions that the president faces are perhaps some of the most—on Afghanistan are some of the most important he may face, in his presidency, about how we go forward there.

And this is a situation in which I think this decision process should not be rushed. If there are urgent needs, I've just authorized in the last 10 days or so, within the troop levels the president has approved, sending another 2,500 to 3,000 critical enablers that General McChrystal has asked for.

And I'm prepared to ask for the flexibility to send more enablers, if we need to, before the president makes a decision on whether or not to send significant additional combat troops.

But my view is, as the president said yesterday, it's important to make sure we've got the strategy right before we start talking the resource issue. And frankly, some of the questions we're asking are outside of General McChrystal's area of authority. They have to do with the political situation, they have to do with focus and so on. And so I think there's a sort of a sense of—I felt a sense of building momentum that's sort of demanding a decision in days, if not a week or two. And I just think that, given the importance of the decisions that the president faces, we need to take our time and get this right.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Q. On the resource issue, on McChrystal, some of us are told that McChrystal has completed his report on troop requests, the options for troop requests, and is awaiting Washington to ask for his request. What's your—

Secretary Gates. We're working—we're working through the process by which we want that submitted.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I ask you something else? The president, of course, is about to award yet another Medal of Honor posthumously to a family of a soldier who died in an act of courage in the war. People, still, are getting very curious why, in awards in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no living Medal of Honor recipient. What's your view? Has no one performed an act of courage worthy of the Medal of Honor, and lived through it?

Secretary Gates. This has been a source of real concern to me. And I would tell you, it was one of—I think it was one of President Bush's real regrets, that he did not have the opportunity to honor a living Medal of Honor winner—or recipient, I should say.

The—we are looking at this. There are—I would—without getting into any details, there are some in process. But it is, as everybody knows, a very time-intensive, thorough process. But I would say that I've been told there are some living potential recipients that are—that have been put forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Q. Back to Afghanistan, if we can, the vice president said today in an interview the decision about troop levels will be made after all the present troops are in place, the civilians are in place and the election is determined—solely focusing on the objective.

Is he right in saying that no decisions on troop levels will be made until after even the civilian surge is finished—

Secretary Gates. I don't—

Q.—which might be the beginning of the year?

Secretary Gates. I don't want to get into the timing. The president will make his decision when the questions that he has asked and the assessments that are going on have been completed. And I don't think anybody should put any conditions on that.

The troops he's already approved are almost all there at this point. The civilian surge is beginning to flow. It remains to be seen how long it will take to see the outcome of the election. But I would tell you there is no question that the—that the nature of the election in Afghanistan has complicated the picture for us.

Thank you.

Secretary Robert Gates and Minister Bartak delivered these remarks in Arlington, VA

Secretary Gates. It is my pleasure to have the opportunity to meet with Minister Bartak today. We had a very good conversation. We obviously talked about the new architecture for missile defense and about the fact there will be a U.S. missile defense in Europe.

We talked about opportunities for future cooperation. I said that we would welcome Czech participation in the new architecture. And we will look for opportunities to do that. We will continue our bilateral research efforts in missile defense.

We've agreed that there will be a highlevel defense group meeting, in Prague hopefully early this fall, the primary purpose of which will be to examine further opportunities for enhancing the security relationship between the Czech Republic and the United States.

We had a very good exchange. I thanked the minister also for Czech efforts in Afghanistan. And we talked about NATO and all in all had a very good meeting.

Mr. Minister.

Minister Bartak. Thank you.

I will speak Czech to make it easier for our reporters.

I would like to thank for the opportunity to meet with the secretary of Defense of the United States and in particular with a view to the current situation, where we were notified about a decision about missile defense.

This trip wasn't planned for this purpose, because the main purpose of this trip was to develop our cooperation not only in military but also in other areas, such as scientific and research development.

And we also brought the message that even though our preliminary elections were moved, but we don't know the date when they are going to take place in fact, this administration is going to lead the country in a stable manner and it won't affect negatively any of our commitments. And we will do our best to lead the country in a stable manner until the regular elections take place.

And Secretary Gates already described the meeting in detail, so I would only add that the discussions were not focused only on missile defense but also on the cooperation that is going to take place as soon as possible, and we are going to reach very tangible results soon.

And the main message for the home would be that the missile defense doesn't end here. Actually, we are going to reevaluate it, and we are going to cooperate and we are going to figure out a way how Czech Republic can be involved in the future missile defense as well. Thank you.

Secretary Gates. Okay, we have time just for one question from this side. Yes.

Q. Prague Daily Newspaper, the Czech Republic. Mr. Secretary, what are—what flexibility does the new system—or will the new system provide, should the intelligence on Iran change again in the future?

Secretary Gates. Well, the original program that I recommended would have had no capability against short- and mediumrange missiles until, probably, 2018. What the new system provides is a—is some capability, beginning in 2011, that will grow steadily each year in terms of its sophistication and its coverage of Europe. The next phase would begin in 2015.

So if the intelligence is wrong—and I was in that business long enough to know that that happens—we actually are better able to deal with a changed situation in which the intelligence assessments are wrong, with the new architecture than we were with the old one, because there was no intermediate stage, if you will, with the ground-based interceptors at that time.

The other aspect of this is, as we talked about yesterday—is that the ground-based interceptors were really designed primarily to deal with perhaps—well, probably no more than five targets. And we were assuming those would be longer-range, perhaps intercontinental ballistic missiles. What we have seen with the Iranians is that they are producing and deploying significant numbers of short- and mediumrange missiles. And so they could overwhelm—even when the 10 interceptors were in place, a salvo like that could overwhelm it. So this, I think, provides significantly more protection, should the intelligence forecast be wrong.

Q. (Inaudible)—first question for the Defense minister. Mr. Minister, would you be interested in hosting any of the—of these new interceptors?

And for Mr. Secretary, NATO has said today—the NATO secretary-general has said today that the U.S., Russia and NATO should link their systems. Can you say what, if any, assurances you've gotten from Russia on whether that is indeed possible; what short-term steps could be taken for something like that to happen, since it's been discussed in the past? And what do you say to the Republicans on the Hill who say that they do not trust this intelligence?

Minister Bartak. Czech Republic is definitely interested in being part of missile defense in future as well, but it would be too early to talk about hosting the interceptors of missiles yet. It depends on our future technical meetings and how the new concepts of anti-missile defense is going to develop. Obviously, the decision will be up to the administration that will be at power at that time. And we are not talking about near future, it might be in a couple of years.

Secretary Gates. What was the first part of your question, Lita?

Q. The secretary-general has suggested that the U.S., NATO and—

Secretary Gates. Yeah. The—there was no discussion of any of this with the Russians, to the best of my knowledge. For two years—more than two years—I have encouraged the Russians to be our partners in this missile defense.

The Russians have a radar in southern Russia, the Armavir radar, that actually would fill a gap in coverage. And we would welcome the Russians networking with this—with us in this. We think that we could make that happen.

One of the attributes of this changed architecture is that we are now able to network the capabilities, the radars, of several different kinds—of several different kinds and of several different countries, so we're actually in a better position with the new architecture to be able to integrate a Russian contribution than we were before. But there were no—to the best of my knowledge, as we put this proposal together, there were no conversations with the Russians.

In terms of those who question whether we're over-relying on intelligence, as I suggested to your Czech colleague, I probably am more familiar with the risks of overreliance on intelligence than anybody, because I've seen how often it's been wrong. And as I say, I think that this architecture gives us—if the intelligence is wrong and the Iranians develop a capability sooner than the intelligence is saying, this architecture gives us a better chance of being able to cope with it than the program that I signed in December 2006, just because of the new technologies that are available, that give us more flexibility.

And as—you know, the reality is also we are going to continue the R&D [research and development] on the ground-based interceptors as a fall-back.

Thank you all.

On Armenian Independence

The people of the United States join the people of Armenia in celebrating Armenia's day of independence today. We deeply value the many cultural and historic ties that bind our two countries. The United States gains strength as a nation from the contributions of so many Americans of Armenian ancestry. We congratulate the people of Armenia on their national day.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and President Mikheil Saakashvili delivered these remarks in New York, NY

Secretary Clinton. (Inaudible) many good friends (inaudible) the United States supports both in terms of your territorial integrity and sovereignty. We are working to try to ensure that Russia abides by the 2008 ceasefire, and hopefully to eventually reintegrate your country as it should be. We also know that working toward democracy and the changes that you're attempting to achieve are challenging, but we want to support and encourage the steps that need to be taken. And the United States supports Georgia, and we want to make that very clear and unequivocal statement here today.

President Saakashvili: Madame Secretary, it's an incredible honor for all of us be here. I mean, we've been very grateful for all the support you've given us when—for the past several years, you in capacity of senator, and as serving Secretary of State, as well as this Administration. In fact, with this Administration, we had the new level of cooperation (inaudible) foreign minister was there with you (inaudible) the strategic partnership. I also saw your article this morning in FT Financial Times of London, and it was very impressive because the message was very clear-cut, very unambiguous, and it really resonates very well (inaudible) Georgia as well the whole region. And we are very grateful to you for that moral clarity, as well as strategic vision of what U.S. role in our region should be.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Mr. President. Well, as I said in the article and I will repeat, we think this approach is much more effective, and it will certainly cover Georgia and the Caucasus and it will send a clear message that the United States is committed to the defense of all of Europe in the years going forward. Thank you very much.

Joint Statement by the White House and 10 Downing Street

President Obama and Prime Minister Brown held a meeting this morning on the margins of the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh. They discussed Britain and the United States' shared interest in Afghanistan and ensuring it could never again be used for attacks by al Qaeda against the United Kingdom, the United States or our allies. They agreed that Iran's nuclear activity was unacceptable, that the international community expected answers on October 1 and was also united in calling upon Iran to live up to its international responsibilities. They also looked forward to a strong agreement from today's G20 Summit which would help secure economic recovery and deliver a global plan for jobs and sustained growth.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu delivered these remarks in New York, NY

Secretary Clinton. (In progress) we've developed (inaudible) openness in what is often very difficult circumstances with the many challenges that we face. Good morning. Good morning. Well, this is a special privilege and pleasure.

Foreign Minister Davutoglu. Same.

Secretary Clinton. It represents the importance of the U.S.-Turkish partnership. And the foreign minister and I speak on a regular basis on a range of issues that are important, including energy and Turkey's EU accession process and the normalization efforts with Armenia and the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East. There's hardly an issue that we do not discuss.

And I very much appreciate the strong commitment that the Turkish Government has made to the Armenia normalization process, and I also am very grateful for the strong relationship that the United States and Turkey have had, which continues today.

So thank you so much, Minister, for being with us.

Foreign Minister Davutoglu. Thank you very much, Madame Secretary. It is a great honor and privilege for me to meet with you again (inaudible). As has been described by President Obama, our relations (inaudible) model in the sense of (inaudible) both the depth and the scope of our relations, from Middle East to Central Asia, from EU to (inaudible) almost in all fields, and recently this year we are also member of United Nations Security Council (inaudible) another area of cooperation. So therefore we need to talk and consult (inaudible). We have been doing this by phone, through (inaudible) several occasions. Thank you very much again.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister H.E. Edward Nalbandian delivered these remarks in New York, NY

Foreign Minister Nalbandian. (Inaudible.)

Secretary Clinton. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with the foreign minister. He and I have talked on the phone. I have watched his very diligent and effective efforts over the last months that I've had the privilege of being the Secretary of State. And I want to reiterate our very strong support for the normalization process that is going on between Armenia and Turkey, which we have long said should take place without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe.

We will continue to work closely with the foreign minister and, of course, with his president and the Government of Armenia. And we also are very committed to the democratic development of Armenia. We want to be a partner and a friend in increasing prosperity and economic development as well. So this is a comprehensive relationship. We are very focused on this challenge of normalization which Armenia has demonstrated great commitment to, yet our relationship is much broader and much deeper in addition to that.

Foreign Minister Nalbandian. Thank you, Madame Secretary. It's my pleasure to meet again in the United States and to meet with you, Madame Secretary, and this is a good opportunity to discuss a wide range of the issues on our bilateral agenda and international issues and specifically in our region, Turkish-Armenian normalization (inaudible).

Secretary Clinton. Indeed.

Foreign Minister Nalbandian. Thank you very much for this (inaudible).