¹ For a typology see Christoph Engel: Hybrid Governance Across National Jurisdictions as a Challenge to Constitutional Law, in: European Business Organization Law Review 2 (2001) 569-584.Google Scholar

² Proof of this are, for instance, the following papers: Claire Cutler: Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International Law, in: Review of International Political Economy 4 (1997) 261-285; Christine Chinkin: A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, in: European Journal of International Law 10 (1999) 387-395); Alfred C. Aman: The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance, in: Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 8 (2001) 379-400.Google Scholar

³ This was the topic of the Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer at its year 2000 meeting, Ingo Pernice: Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 60 (2001) 148-193; Peter Huber: Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, ibid. 194-245; Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff: Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, ibid. 246-289.Google Scholar

⁴ See the programmatic account by Jochen A. Frowein: Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts, in: Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 39 (2000) 427-448.Google Scholar

⁵ Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).Google Scholar

⁶ See below II 4 b.Google Scholar

⁷ The standard text is George A. Akerlof: The Market for ‘Lemons'. Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970) 488-500.Google Scholar

⁸ Reality in Germany is different. Public law makes the admission of doctors to practice conditional upon membership in the competent doctors’ chamber. Moreover, the chamber acts under public, not under private law, when it defines good medical practice and sanctions the standards.Google Scholar

⁹ See below 3 c.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See below 4 a.Google Scholar

¹¹ See below 5 a.Google Scholar

¹² See below 2 and 4 b.Google Scholar

¹³ See below 5 b.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See below 5 b.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See below 2.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Comprehensivly Johannes Dietlein: Die Lehre von den grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten, Berlin 1992.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See below 4 b.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See below 5 b.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See below 3 a.Google Scholar

²⁰ Dogmatically, this case does not pose new questions. It is therefore not explicitly dealt with here.Google Scholar

²¹ See below 3 b.Google Scholar

²² Again, this duty to protect is not investigated, since it poses no new dogmatic questions.Google Scholar

²³ “geeignet”.Google Scholar

²⁴ “erforderlich”.Google Scholar

²⁵ “angemessen”; for a comprehensive overview of the dogmatics of fundamental freedoms as developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court, see Jörn Ipsen, Staatsrecht II Grundrechte, Neuwied 2000 § 3.Google Scholar

²⁶ For a comprehensive overview see Ipsen (note 25) § 4 – 17.Google Scholar

²⁷ Leading cases BVerfGE 6, 32 – Elfes; BVerfGE 80, 137 – Reiten im Walde.Google Scholar

²⁸ For the details see Ipsen (note 25) § 15.Google Scholar

²⁹ For the details see Ipsen (note 25) § 17; intellectual property will usually be more important than physical, but it also falls under article 14, BVerfGE 49, 382.Google Scholar

³⁰ See in detail Wolfram Höfling: Vertragsfreiheit. Eine grundrechtsdogmatische Studie (1991).Google Scholar

³¹ For the details see Ipsen (note 25) § 10.Google Scholar

³² For the details see Ipsen (note 25) § 9 – I deliberately do not mentioned article 9, Basic Law, at this point, see further below in this section.Google Scholar

³³ This is made obvious by the dogmatic figure of “practical concordance” developed by Konrad Hesse, comprehensive Konrad Hesse: Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Heidelberg²⁰ 1995, R 317 – 320.Google Scholar

³⁴ Leading case BVerfGE 50 290 – Mitbestimmung.Google Scholar

³⁵ For the competitive aspect see below 3 c.Google Scholar

³⁶ Jean Jacques Rousseau: Contrat Social, Paris 1762, Book II Chapter III.Google Scholar

³⁷ Basic Michael Thompson/Richard Ellis/Aaron Wildavsky: Cultural Theory, Boulder 1990.Google Scholar

³⁸ Stimulating on both the performance and the possibility conditions Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons. The Evaluation of Institutions for Collective Actions, Cambridge 1990.Google Scholar

³⁹ I owe this stimulating comparison to Fritz Scharpf.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ I have fleshed this idea out in greater detail in Christoph Engel: Freiheit und Autonomie, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2003/9, http://www.mpprdg.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2003_9online.pdf (2/24/2004).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Leading case BVerfGE 61, 82, 105 – Sasbach.Google Scholar

⁴² BVerfGE 28, 295, 304.Google Scholar

⁴³ BAGE 1, 185, 193; even this court now makes a difference, BAGE 52, 88, 97 s.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ BVerfGE 15, 256, 262.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ BVerfGE 31, 314, 321 s.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ BVerfGE 19, 1, 5.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Constitutional lawyers sometimes posit the opposite, see e.g. Kluth (note 40) 28.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ BVerfGE 13, 174, 175.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ In German, the four tests are usually called: “Legitimer Zweck, Geeignetheit, Erforderlichkeit, Angemessenheit”, see only BVerfGE 67, 157, 173 and Peter Lerche: Übermass und Verfassungsrecht. Zur Bindung des Gesetzgebers an die Grundsätze der Verhältnismässigkeit und der Erforderlichkeit, 2nd. Edition (1999).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The only question may be whether any legitimate aim is sufficient (BVerfGE 30, 227, 243) or whether Article 9, par. 2, Basic Law is limitational, too (von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck-Kempen) ⁴ Article 9 GG, R 163 s.Google Scholar

⁵¹ BVerfGE 79, 127, 146 ss. and in particular 152 ss. – Rastede; for the (small) differences see e.g. Friedrich Schoch: Zur Situation der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung nach der Rastede-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in: Verwaltungsarchiv 81 (1990) 18-54 (26 ss.).Google Scholar

⁵² According to established jurisprudence, this power is not limited to fundamental freedoms that give it explicitly to government. Any fundamental freedom is, in other words, an implicit limitation to any other, BVerfGE 39, I 43. This is the dogmatic effect of the already-mentioned principle of practical concordance, see above at note 33. As long as the contents of private regulation remains unspecified, one cannot determine which freedoms of addressees the government could rely on.Google Scholar

⁵³ This is the main point of Lawrence Lessig: Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York 1999, 6, 13 and passim; James Boyle: Foucault in Cyberspace. Surveillance, Sovereignty and Hard-Wired Censors, in: University of Cincinnati Law Review 66 (1997) 177 – 205 (177 and passim).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Basic Jack Knight: Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge 1993.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁵ Basic George J. Stigler: Theory of Economic Regulation, in: Bell Journal of Economics 2 (1971) 3 – 21.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Characteristic A. Michael Froomkin: Of Government and Governance, in: Berkeley High Technology Law Journal: “it is another thing to tolerate private sector leadership when it clothes itself in the guise of ‘bottom-up rulemaking’ but actually seeks to use government or government-like power to lock in advantages enjoyed by established firms, often at the expense of consumers or new competitors”.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See below 3 a.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Critical for that reason David G. Post: Governing Cyberspace, in: Wayne Law Review 43 (1996) 154 – 171 (at footnote 30).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ This holds true for many German businesses, which are legally obliged to be a member of the respective business chamber. These chambers usually have some regulatory authority. For an overview of the complicated practice see Rainer Pitschas: Recht der Freien Berufe, in: Reiner Schmidt (ed.), Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht Besonderer Teil A 2, Berlin 1996, 1 – 126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁰ See again Akerlof Quarterly Journal of Economics 1997 (note 7).Google Scholar

⁶¹ This position is not unquestioned, and the constitutional jurisprudence is not fully clear. For the details see Stern, Klaus: Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland III Allgemeine Lehren der Grundrechte § 86 (897 – 899) on constitutional jurisprudence.Google Scholar

⁶² See below e.Google Scholar

⁶³ Albert O. Hirschman: Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Hesse (note 33) R 317 – 319. Those with a less liberal attitude towards practical concordance (for an overview see Stern [note 61] § 81 IV) do not reach a different result, but they have to use a different dogmatic technique. They have to interpret the conflicting fundamental freedoms in light of corroborating objective constitutional law.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ From the many doctrinal voices see only the following three: Udo Di Fabio: Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht zwischen gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung und staatlicher Steuerung: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 56 (1997) 235 – 282 (263 – 268); Neil W. Netanel: Cyberspace Self-Governance. A Sceptical View from Democratic Theory, in: 88 Cal. L. Rev. 395 (2000); Walter Leisner: Verfassungsgrenzen privater Selbstregulierung, in: Michael Kloepfer (ed.): Selbst-Beherrschung im technischen und ökologischen Bereich. Selbststeuerung und Selbstregulierung in der Technik-Entwicklung und im Umweltschutz 151 151 (1998): there is a “danger that all anti-power mechanisms of public law fail”.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ I am grateful to to Kenneth H. Keller for this idea.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ On the danger of excessive efficacy see below III 1.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See above at note 54.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ BVerfGE 4, 7, 17 s.; 50, 190, 337; from the abundant literature see only Christian Koenig: Die öffentlichrechtliche Verteilungslenkung. Grund und Grenzen einer Deregulierung am Beispiel der Vergabe von Konzessionen, Kontingenten und Genehmigungen zur unternehmerischen Nutzung öffentlich verwalteter Güter (Schriften zum öffentlichen Recht 655) Berlin 1994, 51 – 71.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See only art. 4 par.1 EC Treaty, more from Christoph Engel: Europarechtliche Grenzen für die Industriepolitik, in: Hans-Werner-Rengeling (ed.): Europäisierung des Rechts (1996), 35 – 67 (46 – 52).Google Scholar

⁷¹ See BVerfGE 17, 306, 314; for a more elaborate treatment under the parallel guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights see Engel, Christoph: Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Law and Economics of International Telecommunications 19) Baden-Baden 1993, 459 – 461 (with references to the more specific parts of the book).Google Scholar

⁷² Characteristic BVerfGE 80, 137, 159 ss. – Reiten im Walde.Google Scholar

⁷³ Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem: Effizienz als Herausforderung an das Verwaltungsrecht – Einleitende Problemskizze, in: id./Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann (ed.): Effizienz als Herausforderung an das Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 11 – 59 (31 s.) alludes to this.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ More on this below 4 b.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ For greater detail see above b – d.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Basic on the importance of the latter for the law Gunther Teubner: Recht als autopoietisches System, Frankfurt 1989; more on the importance for the principle of proportionality from Christoph Engel: The Constitutional Court – Applying the Proportionality Principle – as a Subsidiary Authority for the Assessment of Political Outcomes, Preprint der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter Bonn 2001/10.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ BVerfGE 4, 157, 169; for a summary of the literary discussion on the decision see Engel, Christoph: Völkerrecht als Tatbestandsmerkmal deutscher Normen (Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht 19) Berlin 1989, 166–175.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ BVerfGE 92, 26.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ From the large literature on regulatory competition see only the following three titles: Lüder Gerken (ed.): Competition Among Institutions (1995); Markus Müller: Systemwettbewerb, Harmonisierung und Wettbewerbsverzerrung. Europa zwischen einem Wettbewerb der Gesetzgeber und vollständiger Harmonisierung (2000); Henri I.T. Tjiong: Breaking the Spell of Regulatory Competition. Reframing the Problem of Regulatory Exit, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 66 (2002) 66-97.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ For a succinct introduction into systems theory see Luhmann, Niklas: Ökologische Kommunikation. Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf ökologische Gefährdungen einstellen? (1990); another conceptual possibility for making the same point is offered by Gerhard Wegner: Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen Selbst- und Fremdsteuerung. Ein neuer Ansatz (1996), Wegner stresses the possibility that addressees react creatively to governance impulses.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Convincing: Teubner (note 76) 81-122.Google Scholar

⁸² More on this by Christoph Engel: Delineating the Proper Scope of Government – a Proper Task for a Constitutional Court?, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157 (2001) 187-219.Google Scholar

⁸³ From the literature see only Heun, Werner: Funktionell-rechtliche Schranken der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Reichweite und Grenzen einer dogmatischen Argumentationsfigur (1992).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ BVerfGE 50, 290, 332 s.; more from Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann: Staatliche Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit. Juristische und ökonomische Vorgaben, in: Joachim Lege (ed.): Gentechnik im nichtmenschlichen Bereich – was kann und was sollte das Recht regeln ? 51-88 (2001)Google Scholar

⁸⁵ For the details see §§ 1025-1065, and § 1059 Zivilprozeßordnung in particular; for a political scientists perspective on arbitration see Lehmkuhl, Dieter: Commercial Arbitration. A Case of Private Transnational Self-Governance ? (Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter Bonn 2000/1).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See above b.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ On other instances of deliberate competitive pressure on regulation see Engel, Christoph: Legal Experiences of Competition Among Institutions, in: Gerken (note 79) 89-118 (108-115).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Cf. Kenneth W. Dam: Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (Chicago John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 59) Chicago 1998, 10 s. and passim.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ For some details see below IV.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See above 2 a.Google Scholar

⁹¹ See again Hirschman (note 63).Google Scholar

⁹² See above 2 b.Google Scholar

⁹³ BVerfGE 10, 89, 102.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ BVerfGE 50, 290, 354 s. – Mitbestimmung. The court does not use the dogmatic tools thus developed. Instead it relies on an extra limitation to fundamental freedoms for the development of abstract legal regimes. Basic on this Gerd Morgenthaler: Freiheit durch Gesetz. Der parlamentarische Gesetzgeber als der Erstadressat von Grundrechten (1999); Martin Gellermann: Grundrechte in einfachgesetzlichem Gewande. Untersuchung zur normativen Ausgestaltung der Freiheitsrechte (2000); critical Christoph Engel: Rundfunk in Freiheit, in: Archiv für Presserecht 1994, 185–191.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Stimulating Milos Vec: Aushöhlung des Staates? Selbst-Normierung im Staat der Industriegesellschaft als historisches Problem, in: Rechtshistorisches Journal 19 (2000) 517-532.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ The decisive question is whether the courts would treat private regulation as an entrepreneurial activity.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See above 2 a.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ For a succint presentation of the ordo-liberal perspective see Vanberg, Victor: Freiburg School of Law and Economics, in: Peter Newman (Ed.): The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law II, 172-179.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See only Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker: Wirtschaftsordung und Staatsverfassung, in: id.: Recht und ökonomisches Gesetz. Über die Grenzen von Staat, Gesellschaft und Privatautonomie (Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik 50) Baden Baden² 1984, 33–68.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Cf. above 2 e.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ BVerfGE 1, 97, 101 s. This procedural situation is somewhat unsatisfactory, if the private regulatory body is already dismantled when the Constitutional Court finally decides upon the constitutional complaint of the addressees.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Out of the rich literature see only Matthias Schmidt-Preuss: Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht zwischen gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung und staatlicher Steuerung, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 56 (1997) 160-234 (172); Di Fabio (note 65) 254.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ See above 2 a.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ See BAGE 1, 185, 193.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Comprehensive Stern (note 61) 76.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ BAGE 52, 88, 97 s.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Characteristic BVerfGE 88, 203.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See above 2 a.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ For an overview see again Dietlein (note 16).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See above 2 e.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ For greater detail regarding Internet contents regulation see Engel, Christoph: The Internet and the Nation State, in: id./Kenneth H. Keller (eds.): Understanding the Impact of Global Networks on Local Social, Political and Cultural Values (Law and Economics of International Telecommunications 42) Baden-Baden 2000, 201-260 (245-258).Google Scholar

¹¹² For greater detail see Teubner (note 76) 102-111.Google Scholar

¹¹³ See above 2 b.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ For greater detail see Engel, Christoph: Die Grammatik des Rechts, in: Hans-Werner Rengeling (ed.): Instrumente des Umweltschutzes im Wirkungsverbund Baden-Baden 2001, 17–49.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ For greater detail see Engel, Christoph: Offene Gemeinwohldefinitionen, in: Rechtstheorie 32 (2001) 23-52.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ For greater detail see Windhoff-Héritier, Adrienne: Politikimplementation. Ziel und Wirklichkeit politischer Entscheidungen, Königstein 1980, 29–31.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ For greater detail see Engel, Christoph: Legal Responses to Bounded Rationality in German Administration, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1994, 145–162.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Insight of Wegner (note 80).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Cf. Renate Mayntz: Implementation von regulativer Politik, in: id. (ed.): Implementation politischer Programme II, Opladen 1983, 50-74 (65-69).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹²⁰ More on this by Iris Bohnet: Kooperation und Kommunikation. Eine ökonomische Analyse individueller Entscheidungen (Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften 98) Tübingen 1997.Google Scholar

¹²¹ See again Hirschman (note 63).Google Scholar

¹²² See only the leading article by W. Brian Arthur: Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events, in: Economic Journal 99 (1989) 116-131.Google Scholar

¹²³ Extensively Stefan Okruch: Innovation und Diffusion von Normen. Grundlagen und Elemente einer evolutorischen Theorie des Institutionenwandels, Berlin 1999.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Boyle University of Cincinnati Law Review 1997 (note 53) 177; Lessig (note 53) 136 and passim.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ The intuition is old, see already Schumpeter, Joseph A.: Konjunkturzyklen, Göttingen 1961 [1939] 57 s.; see further Aakerman, Nordel: The Necessity of Friction, Heidelberg 1993; Gernot Grabherr: Lob der Verschwendung, Berlin 1994; Stefan Okruch: Evolutorische Wirtschaftspolitik. Von der positiven zur normativen Theorie, in: Carsten Herrmann-Pillath / Markus Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (eds.): Handbuch zur evolutorischen Ökonomik, Heidelberg (forthcoming).Google Scholar

¹²⁶ See e.g. Martignon, Laura / Hoffrage, Ulrich: Why Does One-reason Decision Making Work, A Case Study in Ecological Rationality, in: Gerd Gigerenzer / Peter M. Todd (eds.): Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, New York 1999, 119-140 (128 s. and passim).Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Cf. above II 2 b.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ See above II 4 b.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ The professional jargon calls this the “doctrine of essentiality”, leading case BVerfGE 49, 89, 126 s.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Typical Hartmut Maurer: Staatsrecht, Munich 1999, § 8, R 19.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Walter Pauly: Der Regelungsvorbehalt, in: Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1991, 521-524 (523); cf. also Martin Schulte: Schlichtes Verwaltungshandeln. Verfassungs- und verwaltungsrechtsdogmatische Strukturüberlegungen am Beispiel des Umweltrechts (Jus Publicum 12) Tübingen 1995, 132.Google Scholar

¹³² German constitutionalists call this “the protection of fundamental freedoms by procedure”, leading case BVerfGE 47, 46 – Sexualkunde.Google Scholar

¹³³ Cf. Schulte (note 131) 116-123.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Cf. Pauly (note 131) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1991, 521.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ See in particular Pauly (note 131) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1991, 521 ss.; further references by Schulte (note 131) 124; Schulte himself is opposed, id. 125-132.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ See above 1.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ See above II 1.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Or if constitutional law superseded the charter.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ See above II 2 a.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ See above II 3 a.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ See above II 3 b.Google Scholar

¹⁴² See above II 3 c.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ See above II 4 b.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See above II 5 b.Google Scholar