¹ Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, Boston, Beacon Press, 1996 Google Scholar; Brock, Gillian, ‘Liberal Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism: Locating the Disputes’, Public Affairs Quarterly, 16:4, 2002, pp. 307–27Google Scholar.

² Cosmopolitans argue that it is important for people to think of themselves as ‘citizens of the world’, and to feel a strong sense of obligation to all human beings, whether or not they are our co-nationals. I agree with this. But cosmopolitans typically assume that the most effective way to get people to fulfil their obligations to non-nationals is to present these obligations as flowing solely from individual to individual on the basis of our common humanity, unmediated by appeals to national identity. I doubt this. In many cases, I think the most effective way to get people to take seriously their international obligations is to present them as a matter of national honour and national identity: i.e., that it is the ‘Canadian’ thing to do, and that it would cast shame on Canada's reputation internationally if Canadians were seen as selfish or indifferent. Many charitable organizations are well aware of this, and build appeals to national identity into their fund-raising campaigns. They have found, through experience, that appealing to national identity is an effective way of raising money to help non-nationals. People who identify strongly with their nation often want their nation to be well-respected by others, and to be seen as a decent and honourable society. This national vanity, if you like, can be turned into a powerful motivation for international humanitarianism. It is important to clarify here that this is a debate over motivation, not philosophical justification. If we ask why these international obligations are indeed matters of moral obligation, the answer will appeal to universal ideals of common humanity, not to ideas of national identity or national honour. But if we ask how best to motivate people to act upon these humanitarian obligations, the answer in some cases, I believe, is to appeal to national identity. Strong national identities can be a resource, not an obstacle, to motivating people to fulfil international obligations. Cosmopolitans also typically assume in order to ‘make room’ for ideas of being a citizen of the world, we need to reduce the psychological room occupied by the idea of being a citizen of a particular nation. But here again, I think that feelings of national citizenship can be levered to support ideas of world citizenship, in those countries where internationalism is seen as part of the national character or national tradition.

³ Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia tortured a boy to death.

⁴ According to a 1997 survey, 94% of Canadians agreed with the statement that ‘Canada is a world leader in working for peace and human rights around the world’. Apparently, most people around the world agree that Canada is a world-leader in this regard, according to the 20-country survey reported in Angus Reid Group, Canada and the World: an International Perspective on Canada and Canadians, Ottawa, Angus Reid Group, 1997 Google ScholarPubMed.

⁵ For evidence that Canadians are indeed viewed around the world as ‘honest’, ‘friendly’ and ‘polite’ (but not very ‘sexy’), see Angus Reid, Canada and the World.

⁶ It was therefore a shock to many Canadians when Canada was singled out in a recent Al Qaeda message as a possible target for terrorist attack. This has led to a public debate about whether Canadians travelling overseas should no longer sport the Canadian flag.

⁷ For polling evidence that Canadians are indeed more open than Europeans to change in general, see Nevitte, Neil, The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective, Peterborough, Broadview, 1996, pp. 97–101 Google Scholar. Openness to immigrants is reflected in Canada's policy of admitting 1% of its population each year as new immigrants – the highest per capita immigration rate in the world alongside Australia. Surveys show that many Canadians think this is ‘too many’, and one political party (the Canadian Alliance) has campaigned on the platform of cutting the intake to 0.5% a year. This is often described as an ‘anti-immigration’ platform, but 0.5% is roughly equivalent to the American level of immigration. In other words, the debate between ‘pro-immigration’ and ‘anti-immigration’ parties in Canada is a debate between those who think Canada should be tied (with Australia) for first in the world in per-capita immigration and those who think Canada should be tied (with the US) for second in the world in per-capita immigration. Even the ‘anti-immigrant’ section of the Canadian populace is more welcoming of immigrants than most European citizens.

⁸ Lipset, Seymour, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada, Ottawa, C. D. Howe Institute, 1990 Google Scholar.

⁹ See Nevitte's discussion of several of these examples in The Decline of Deference, including evidence that Canadians are less deferential to authority than Americans (p. 79); more permissive of political protest (p. 96); more open to and welcoming of change (p. 97); more tolerant of homosexuality and divorce (p. 217), and more egalitarian regarding gender relations (p. 248). For example, Americans are more than twice as likely as Canadians to believe that ‘the father must be the master in his own house’ (44% vs 19%), and the difference has been growing ( Adams, Michael, Better Happy than Rich? Canadians, Money and the Meaning of Life, Toronto, Penguin, 2000, pp. 25–7)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ N. Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, op. cit.

¹¹ I say ‘alleged’ because the evidence suggests that Americans are much less isolationist than many people (including their own political leaders) suppose. See Kull, Steven and Drestler, I. M., Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1999 Google Scholar.

¹² Galbraith, John Kenneth, The Affluent Society, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1958 Google Scholar.

¹³ Heath, Joseph, The Efficient Society: Why Canada is as Close to Utopia as it Gets, Toronto, Viking, 2001 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism, London, Sage, 1997 Google Scholar.

¹⁵ For a description of the strong pull that the US has on talented Canadians, see Simpson, Jeffrey, Star-Spangled Canadians: Canadians Living the American Dream, Toronto, HarperCollins, 2000 Google Scholar. Right-wing parties in Canada claim that people move to the US because of its lower tax-rate, and so argue that Canada should cut the tax rate in order to maintain our best and brightest. However, as Simpson shows, the main motivation for emigrating to the US is not taxes or income more generally, but rather greater opportunity for professional accomplishment. American companies are more likely to be at the cutting edge of product development; American universities and hospitals are more likely to be at the cutting edge of research; American NGOs are more likely to have a seat at the table of influential projects; and so on.

¹⁶ It also soothes some of the resentment that comes from the fact that the US seems to take Canada's support for granted on international issues, without asking for Canada's advice, and without showing much gratitude for the support. This is a sore point, but it seems that most of America's allies feel the same way.

¹⁷ It should be noted, however, that Canada is a regionalized country, and there are regional variations in these attitudes. There is a strand of right-wing populism in Western Canada, particularly Alberta, that does not share some of the attitudes I have just described, particularly regarding the international community (towards which it is more sceptical) and the United States (towards which it is more friendly).

¹⁸ Gywn, Richard, Nationalism without Walls: TheUnbearable Lightness ofBeing Canadian, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1995 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Laczko, Leslie, ‘Canada's Pluralism in Comparative Perspective’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17:1 (1994), pp. 20–41 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ ‘Survey of Canada’, The Economist, 29 06 1991, page 3 Google ScholarPubMed.

²¹ For a more detailed discussion of these three trends, see my Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, chs 5–9Google Scholar.

²² Glazer, Nathan, We are All Multiculturalists Now, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1997 Google Scholar.

²³ For the British model of multiculturalism through race relations, see Favell, Adrian, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain, revised edn, New York, St Martin's Press, 2001 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ France is the main exception, in its refusal to grant autonomy to its main substate nationalist group in Corsica. However, even here, legislation was in fact adopted to accord autonomy to Corsica, and it was only a strange ruling of the Constitutional Court which prevented its implementation. France too, I think, will soon join the bandwagon.

²⁵ I have elsewhere discussed these underlying sociological factors under four headings: demographics; rights-consciounsess; democracy; and geopolitical security. See ‘Canadian Multiculturalism in Historical and Comparative Perspective: Is Canada Unique?’, Constitutional Forum, forthcoming.

²⁶ Bashevkin, Sylvia, True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1991 Google Scholar.

²⁷ N. Nevitte, Decline of Deference, op. cit., p. 73; McRoberts, Kenneth, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1997 Google Scholar.

²⁸ On the other hand, if immigrants have a choice between Canada and the United States, they typically choose the US.

²⁹ Polls in Canada often ask whether Quebeckers think of themselves as ‘Canadian only’, ‘more Canadian than Québécois’, ‘equally Canadian and Québécois’, ‘more Québécois than Canadian’ or ‘Québécois only’. The numbers of people reporting their identity as primarily or equally Canadian has dropped regularly. See K. McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada; Matthew Mendelsohn, ‘Measuring Identity and Patterns of Attachment: The Case of Quebec’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, forthcoming.

³⁰ See K. McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, op. cit., chs 6–7.

³¹ See, for example, Shabani, O. A. P., ‘Who is Afraid of Constitutional Patriotism?’, Social Theory and Practice, 28:3 (2002), pp. 419–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² We can find similar examples within the Aboriginal community. The increasing influence of Western values and Western education within Aboriginal communities has not guaranteed that Aboriginals ‘feel Canadian’. While some Aboriginal leaders reject Western liberal values, even those who generally accept them do not always identify themselves as Canadian.

³³ Norman, Wayne, ‘The Ideology of Shared Values’, in Carens, Joseph (ed.), Is Quebec Nationalism Just?, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995, pp. 137–59Google Scholar; Schneiderman, David, ‘Human Rights, Fundamental Differences? Multiple Charters in a Partnership Frame’, in Laforest, Guy and Gibbins, Roger (eds), Beyond the Impasse: Toward Reconciliation, Montreal, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1998 Google Scholar.

³⁴ Taylor, Charles, ‘Shared and Divergent Values’, in Watts, Ronald and Brown, D. (eds), Options for a New Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, pp. 53–76 Google Scholar.

³⁵ See M. Mendelsohn, ‘Measuring Identity’, op. cit.

³⁶ Some defenders of ‘sovereignty-association’ have implied that a sovereign Quebec could still enjoy Canadian citizenship and passports.

⁵⁷ This may seem to resurrect Rawls's account of social unity. After all, have I not just agreed with Rawls that people cooperate in political institutions because they view these institutions as reasonably just? However, Rawls goes further and argues that this perception of the justness of institutions guarantees social unity, and leads people to view themselves as members of ‘one cooperative scheme in perpetuity’. So for Rawls, where people perceive public institutions as just, they will not support secession. In the Canadian case, however, while perceptions of just institutions lead to cooperation, they have not undermined secessionist beliefs. Rawls rightly emphasizes the importance of a broad consensus on certain political principles and of the public's perception that these principles are upheld by public institutions. These are indeed necessary conditions of a viable and just liberal-democracy. But Rawls also argues that where these conditions are met, this is a sufficient condition of political unity – i.e. that these conditions guarantee that people will continue to want to live together in a single state. And this, it seems to me, is wrong in the Canadian case. These conditions help to sustain day-to-day cooperation with pan-Canadian institutions, but do not resolve the question of whether the Québécois would like to secede and form a separate state. For more on my disagreement with Rawls on this point, see my Politics in the Vernacular, ch. 5.

³⁸ The same dynamic would almost certainly exist in reverse if Quebec were to secede. Even if a clear majority in Quebec voted to secede, there would still be many anglophone and immigrant Quebeckers who identify more with Canada than Quebec, and who would therefore have trouble identifying with their new country. Yet so long as the new Quebec state operated in accordance with high standards of the rule of law, human and minority rights, impartiality, democratic accountability and so on, then these people would almost certainly cooperate to ensure the successful functioning of Quebec institutions. Their lack of a strong sense of Quebec identity would not prevent them from recognizing and participating in trustworthy and legitimate institutions.

³⁹ Russia provides some confirming evidence from the opposite direction. There are very high levels of national identification with the Russian political community, but very little willingness to cooperate with the institutions of the state, which are seen as neither impartial nor effective. Strong identification does not guarantee active cooperation; weak identification does not preclude active cooperation.

⁴⁰ Offe, Claus, ‘“Homogeneity” and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity Conflicts with Group Rights’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 6:2 (1998), p. 120 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Offe, , ‘Political Liberalism, Group Rights and the Politics of Fear and Trust’, Studies in East European Thought, 53 (2001), pp. 167–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ By saying it is banal, I do not mean to imply that it is trivial or benign. On the contrary, the process of publicly negotiating identities occurs within a field of power relations that construct and sustain various forms of assimilation, inequality, oppression, hierarchies and expertise. Powerful actors seek to contain or shape this process of negotiation, including both state actors and corporate actors, trying to bend it to the logic of governmentality or corporate profitability. Identity politics is not immune from the power relations that affect all other forms of domestic politics, including Offe's ‘interest politics’. That indeed, is my point: identity conflicts are located within the same everyday logic of negotiation and power that shapes all domestic politics. For a discussion of the way the state seeks to strengthen itself by defining the field of identity negotiation in Canada, see Day, Richard, Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000 Google Scholar. For a discussion of how identity negotiations in Canada are shaped by global market forces, see Abu-Laban, Yasmeen, Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization, Peterborough, Ont., Broadview Press, 2002 Google Scholar. I would like to thank Jim Tully for pressing me on this point.

⁴² For a more detailed critique of Offe's claim that identity claims are nonnegotiable, see my ‘The Impact of Group Rights on Fear and Trust: A Response to Offe’, Hagar: International Social Science Review, 3:1 (2002), pp. 19–36 Google Scholar. Offe provides no evidence for this claim other than to cite an article where Hirschman makes the same claim ( Hirschman, Albert, ‘Social Conflict as Pillars of Democratic Market Society’, Political Theory, 22:4, 1994, pp. 203–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Unfortunately, Hirschman provides no evidence for the claim either. For a related critique of Offe and Hirschman, and a description of how identity claims are democratically managed through negotiated compromises, see Bellamy, Richard, Liberalism and Pluralism, New York, Routledge, 1999, chs 4–5Google Scholar.

⁴³ For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I'd like to thank Richard Bellamy, Sue Donaldson and James Tully.