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The Changeableness of Subnational Constitutions: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2017

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Abstract

Why have some German Land constitutions been changed more frequently than others? This is the basic research question addressed in this article. In addition and maybe even more importantly, for the first time the article will apply fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to the study of comparative constitutional policy, and thus will investigate what conditions explain the changeableness of subnational constitutions. Overall, I will argue that subnational constitutional policy is not just a manifestation of Germany’s consensus democracy. On the contrary, it seems that a crucial element of majoritarian democracy – that is, a low number of effective parties – appears to be a core condition for the changeableness of constitutions. In addition, the findings suggest that any theory striving to explain the frequency and scope of constitutional amendments in a comparative perspective should include both institutional and party factors.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press 2017 
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Table 1Features of German Land Constitutions (as of December 2014)

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Table 2Configurational Conditions for the Changeableness of German Land Constitutions

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Table 3Constitutional Changeableness: Thresholds for the Degree of Membership in the Conditions and the Outcome

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Table 4Fuzzy-set Scores for Configurations of Conditions

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Table 5Necessary Conditions for Constitutional Changeability

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Table 6Constitutional Changeableness: Truth Table

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Table 7Intermediate Solution: Sufficiency Conditions for Constitutional Changeableness