¹ I thank Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and David Held for their comments on the draft of this article.

² Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust, New York, Free Press, 1975; see also the Commission on Global Governance's rather broad conceptualization in Our Global Neighbourhood, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.

³ See Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. See also the excellent reviews in Renate Mayntz, New Challenges to Governance Theory, Jean Monnet Papers, Florence, European University Institute, 1998; Renate Mayntz, ‘Common Goods and Governance,’ in Adrienne Heritier (ed.), Common Goods. Reinventing European and International Governance, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, pp. 15–27.

⁴ On these concepts see, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989.

⁵ For a discussion see Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002; Claire A. Cutler et al. (eds), Private Authority and International Affairs, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1999; Virginia Haufler, ‘Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non-State Actors’, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 94–111; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy. Governing without Government?, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1998; Wolfgang H. Reinicke and Francis Deng, Critical Choices. The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2000.

⁶ On PPPs see Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau (ed.), Public-Private Policy Partnerships, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2000; Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International Governance?,’ in Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly (eds), Reconstituting Political Authority: Complex Sovereignty and the Foundations of Global Governance, forthcoming.

⁷ Mayntz, ‘Common Goods and Governance’, op. cit., p. 21.

⁸ This is not to suggest that non-hierarchical steering does not occur inside nation-states or inside the EU. However, the new modes of governance take place under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ in those institutional contexts.

⁹ On this point see also Hurd, Ian, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,’ International Organization, 53: 2 (1999), pp. 379–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ On the ‘logic of appropriateness’ versus the ‘logic of consequentialism’ see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, New York, Free Press, 1989; March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, International Organization, 52: 4 (1998), pp. 943–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ For the following see Thomas Risse, ‘ “Let's Argue!” Communicative Action in International Relations’, International Organization, 54: 1 (2000), pp. 1–39; Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse, ‘Arguing and Persuasion in Multilateral Negotiations: Theoretical Approach and Research Design’, paper presented at the Fourth Pan European International Relations Conference, University of Kent, Canterbury, 7–10 September 2001.

¹² Jürgen Habermas calls this ‘communicative action’, Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 vols, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1981. Since communications are all-pervasive in social action and interaction – including strategic behaviour (see below), I prefer the term ‘argumentative’ rationality, since the goal of such communicative behaviour is to reach argumentative consensus on validity claims of norms or assertions about the world.

¹³ Ibid., vol. 1, p. 385 (my translation). For the following, see Volker von Prittwitz (ed.), Verhandeln und Argumentieren. Dialog, Interessen und Macht in der Umweltpolitik, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996; Thomas Saretzki, ‘Wie unterscheiden sich Argumentieren und Verhandeln?’, in von Prittwitz, Verhandeln und Argumentieren, op. cit., pp. 19–39; Lars G. Lose, ‘Communicative Action and the Social Construction of Diplomatic Societies: Communication and Behavior in the Real World’, paper presented at the Femmoller Workshop, 24–8 June 1998; Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and Weigard, Jarle, ‘Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 20: 3 (1997), pp. 219–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Müller, Harald, ‘Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln. Zur Kritik der utilitaristischen Handlungstheorien’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 1: 1 (1994), pp. 15–44; 28 (my translation).Google Scholar See also Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics. Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

¹⁵ Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 209.

¹⁶ Lose, ‘Communicative Action and the Social Construction of Diplomatic Societies’, op. cit. p. 9.

¹⁷ Cf. Saretzki, ‘Wie unterscheiden sich Argumentieren und Verhandeln?’, op. cit., pp. 32–6. See also Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, The Storr Lectures, New Haven, Yale Law School, 1991, p. 5.

¹⁸ Eriksen and Weigard, ‘Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?’, op. cit., p. 227.

¹⁹ For the following see Ulbert and Risse, ‘Arguing and Persuasion in Multilateral Negotiations: Theoretical Approach and Research Design’, op. cit.; Holzinger, Katharina, ‘Verhandeln statt Argumentieren oder Verhandeln durch Argumentieren? Eine empirische Analyse auf der Basis der Sprechakttheorie’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 42: 3 (2001), pp. 414–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ Risse, Thomas, ‘International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area’, Politics & Society, 27: 4 (1999), pp. 526–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ A third and fourth way would be voting and coercion which are neglected here. Very few international bodies use voting procedures in negotiation systems. As to coercion, it is ultimately based on the threat to use force and is inconsistent with voluntary agreement.

²² See Steffek, Jens, ‘The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach’, European Journal of International Relations, 9: 2 (2003), pp. 249–75; 264,CrossRefGoogle Scholar on this point.

²³ See Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Enlargement of the EU’, op. cit.; Frank Schimmelfennig, Rules and Rhetoric. The Eastern Enlargement of NATO and the European Union, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

²⁴ See Risse, ‘International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area’, op. cit.

²⁵ For such a procedure see Holzinger, ‘Verhandeln statt Argumentieren oder Verhandeln durch Argumentieren?’, op. cit; Holzinger, ‘Kommunikationsmodi und Handlungstypen in den Internationalen Beziehungen’, op. cit.

²⁶ For the following see Cornelia Ulbert et al., Arguing and Persuasion in Multilateral Negotiations, Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, Freie Universität Berlin and Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, forthcoming.

²⁷ See Payne, Rodger A., ‘Persuasion, Frames, and Norm Construction’, European Journal of International Relations, 7: 1 (2001), pp. 37–61;CrossRefGoogle Scholar William A. Gamson, Talking Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

²⁸ On trisectoral networks in general see Reinicke, Global Public Policy. Governing without Government?, op. cit.; Reinicke and Deng, Critical Choices. The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance, op. cit. See also Hall and Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, op. cit.

²⁹ On the latter groups see Peter M. Haas (ed.), ‘Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization, 46 (special issue, 1992); Margret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1998.

³⁰ See, e.g., Sanjeev Khagram, ‘Toward Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development: Transnational Civil Society Organizing Around Big Dams’, in Ann M. Florini (ed.), The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo and Washington, DC, Japan Centre for International Exchange and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, pp. 83–114; Dingwerth, Klaus, ‘Globale Politiknetzwerke und ihre demokratische Legitimation’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 10: 1 (2003), pp. 69–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ On the latter see, e.g., European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.

³² For some propositions see also Checkel, Jeffrey T., ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, International Organization, 55: 3 (2001), pp. 553–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ On compliance problems in general see Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations, and Compliance’, in Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds), Handbook of International Relations, London, Sage, 2002, pp. 538–58; Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Die Wirkung internationaler Institutionen: Von der Normanerkennung zur Normeinhaltung’, in Markus Jachtenfuchs and Michele Knodt (eds), Regieren in internationalen Institutionen. Festschrift für Beate Kohler-Koch, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2002, pp. 141–81; Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, op. cit.

³⁴ On legalization see Judith L. Goldstein et al. (eds), ‘Legalization and World Politics’, International Organization, 54: 3 (special issue, 2000).

³⁵ See also Keith, Linda Camp, ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?’, Journal of Peace Research, 36: 1 (1999), pp. 95–118;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Andrea Liese, ‘Staaten am Pranger. Zur Wirkung internationaler Regime auf die innerstaatliche Menschenrechtspolitik’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Universität Bremen, 2001.

³⁶ On the concept of ‘norm cascades’ see Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52: 4 (1998), pp. 887–917.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ On the logic of appropriateness see March and Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, op. cit. It must be noted here, however, that internalization of norms does not necessarily require that actors are personally convinced of the moral validity of a norm. It is sufficient that they know about what (international) society expects of them. See on this point Ronald L. Jepperson, ‘The Development and Application of Sociological Institutionalism’, in Joseph Berger and Zelditch Morris Jr. (eds), New Directions in Sociological Theory: The Growth of Contemporary Theories, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 229–66.

³⁸ See Thomas Risse et al. (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, Thomas Risse et al., Die Macht der Menschenrechte. Internationale Normen, kommunikatives Handeln und politischer Wandel in den Ländern des Südens, Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2002. On socialization in general see also Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, forthcoming.

³⁹ For the following see Risse, ‘International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area’, op. cit.

⁴⁰ See Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, op. cit., Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1992; Jon Elster, ‘Introduction’, in Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1–18; 12.

⁴¹ See Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia Handler, ‘On Compliance’, International Organization, 47: 2 (1993), pp. 175–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² On deliberative democracy and global governance see particularly David Held, Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Klaus Dieter Wolf, Die Neue Staatsräson – Zwischenstaatliche Kooperation als Demokratieproblem in der Weltgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000; James Bohman and William Regh, Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997; Elster, Deliberative Democracy, op. cit., Joerges, Christian and Neyer, Jürgen, ‘Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (1997), pp. 609–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴³ Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, op. cit., p. 387.

⁴⁴ See Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Take the World Commission on Dams: a construction industry representative actually changed his position during the negotiations as a result of which the sending body did not accept the Commission's final report, thereby seriously hampering the implementation of the deal.

⁴⁶ ‘Two level arguing’ is analogous to Putnam's ‘two level games,’ see Putnam, Robert, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 42: 2 (1988), pp. 427–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I thank Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and David Held for alerting me to this point.