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Local-Level Accountability in a Dominant Party System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2016

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Abstract

This article investigates accountability in South Africa’s dominant party system by studying how the African National Congress (ANC) reacts to electoral incentives at the local level. It compares the ANC’s degree of responsiveness to voters across municipalities with different levels of political competition. The analysis focuses on whether and under which conditions the ANC is more likely to renominate better quality municipal councillors. It examines the relationship between renomination as ANC municipal councillor and local government performance – as measured by voter signals, service delivery and audit outcomes. The results show that the ANC does indeed adapt its behaviour to electoral incentives. In municipalities where the ANC has larger margins of victory, performance matters little for renomination. In contrast, in municipalities with higher electoral competition, local government performance is strongly correlated with renomination. These results suggest the need to expand dominant party research to topics of voter responsiveness and sub-national behaviour.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press 2016 
Figure 0

Figure 1Schematic Representation of the Approach

Figure 1

Figure 2Renomination Rates of Municipal Councillors

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Figure 32011 Renomination Status, ANC Councillors

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Table 1OLS Regression of 2011 Renominations on Voter Signals

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Table 2OLS Regression of Renomination on Changes in Access to Water

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Table 3OLS Regression of Renomination on Audit Outcomes, 2010

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Table 4OLS Regression of Renomination on Voter Signals with Competitiveness

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Table 5OLS Regression of Renomination on Access to Water with Competitiveness

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Table 6OLS Regression of Renomination on Audit Opinions with Competitiveness

Supplementary material: PDF

Wegner supplementary material

Appendix

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