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Spies in Ancient Greece1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2009

J. A. Richmond
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This paper is written to give some account of the part played by secret agents against foreign states. Only in the most incidental way will it mention secret agents who tried to detect internal dissent and conspiracy. Plato thought that all Greek states were in a permanent state of war, declared or undeclared. Even in modern times no two independent states have totally identical interests, and when negotiating about clashes of interests, in peacetime just as in war, any government will seek a position in which it can keep its own secrets and discern those of the opposing side. We know very little of Greek spying in time of peace. When diplomacy failed, Greek states could have recourse to war to attain their objectives. War requires some strategic plan of intended operations. In modern conditions many experts must have a hand in devising the plan, and it must be prepared well in advance. In the ancient world things were simpler. One wonders how many Carthaginians knew, or had to know, that Hannibal intended to march round the Mediterranean and attack Italy. Certainly he took the Romans by surprise. The execution of the plan is best entrusted so far as possible to a single commander, even in modern times. We know next to nothing about how military policy was determined in peacetime, but we have a little more information about conditions in times of war.

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Research Article
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Greece & Rome , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , April 1998, pp. 1 - 18
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1998

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References

Notes

2. These are especially characteristic of despotisms and flourished under the Roman Empire.

3. Laws 1.626a, cited by Starr, , op. cit., 2Google Scholar.

4. The Athenian practice of sending out a board of generals had as its most spectacular debâcle the destruction of the Sicilian Expedition in 413 B.C. Yet on occasion, even the democratic Ten Thousand could see that secrecy, if nothing else, was served by having a single commander (Xenophon, , An. 6.1.18)Google Scholar.

5. Onasánder 32.10.

6. The Romans adopted the word for military use, but used it to mean a ‘scouting ship’: litteris … per catascopum missis (‘a letter … having been sent by a scouting ship’), Bell. Afr. 26.3.

7. Kromayer, J. – Veith, G., Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer (Munich, 1928)Google Scholar.

8. Aeneas Tacticus 16.19–20.

9. Antiphanes, (CPG 2.274) in Athenaeus 2.66dGoogle Scholar; Demosthenes 18.133. Aeschines reproached Demosthenes for having personally twice tortured as a spy Anaxinus, whose guest he once had been. Demosthenes, it seems, did not deny the fact, retorting that he valued more highly the city's pinches of salt than the table of a stranger (Aeschin. 3.224).

10. A priori a bow would seem to be rather an unsuitable weapon for a spy at night: the light needed to use it would tend to make the spy conspicuous.

11. Iliad, 10.204–459.

12. Euripides, , Rhesus 208–13Google Scholar: see W. H. Porter's note ad loc.

13. 4. 242–58.

14. Starr, , op. cit., 21Google Scholar, Riepl, , op. cit., 442Google Scholar.

15. Alex. 5.2.

16. Demosthenes (18.137) explicitly denounced Aeschines as a spy for Philip.

17. Cf. Starr, , op. cit., 22–4Google Scholar. With merchants one may group skilled workers like physicians, musicians, architects, sculptors, teachers, and entertainers.

18. Aristotle, (Ath. 11.1) believed Solon's visit to Egypt combined trade and curiosityGoogle Scholar; whether Herodotus travelled among the Persians in the guise of a merchant, or attached to some kind of caravan of merchants, cannot be decided.

19. The Persians had profited by the desertion from the Egyptians to Cambyses of the wellinformed Greek mercenary captain, Phanes of Halicarnassus (Herodotus 3.4).

20. Revised by Dinon of Colophon in 80 books probably before Alexander set out (Jacoby, F., FGrHist 690)Google Scholar.

21. When the Persian King, Xerxes, invaded Greece, he was advised by Demaratus, an exiled king of Sparta. Disappointed Greek statesmen all too frequently fled to seek support from the Great King.

22. Something, however, must have been known from the tin traders who voyaged to Cornwall (Strabo 3.5.11, C 175–6).

23. Caes, . Gall. 4.21Google Scholar.

24. Caes, . Gall. 4.23Google Scholar.

25. Frederick the Great is said to have remarked that if his night-cap knew his plans he would throw it in the fire (referred to by Adcock, F. E., The Greek and Macedonian Art of War [Berkeley, 1957], 75)Google Scholar. This may derive from the reply by the Roman general Q. Metellus Pius to a friend, si huius consilii mei interiorem tunicam consciam sensero, continuo earn cremari iubebo (‘If I perceive that my undergarment is aware of this plan, I will order it to be burned at once’), Val. Max. 7.4.5.

26. Numbers 13.

27. Ubi, quoniam et illud firmius uisum est receptaculum, apud fidissimum amicorum delitescebat, Strategium quemdam ex Palatino milite senatorem, Constantinopolim quantum fieri poterat clanculo saepe intermeans, ut indicio eiusdam Strategii patuit, postquam saepius in factionis conscios inquisitum. ritu itaque sollertissimi cuiusdam speculatoris, ignotus ob squalorem uultus et maciem rumuscubs colligebat tune crebescentes … (‘In that place, since it seemed to be a more secure refuge, he lay hidden in the house of one of his most trustworthy friends, one of the Palatine guards who had become a senator, a man named Strategius, As secretly as he could he often wandered about Constantinople, as became clear from the evidence of Strategius after repeated interrogation of those with knowledge of his party. So, after the manner of a very skilful spy, undetected because of the filth and gauntness of his face, he used to gather the rumours that were then becoming abundant’), Amm. Marc. 26.6.4–6.

28. 18.132.

29. Anon. Strat. 42.7, 11 (cited in Austin, N. J. E. and Rankov, N. B., Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople [London, 1995], 59Google Scholar, from Dennis, G. T., Three Byzantine Military Treatises [Dumbarton Oaks Texts 9, Washington D.C., 1985], not accessible to me)Google Scholar.

30. Polyaenus 3.13.1.

31. In the Hellenistic period it seems that inspection of letters by custom officials was not confined to wartime: cf. Plaut, . Trin. 794, 810Google Scholar, Ter. Phorm. 150.

32. On passports see Radermacher, L., ‘Excursus zu Aristophanes' Vögeln’, WS 50 (1932), 26–36Google Scholar.

33. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway in 1940 largely was carried out by troops concealed in merchant vessels.

34. These measures are prescribed by Aeneas Tacticus (10.2–26) for their deterrent and preventive effects. It would be interesting to compare them with those taken in the United Kingdom by the passing of the Defence of the Realm Act in 1914, and in other countries also.

35. Thucydides (2.39.1) makes Pericles contrast this custom with the Athenian confidence in admitting strangers. However the 500 Dockyard Guards (Aristotle, , Ath. 24.3Google Scholar) hardly encouraged snoopers.

36. Strabo 14.2.5, C 653: τῶν δὲ ναυστάθμων τινὰ καὶ κρυπτὰ ἦν καὶ ἀπόρρητα τοῖς πολλοῖς, τῷ δῶ κατοπτεύσαντι ἢ παρελθόντι εἴσω θάνατος ὥριστο ἡ ζημία (‘Some of the harbours were both hidden and forbidden to the public. Death was the penalty prescribed for anyone who viewed them or entered inside’). The death penalty, when abolished for almost all other offences, was retained in Britain as the penalty for sabotage in Her Majesty's dockyards.

37. Aeneas Tacticus 28.1–2.

38. Aeneas Tacticus 5.

39. Aeneas Tacticus 29.2, 5.

40. Aeneas Tacticus 22.

41. Aeneas Tacticus 22.24.

42. On such a night the escape from Plataea took place: cf. Thuc. 3.22.1.

43. Aeneas Tacticus 26.1–4.

44. Aeneas Tacticus 26.12–14.

45. Aeneas Tacticus 24–5.

46. Aeneas Tacticus 37.6–7. As the ancients had no explosives, they mined to secure entry or to set fire to any timber used in the defences.

47. Herodotus 5.52, 1.123.3; Polyaenus 3.9.57; Plutarch, Pel. 8.3. A general, Pompiscus of Arcadia, who is otherwise unknown, seems to have been especially alert to the significance of roads (Polyaenus 5.33.1).

48. Onasander 10.15 and note 9 supra.

49. Aeneas Tacticus 6.1–3.

50. Onasander 10.22.

51. Diodorus Siculus 14.55; Polyaenus 5.10.2. Sealed orders were probably among the countermeasures taken by Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, in August 310 B.C. He was at war with Carthage, and planned to carry the war to Africa, sailing not by the natural route to Carthage by the south of Sicily, but by the longer northern route, to evade the hostile fleet. Justin talks of huius consilii … admirable silentium (22.4.3), and nullo militum sciente quo ueheretur (22.5.1). Some precautions must have been taken against the chance that ships might be scattered on the six day voyage (Diodorus Siculus 20.6.1). Similarly, Demetrius Poliorcetes took this measure in his surprise descent on Europe (Polyaenus 4.7.2). Cf. also Riepl, , op. cit., 302–3Google Scholar.

52. Aeneas Tacticus 9: cf. Onasander 23.3. Polyaenus (3.9.20) relates how Iphicrates used such a stratagem.

53. Herodotus 8.75; at the very least one may suspect some confusion in the account of the second mission, on which Sicinnus was alleged to have been sent after the battle, Herodotus 8.110: cf. Thucydides 1.137.4.

54. Onasander 10.9; attested in the case of Xerxes (Herodotus 7.146) and others.

55. Thucydides 1.132.5. When the Athenians intercepted despatches sent to Sparta by the Persian King written in cuneiform script (‘Assyrian letters’) they were deciphered at Athens (Thucydides 4.50). Perhaps they were intended to be read aloud by the ambassador, rather than puzzled out by the Spartans.

56. The methods that follow are all set out in Aeneas Tacticus 31, unless another source is indicated. Some additional Roman variations are to be found in Front. Strat. 3.13.

57. Herodotus 5.35.

58. Suet. Iul. 56.6: cf. Gell. 17.9.1, where it is implied that Caesar varied his ciphers.

59. Ov. Ars 3.627–30.

60. Cf. West, S., ‘Archilochus' Message-stick’, CQ 38 (1988), 42–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar. N. Dunbar on Aristophanes, Birds 1283 reports that T. Kelly, ‘The Spartan σκυτάλη’ (an article that I have not seen), Eadie, J. W. and Ober, J. (edd.), The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honour of C. G. Starr (Lanham, 1985), 141–69Google Scholar also argues for the falsity of the tradition. It is not stated that the despairing Spartan despatch captured by Alcibiades in 410 B.C. (Plutarch, , Ale. 28.8Google Scholar) was encrypted.

61. Cf. Steier, A., ‘Taube’, PW A4 (1932), 2493–2494Google Scholar.

62. Herodotus 8.128; Aeneas Tacticus 31, 25 ff.; Caes, . Gall. 5.48Google Scholar.

63. Cf. Appendix, inf.

64. Aeneas Tacticus 6.4; the use of some kind of flags is attested at the Battle of Sellasia, 222 B.C. (Polybius 2.66.10; Plutarch, , Phil. 6.3)Google Scholar.

65. Aeneas Tacticus 22.3.

66. Herodotus 6.115; a shield-signal raised in scouting ships helped to win the battle of Aegospotami (405 B.C.), which virtually ended the Peloponnesian War: Xen, . H.G. 2.1.27Google Scholar, Plutarch, , Lys. 11.2Google Scholar. Armour was kept highly polished (Onasander 28).

67. Aeneas Tacticus 6.5.

68. Aeneas Tacticus 18.20–1.

69. Politics 5. 1313b13.

70. Pluarch, , Pel. 8.3, 9.1, 11.2Google Scholar: cf. Plutarch, , De defectu oraculorum, 434 DGoogle Scholar.

71. Th. 211 ff.

72. Euripides, , Ba. 821 ffGoogle Scholar.

73. The Romans so developed internal spying as a profession (Riepl, , op. cit., 448–56)Google Scholar that they must have had a pool of talent for military purposes.

74. The invention was ascribed to Palamedes: Sophocles, , GrTF 432Google Scholar and Scholium, to Euripides, , Orestes 432 (148.22 Sch.)Google Scholar.

75. Iliad 18.211.

76. 549–50.

77. Aeschylus, , Agamemnon 8, 21, 281 ffGoogle Scholar.

78. The pseudo-Aristotelian, De mundo 6 (398a31)Google Scholar claims that messages could be relayed to the King of Persia by beacons with great speed.

79. αἴρειν τοὺς Φρυκτούς (‘to raise the beacons’), Aeneas Tacticus 7.4, a fairly frequent phrase.

80. Thucydides 3.22.7; the difficulties in understanding the passage are not satisfactorily elucidated yet, despite the passages conveniently assembled by Reincke, G., ‘Nachrichtenwesen’, PW 16 (1933), 1496–1541, 1504Google Scholar.

81. Aeneas Tacticus 16.16.

82. Polybius 10.45–7. The system suggested is still used by prisoners to tap messages from one to another, and is graphically described by Koestler, Arthur, who had himself been a prisoner, in his novel Darkness at Noon (1940)Google Scholar.

83. Riepl, , op. cit., 96–102Google Scholar powerfully states the practical difficulties in sending messages for long distances by using the method that Polybius describes.

84. Attested by Caesar, Julius, Ciu. 3.65.3 and elsewhereGoogle Scholar.