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Commandment and Consciousness in Talmudic Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2011

Robert Goldenberg
Affiliation:
Wichita State University, Wichita, Kansas 67208

Extract

Legal historians have given considerable attention to the question of intention in rabbinic law. Solomon Zeitlin, in the early years of the present century, published a number of articles touching on this matter, in which his chief purpose was to show that the legal significance of intention was one of the central points of contention between the two great Tannaitic schools, the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai. A little later, Michael Higger wrote a doctoral dissertation for Columbia University which he entitled Intention in Talmudic Law. Still more recently, Louis Finkelstein sought to push the dispute over intention back to the days of the Pharisees and Sadducees, attributing to the Sadducees the view that intention by itself has no legal consequence, and as usual explaining this view in terms of the Sadducees' social position.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1975

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