¹ For examples and a more detailed substantiation of this point see S. Rawidowicz, Ludwig Feuerbachs Philosophic; Ursprung und Schicksal (1931), 209–12.

² We say that this may appear strange at first sight because Feuerbach would seem to be more than anything else the great antagonist of theology. Theology seems to be his one great enemy against which he fights relentlessly and uncompromisingly. This in a way is true, and yet it can be very misleading. For Feuerbach is the great antitheologian only if we equate theology generally with the neoplatonic-idealist formulation. True, historically speaking, much of theology was neoplatonic-idealist in its formulation, and Feuerbach himself identifies and equates theology in general with the neoplatonic-idealist formulation. Nevertheless, such an identification is not valid. The neoplatonic-idealist formulation is only one kind, albeit a very pervasive and a very important kind, of theology but not theology as such. Thus, the fact that Feuerbach negates neoplatonic-idealist theology does not preclude the possibility of his assuming the role of the cantheologian himself, although, of course, presenting a different kind of theological interpretation. This is further seen in the fact that although Feuerbach uses the word theology as standing for something to which he is completely opposed, and although he tries to show that theology is really but another name for the neoplatonic-idealist Weltanschauung, he still finds kindred spirits to his own in what he and all of us would call the theological sphere, e.g., Luther in particular. Indeed, it is a basic thesis of Feuerbach expressed in the Grundsatze that the internal development of theology, i.e., neoplatonic-idealist theology, has been propagated by the continuous attempt to interpret Christianity in the Feuerbachian way, i.e., reducing itself to anthropology. Of course, in Feuerbach's view, it failed to articulate it completely and uncompromisingly. But the attempt and orientation are there. Thus, from this aspect Feuerbach himself sees himself as the culminator (not only the negator) of the theological tradition, thus, as a theologian. Feuerbach's relation, therefore, to the whole body of previous theology is really twofold. He sees himself both as the negator and culminator. In a way this is not paradoxical for Feuerbach, since in good Hegelian tradition culmination means in a special sense also negation.

³ This can be seen quite clearly in Barth's evaluation of Feuerbach in Theology and Church (1962; see, for example, 217f., 222f., 226, 228) and in Protestant Thought (1959; see, for example, 355, 357–59). [The first of these is included as an Introductory Essay in the Harper Torchbooks ed. of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity (1957), x-xxxii.’

⁴ Barth, K., Theology and Church, 217Google Scholar.

⁵ Ibid., 231–34.

⁶ Ibid., 228.

⁷ Ibid., 217f. For the many other instances where Barth clearly characterizes the Feuerbach he confronts as Feuerbach the theologian see the references given above in footnote 3.

⁸ While it is true that Barth himself and most other scholars of Feuerbach refer to Feuerbach's thesis as the deification of man, it seems to us that this is not a precise description of what Feuerbach is actually doing. Feuerbach does not deify man to the nature of God but rather reduces God to human attributes. Thus, the precise description should be the humanization of God rather than the deification of man. While the two obviously may serve to point to the same phenomenon, i.e., the cancellation of all differences between man and God, and to the extent that this is the issue in question the two formulations may be used interchangeably, they nevertheless point also to important differences in the process by which the cancellation is brought about. Barth, although referring to Feuerbach's deification of man, is nevertheless dealing with and answering Feuerbach's humanization of God. For further treatment of this point see the introduction to my forthcoming translation of Feuerbach's Die Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (L. Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future) to be published soon by Bobbs Merrill Co.

⁹ Ibid., 226, 227.

¹⁰ Essence of Christianity, translated by George Eliot (Harper Ed.), 21.

¹¹ John Glasse, “Barth on Feuerbach,” Harvard Theological Review 57 (April, 1964). This is a most recent contribution to the evaluation of the Barth-Feuerbach confrontation. It is a substantial and most learned essay, taking full cognizance of the literature and making an important contribution to the understanding of the confrontation by its thorough probing into the material. Although we cannot but commend the authentic scholarship involved, we, nevertheless, must in the last analysis take issue with the interpretation offered. As will become clear later in cur paper when we have occasion to deal at greater length with professor Glasse's paper, the quarrel is not about the facts of the case (here he is superb in the authenticity and breadth of his perception) but about the interpretation and evaluation of what they signify.

¹² Ibid., 74. Actually, judging by the number of references, Barth's Feuerbach is preeminently the author of both Das Wesen des Christentums and Die Grundsätze der Philosophic der Zukunft. In Barth's essay on Feuerbach in Theology and Church there are 37 references to Das Wesen des Christentums and 22 references to Die Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft. This is to be compared with seven references to Das Wesen der Religion. But even these few references to Das Wesen der Religion are, as professor Glasse rightly remarks, only those which are fully consistent with the standpoint of Das Wesen des Christentums and Die Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, thus betraying none of the differences which exist between the former and the latter. Feuerbach's position in Das Wesen des Christentums and Die Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft is, therefore, essentially the only Feuerbachian position which Barth confronts. Although there are, as we shall see presently, some differences between the two works, professor Glasse is justified, nevertheless, in referring exclusively to the Feuerbach of Das Wesen des Christentums, since the basic Feuerbachian position in both works is essentially the same. Die Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, by the way, to which Barth refers is the one edited by H. Ehrenberg and entitled, somewhat briefly, Philosophie der Zukunft (1923).

¹³ Ibid., 93, footnote 47.

¹⁴ Feuerbach in his writing prior to 1839, for example, is a Hegelian attacking vehemently the very positions he was to hold after 1839. See in particular his critique of Carl Bachmann's Anti-Hegel in Feuerbach's Samtliche Werke, ed. W. Bolin and F. Jodl (Formann, Stuttgart, 1903–11), II, 17–80.

¹⁵ While these two works form a definite unit in Feuerbach, i.e., the theological unit, there are also differences between them. In the Grundsätze Feuerbach examines theology in more general terms. He criticizes the neoplatonic-idealist theology (which he equates with theology in general) in its various manifestations in Western culture in order to establish vis-à-vis it his own position. It is this position which serves him as the foundation and basic orientation on which to build his own specific theological approach to Christianity, i.e., interpreting the doctrines, rituals and symbols of Christianity in accordance with his viewpoint. This latter specifically positive Christian theological task is carried out in Das Wesen des Christentums. Of course it is true that the Grundsätze appeared two years after Das Wesen des Christentums, although logically, according to our interpretation, it should have preceded it. But Feuerbach clearly views the Grundsätze as a summation and explication of what has underlined his position since 1839 (see his introduction to the Grundsätze). He does not arrive at it later. It is only that he writes it and spells it out more forcefully and systematically later. It is evident that for Barth's theological interest in Feuerbach both works are important, since the Grundsatze provides Feuerbach in the general theological context while the Wesen provides him in the specific Christian theological context.

¹⁶ Ibid., 93, footnote 48.

¹⁷ See above, p. 28.

¹⁸ See below, p. 46.

¹⁹ One half of Barth's essay on Feuerbach in Theology and Church is devoted to reporting what Feuerbach has to say, much of it in direct quotations from Feuerbach.

²⁰ It is interesting to note that the question of whether what the Christian tradition holds is valid or illusion does not arise here. This would be the question of the philosopher of religion. Here the question is only whether what the Christian tradition holds can be completely interpreted in Feuerbach's way. This, indeed, is a question in the area of theology.

²¹ K. Barth, Theology and Church, 235. Barth is here quoting Ehrenberg's description in the latter's introduction to his edition of Feuerbach's Philosophic der Zukunft. A more accurate description of Feuerbach, in our view, would be to characterize him as one who misunderstood death and did not know evil. We justify this switch in the introduction to our translation of Feuerbach's Grundsäatze, see above, note 8. Still, for our purposes here it makes no difference.

²² It is important to note in this connection that going along with Feuerbach, even when it is to a considerable extent, does not necessitate finishing with him. And it is the finishing which is crucial. Furthermore, it is also important to note that Barth's agreement with Feuerbach is not motivated by mere clever strategy, i.e., giving in to your opponent as much as possible in order to build him up before proceeding to the kill, thus making his fall all the more dramatic and forceful. Barth's agreement is genuine. He is giving credit where credit is due. Indeed, as we pointed out above, it is these aspects of Feuerbach's theological interpretation, where Feuerbach receives his due from Barth, which make Feuerbach such a forceful and serious opponent and which compel Barth to listen so carefully to him. Still, as long as one can avoid going all the way with Feuerbach, as long as one can say in the last instance “no,” his threat is eliminated, and one can even “laugh in his face.”

²³ J. Glasse, ibid., 84.

²⁴ Ibid., 84.

²⁵ Ibid., 87f.

²⁶ Ibid., 82; also 82, footnote 26.

²⁷ Indeed, the fact that Barth in his relation to the question of man changes from a negative to a positive attitude accords well with our explanation that the change is a change in role. The polemicist is basically negative in his approach. Since he comes to challenge and destroy, he will be characteristically a “nay-sayer.” On the other hand, the dogmatic theologian, since his task is to build and affirm, is basically positive in his approach. This basic over-all difference in approach between the polemicist and the dogmatic theologian (i.e., the first being generally negative, while the latter is generally positive) is reflected here specifically with regard to the question of man.

²⁸ Indeed, if any further indications for this change of role is needed, one can cite the fact, as professor Glasse rightly observes, that Barth's whole treatment of Feuerbach in the nineteen-fifties is cast in the form of surveying, asserting and affirming rather than that of challenging, arguing and negating. Surely, this is a form which may correspond to the role of the dogmatic theologian but most certainly not to that of the polemicist. Furthermore, professor Glasse very keenly raises and pursues some of the problems that these innovations in Barth's position may imply (see, for example, Ibid., 85–87). The interesting thing to note, however, is that these problems impinge internally upon Barth's theological position, not upon his response to Feuerbach. In other words, even the problems that these innovations may suggest are problems regarding Barth qua the dogmatic theologian, not Barth qua the polemicist.

²⁹ Indeed, why should the Feuerbach implicated in the nineteen-fifties be Feuerbach the theologian? And why should Barth continue to polemicize? Has Feuerbach qua theologian not been overcome already in the nineteen-twenties ? Have Barth's polemics against Feuerbach (seeing that these polemics are directed exclusively against Feuerbach qua theologian) not been concluded successfully in the nineteen-twenties? But if the answer is yes, as we have tried to show above, then what is the point for Barth in the nineteen-fifties to polemicize again against Feuerbach the theologian?

³⁰ This thesis belongs fundamentally to the area of the philosophy of religion, if the determining factor is the use to which it is put. Its formulation, however, belongs quite clearly to the area of the psychology of religion. This close intertwining between the philosophy and psychology of religion is typical of Feuerbach, whereby his philosophy of religion is built on and formulated in terms of the psychology of religion.

³¹ Indeed, the Barth-Feuerbach confrontation comes most forcefully to the fore, as professor Glasse rightly observes (ibid., 88), at the point where Barth in the process of expounding his dogmatic theology comes to deal with the question of “whether the life of Jesus Christ really reveals God, or whether in our confession that he is Light, Truth, and Word, we ourselves are merely attributing these to him.” Obviously this is the point at which Feuerbach's challenge of the illusionist projection would arise.

³² Ibid., 94. Although professor Glasse levels his critique against Barth as such, not distinguishing here between the Barth of the nineteen-twenties and the Barth of the nineteen-fifties, it is clear that this critique would hold true only against the Barth of the nineteen-fifties.

³³ Ibid., 95.

³⁴ Yet the essence of this answer is already formulated in the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties, when Barth is dealing with Feuerbach's theological thesis. For, as was already discussed, in order to overcome Feuerbach's theological thesis, Barth must turn to the man who really knows himself to be a dying and sinful creature. Such a man, however, can be only the isolated “solitary individual.” Thus, it is already Feuerbach's theological thesis that exacts the price of isolation from Barth. The confrontation of the nineteen-fifties dealing with Feuerbach's thesis of the illusionist projection merely spells out fully and clearly this position of isolation which has been established already in the nineteen-twenties. This shows the intimate relationship between Feuerbach's two theses, i.e., the theological and the philosophical theses, and the consistency and continuation in Barth's response. This actually is quite understandable, for the real issue which underlies both of Feuerbach's theses and which really challenges Barth is the issue of anthropocentrism. This is the crux of Feuerbach's position (clothing itself in different garbs in the two theses) and the point at which Barth must overcome Feuerbach. But the only way, in the last analysis, in which Barth can overcome Feuerbach's anthropocentrism is to completely disengage himself from the anthropocentric view (he cannot overcome it by repudiating it), thus safeguarding at least the possibility of his theocentric position.