¹ This is not a case of a distinction without a difference, but of a distinction without a terminology. I assume that the term Duality avoids the sense of disruption and hostility implied in the ending “ism.”

² See G. F. Moore, “Zoroastrianism,” Harvard Theological Review, vol. v, especially pp. 224, 225.

³ Dualism proper regards the second principle as well as the first as active. The Stoics, like Plato, regarded matter as passive. “Das wahre Charaktermerkmal der ὔλη ist Passivität.” Aal, Geschichte der Logosidee, p. 113.

⁴ Plato, Timaeus, 30.

⁵ Ibid., 41.

⁶ Ibid., 48.

⁷ For a discussion of the dependence upon Plato of the Christian fathers in the Hexaemeroi see an article by Robbins, Frank E. on “The Influence of Greek Philosophy in the Early Commentaries on Genesis,” in the American Journal of Theology, April, 1912.Google Scholar

⁸ 1 Cor. 15 44–49; also 1 Cor. 2 14.

⁹ Gal. 5 17–21.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 11 12.

¹¹ “There is no reason why Paul should not have been familiar with dualism as it existed in Hellenic thought; but that he embraced it or held it is a supposition obviously incompatible with the general tenour of his teaching.” F. R. Tennant, The Fall and Original Sin, p. 269.

¹² It is to this prevalent but unjust notion of the doctrine of the Logos that its present disrepute is largely due.

¹³ De Opificio Mundi, § 47.

¹⁴ “From the end of the second century it was for ever established in the church that the belief in an essential dualism of God and the world, spirit and nature, was irreconcilable with Christianity.” Harnack, Monasticism, p. 23.

¹⁵ Paul, who (together with the Johannine author) is as largely responsible for this conception of the superhuman character of evil as he is for the non-dualistic sanity of the Christian attitude toward life, seems to have intended by these vigorous terms to emphasize the power of evil rather than to define it metaphysically.

¹⁶ Thus Martineau says: “With Descartes we enter upon the true era of metaphysical dualism.” Types of Ethical Theory, i, 126.

¹⁷ There can be no action, says Eucken, without this duality—keine Tat ohne Zweiheit—and the duality itself is indigenous to the action; it is both grounded within and overcome within it. Boyce Gibson, Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life, p. 96.

¹⁸ Creative Evolution, p. 186.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 369.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 218.

²¹ “Life and Consciousness,” Hibbert Journal, October, 1911, p. 41.

²² Ibid., p. 87.

²³ James Ward has strikingly set forth the contrast of these two realms in the first two chapters of his recent volume, The Realm of Ends.

²⁴ G. M. Stratton, The Psychology of the Religious Life, p. 355.