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In Defence of the Abstract

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2015

Philip Stratton-Lake*
Affiliation:
Keele University
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Abstract

Kant's ethics is frequently criticised by Hegel for being merely formal or abstract, for being infected by the vices of abstraction” as one commentator put it. It is tempting for those sympathetic to the general drift of Kant's ethics to attempt to defend him from this criticism by arguing that it is not merely formal at all. But the abstract nature of Kant's ethics was not accidental: neither is it falsely ascribed to him because of poor, or insensitive interpretation. Kant intended his ethics to be formal and saw this as its virtue. The distinctively Kantian way to deal with the charge of abstraction is not to attempt to give some content to his ethics, but to show that it is none the worse for being abstract, and that this has the advantages Kant thought it did. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this line of argument.

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Type
Hegel and Kant
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 1996

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