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FRENCH INTELLIGENCE AND HITLER'S RISE TO POWER

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 1998

PETER JACKSON
Affiliation:
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
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Abstract

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This article examines the French response to the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany in January of 1933. It argues that French intelligence warned civilian and military leaders that the priorities of the new regime were rearmament and the militarization of German society in preparation for a war of conquest. This essentially accurate appreciation of the situation inside Germany had little impact on the course of French foreign policy. At this juncture French society was preoccupied with worsening economic crisis and pacifist sentiment had reached its inter-war zenith. The national focus was inward and domestic concerns took priority over the external threat from Germany. Finally, France was in a position of relative isolation and could garner no support for a policy of firmness from its erstwhile allies, Great Britain and the United States. This combination of national introspection and diplomatic isolation deterred a succession of governments from taking determined steps to meet the Nazi challenge in 1933.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press