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¹⁸ Howard, M., ‘Europe on the eve of the First World War’ in Evans, R. J. W. and von Strandman, H. Pogge (eds.), The coming of the First World War (Oxford, 1988), pp. 1–17, especially pp. 14–17Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Angell, Norman, The great illusion (London, 1910)Google Scholar. For the influence of ‘Angellism’ see Wallace, S., War and the image of Germany: British academics, 1914–1918 (Edinburgh, 1988), pp. 15–28Google Scholarand Weinroth, H., ‘Norman Angell and “The Great Illusion” An episode in pre-1914 pacificism’, The Historical Journal, XVII (1974)Google Scholar.

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²⁵ Waites, p. 234. The phrase is Geoffrey Best's.

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