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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2014
This essay claims that some recent discussions of moral positions based on a principle of innocents' immunity, “The direct killing of an innocent person is never morally justifiable,” ignore two different meanings of “innocence”: “innocence” as applied to agents and “innocence” as applied to those upon whom the agents act (“patients”). It shows how neglecting this distinction distorts some discussions about abortion and justifiable war. Some recent philosophical analyses are used and developed (1) to argue that “patient innocence” is not dependent on “agent innocence,” but on how the role of “;patients” relates those “patients” to prospective or actual agents, and (2) to show the theoretical importance of distinguishing “excuses” from “justifications” of actions. This approach provides an alternative to traditionalist and revisionist accounts by suggesting how Catholicism's “inconsistent ethic” might be developed into a more coherent, multifaceted vision.