¹ Avery Dulles has shown that whereas the Catholic tradition has by and large adopted an intellectualist definition of faith, i.e., faith as knowing, the Protestant tradition has opted for a more fiduciary-dispositional definition, i.e., faith as truth. See his “The Meaning of Faith Considered in Relationship to Justice,” in Haughey, John C. S.J.,, ed., The Faith That Does Justice (New York: Paulist, 1977), pp. 10–46.Google Scholar On the other hand, the Catholic tradition has always accepted the existence of an independent human morality, whereas many Protestant theologians have categorically denied the possibility of such a morality.

² When I compare my approach with the others, by and large I will not indicate the areas of agreement that may exist. Thus, my principal concern in comparison will be to center on those areas where my approach is distinguished from all the others.

³ The concept of the human (humanum) is by no means a univocal concept in theological literature. The Catholic tradition for the most part has conceived of the humanum in metaphysical and abstract terms. Thus, the humanum in this view is absolute nature which must be distinguished from the realities of history, grace and sin. See Fuchs, Joseph S.J.,, Natural Law: A Theological Investigation, trans. Reckter, Helmut and Dowling, John A. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965).Google Scholar Because of the historical diversity in the Protestant traditions, it is virtually impossible to find any commonly-held view of the human. Nevertheless, however the human is conceived, the central question still remains whether, and to what extent, the human can be a source of moral wisdom and knowledge apart from the resources of explicit faith.

⁴ Barth, Karl, in his Church Dogmatics, II/2, trans. Bromiley, G. W.et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957)Google Scholar, and Lehmann, Paul, in his Ethics in a Christian Context (New York: Harper and Row, 1963)Google Scholar, are representatives of this approach to relating faith and morality.

⁵ Barth, , Church Dogmatics, II/2, p. 517.Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid., p. 518.

⁷ Ibid., p. 526.

⁸ Ibid., p. 522.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 520-27. See also, Lehmann, , Ethics, pp. 268–77.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Barth, p. 527.

¹¹ Ibid. Barth maintains that Christian ethics ought to annex human morality similar to the way in which the children of Israel reentered the land of Palestine. Thus, just as the Israelites moved into the land of Palestine without any apologetics, but rather critically and without compromise, so also do Christian ethics move critically and polemically into a field already occupied by human morality. The result in both cases is one of absorption. For a full discussion of Barth's notion of annexation, see his Church Dogmatics, II/2, pp. 518–24.Google Scholar Also, see Lehmann, , Ethics, pp. 268–84.Google Scholar

¹² See Barth, p. 515, and Lehmann, p. 274.

¹³ Barth, p. 509.

¹⁴ The command of God is always concrete and specific for Barth, and nothing is left to chance or speculation once this command is given. Ibid., pp. 663–64.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 538.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 512. Also, See Lehmann, pp. 131-32.

¹⁷ Robert E. Willis has claimed that Barth made no attempt to utilize the insights that might come from the social sciences because of his general rejection of the possibility of apologetics, or rather his identification of apologetics with dogmatics; see The Ethics of Karl Barth (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), p. 442.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ellul, Jacques, in his To Will and To Do (Philadelphia: Pilgrim, 1969)Google Scholar, and Thielicke, Helmut, in his Theological Ethics. Vol. I: Foundations (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966)Google Scholar, are proponents of this approach.

¹⁹ Thielicke, , Theological Ethics, p. 481.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ellul, , To Will, p. 38.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid., pp. 59-72.

²² For a discussion of “the orders of preservation and divine patience,” see Thielicke, pp. 439-40.

²³ Ellul, p. 78.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 79 and 106.

²⁵ Thielicke, p. 26.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 431-32, and Ellul, p. 97.

²⁷ Ellul, p. 93. Søren Kierkegaard also held to a similar conclusion in his panegyric upon Abraham. See Kierkegaard's, Fear and Trembling (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), pp. 30–37.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ellul, p. 98.

²⁹ Thielicke, pp. 36-38.

³⁰ Ellul, pp. 6-7.

³¹ Ibid., p. 110. Ellul maintains that human morality belongs to what Bonhoeffer called the “penultimate.” As such, it is only useful and necessary as it fulfills the practical function of preserving the world. For Bonhoeffer's position on the role of the natural in the penultimate, see his Ethics, ed. Bethge, Eberhard (London: Fontana, 1966), pp. 120–87.Google Scholar

³² Ramsey, Paul adopts this approach in his Nine Modern Moralists (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962).Google Scholar

³³ For Ramsey this transforming power of faith is the agape of Christ (ibid., p. 15).

³⁴ Ibid., p. 16 and p.212.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 17-18. This human morality is called “natural justice” by Ramsey.

³⁷ Ramsey claims that if it could be proven that we were completely unable to discover an essential human nature, or permanently valid norms or a competent sense of justice in humanity, Christian love would not be blinded. The Christian could still determine what his or her duties were by means of Christian agape (ibid.).

³⁸ Curran, Charles E. makes this point in his “Is There a Catholic and/or Christian Ethics?” in Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 29 (1974), 136–37.Google Scholar Ramsey's own belief that agape not only interpenetrates and invigorates justice but also refashions it seems to point to the fact of discontinuity. Ramsey, , Nine Modern Moralists, p. 16.Google Scholar

³⁹ James M. Gustafson's view of the Christian moral life represents this approach to relating faith and morality. Swezey, Charles M., in the introduction to Gustafson's, Christian Ethics and the Community (Philadelphia: Pilgrim, 1971), pp. 13–15Google Scholar, also describes Gustafson's position as dialectical.

⁴⁰ Gustafson, James M., Can Ethics Be Christian? (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 156.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Gustafson, James M., Christ and the Moral Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 238–40.Google Scholar

⁴² Gustafson, James M., “Moral Discernment in the Christian Life” in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, ed. Outka, Gene H. and Ramsey, Paul (New York: Scribner's, 1968), pp. 26–27.Google Scholar

⁴³ Gustafson, , Can Ethics Be Christian?, p. 157.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 173-79. For a further development of this, see Gustafson's, 1975 Pere Marquette Theology Lecture: The Contributions of Theology to Medical Ethics (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1975), pp. 25–93.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ As a consequence, Gustafson maintains that his approach to Christian ethics refuses to collapse the “morally good’ into the “theologically good.” Can Ethics Be Christian?, p. 174.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 173.

⁴⁷ Mackey, James P. proffers this position on the relation between faith and morality in his The Problem of Religious Faith (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972).Google ScholarDrane, James F. also holds to this approach in Religion and Ethics (New York: Paulist, 1976).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Mackey, p. 265.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 237-38.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 260.

⁵¹ Drane, p. 61. Also, see Mackey, p. 253.

⁵² Mackey, p. 256. Also, see Drane, p. 69.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 265.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Drane, pp. 94-106.

⁵⁶ There are two distinguishable strands in this approach to relating faith and morality. On the one hand, some of the secular theology of the 1950's and 1960's, which is an heir to the 19th-century liberalism, has attempted to reconstruct the meaning of religious statements and the Gospel along the lines of analytic philosophy. Paul M. Van Buren's position is illustrative of such an approach. See his The Secular Meaning of the Gospel Based on an Analysis of Its Language (New York: Macmillan, 1963).Google Scholar On the other hand, there is the neo-Kantian position which attempts to show that faith and religious beliefs are required by practical reason (moral reason) in order for it to complete the moral project. In such an approach the source of religious belief is moral reason, and the source of religious experience is moral experience. Green's, Ronald M.Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978)Google Scholar is a recent attempt to formulate this position. My intent in this section will be to focus on only the first strand in this approach, viz., Van Buren's position.

⁵⁷ Buren, Van, Secular Meaning, p. 163.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 154.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 197.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 102.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 199-200.

⁶² The approach which is developed below is essentially my own, although the starting point for such a position accepts some of the important conclusions arrived at by Rahner in his theological anthropology.

⁶³ N. H. G. Robinson is a contemporary theologian who has espoused the position that Christian ethics is an ethic of redemption. Although Robinson not only accepts the reality of human morality but also grants that it can contain valid truth, he nonetheless attempts to construct an ethic of redemption which is not subject to or conditioned by the realities of creation and sin. See his The Groundwork of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), pp. 121–47.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Bresnahan, James F., “Rahner's Christian Ethics,” America 123 (October 31, 1970), 353–54.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Hick, John, Faith and Knowledge (New York: Collins, 1974), pp. 95–119.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ For a further discussion of the moral necessity for the resources of faith, see my “The Dependence of Christian Morality on Faith: A Critical Assessment,” Eglise et Théologie 12 (1981), 237–77.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Karl Rahner has proved the validity of such a conclusion in two places. See his “Reflections on the Unity of Love of Neighbor and the Love of God” in Theological Investigations, Vol. 6, trans. Karl-H., and Kruger, Boniface (Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), pp. 231–49Google Scholar, and “Atheism and Implicit Christianity” in Theological Investigations, Vol. 9, trans. Harrison, Graham (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 145–64.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Kai Nielsen has stated that any faith claim about God's will must be tested against human reason and experience. See his “Some Remarks on the Independence of Morality from Religion” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ramsey, Ian T. (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 140–51.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ I say “further intelligibility and justification” because in the domain of general moral content, i.e., those general values, convictions, goals, actions, principles, etc., intelligibility and justification are possible without explicit faith. For a further development of my position, see “Christian Ethics: Distinctive and Specific ?,” in Curran, Charles E. and McCormick, Richard A. S.J.,, eds., Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics (New York: Paulist, 1980), pp. 90–110.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ At the level of thematic consciousness they must be distinguished because the criteria which are employed to determine the ethical and theological Goods are logically distinct. If the criteria for both were logically the same, then faith and morality would be collapsed into one another. It is only at the transcendental level that the criterion for both is the same, viz., response to God's offer of Himself in love.