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Moral Reasoning as Perception: A Reading of Carol Gilligan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Abstract

Gilligan's understanding of moral reasoning as a kind of perception has its roots in the conception of moral experience espoused by Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. A clear understanding of that conception, however, reveals grave difficulties with Gilligan's descriptions of the care perspective and justice perspective. In particular, we can see that the two perspectives are not mutually exclusive once we recognize that attention does not require attachment and that impartiality does not require detachment.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 by Hypatia, Inc.

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