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Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Catriona Mackenzie  and
Jacqui Poltera
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Abstract

In this paper we defend the notion of narrative identity against Galen Strawson's recent critique. With reference to Elyn Saks's memoir of her schizophrenia, we question the coherence of Strawson's conception of the Episodic self and show why the capacity for narrative integration is important for a flourishing life. We also argue that Saks's case and reflections on the therapeutic role of “illness narratives” put pressure on narrative theories that specify unduly restrictive constraints on self-constituting narratives, and clarify the need to distinguish identity from autonomy.

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Type
Original Articles
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Hypatia , Volume 25 , Issue 1: Special Issue: FEAST I: Current Work in Feminist Ethics and Social Theory , Winter 2010 , pp. 31 - 54
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Copyright © 2010 by Hypatia, Inc.

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