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Reflective Equilibrium as an Ameliorative Framework for Feminist Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Deborah Mühlebach
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Abstract

As Helen Longino's overview of Hypatia's engagement with feminist epistemology suggests, the last twenty‐five years’ contributions to this field reveal a strong focus on the topic of knowledge. In her short outline, Longino questions this narrow focus on knowledge in epistemological inquiry. The main purpose of this article is to provide a framework for systematically taking up the questions raised by Longino, one that prevents us from running the risk of becoming unreflectively involved in sexist, racist, or otherwise problematic inquiry. I argue that a specific form of the method of Reflective Equilibrium, as it is widely discussed in moral epistemology, logic, and theories of rationality, enables us to cope with the problems of traditional epistemology, which feminist theorizers such as Sally Haslanger have pointed to. With the account of Reflective Equilibrium I am offering—drawing in many respects on the model provided by Catherine Z. Elgin—we have an ameliorative method that allows us to rethink epistemological values, goals, and standards in a systematic way, and that largely avoids implicit and explicit biases in epistemology.

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Hypatia , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , Fall 2016, pp. 874 - 889
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Copyright © 2016 by Hypatia, Inc.

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