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Through Thick and Thin: Validity and Reflective Judgment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

April Flakne
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Abstract

The application of “thick” ethical concepts is best understood as a process of reflective rather than deductive judgment. Taking the form “B is as X as A,” where X is a thick ethical concept and A and B are narrative wholes unified through X (for example, “Those who hid Jews from the Nazis were as brave as Achilles”), reflective judgment opens thick ethical concepts to transformation. Though interpretive, such reflective judgment may still be able to provide validity without recourse to “thin,” purportedly context-neutral terms.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , Summer 2005 , pp. 115 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by Hypatia, Inc.

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