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Connections and Guilt

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2020

Abstract

Moral philosphy, in both the Kantian and Utilitarian traditions, has it as an ideal to provide a set of principles which dominate all other considerations and which will consistently resolve all moral problems. This is often taken to imply that guilt or remorse is irrational if it occurs in circumstances in which one does ones duty but also harms others. This essay explores the possibility of giving up this ideal in favor of a more complex view of morality in which resolutions of conflict are worked out affectively rather than logically.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by Hypatia, Inc.

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