Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-2dmjx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-09T23:32:43.442Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Feminist Second Thoughts About Free Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Paul Benson
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This essay suggests that common themes in recent feminist ethical thought can dislodge the guiding assumptions of traditional theories of free agency and thereby foster an account of freedom which might be more fruitful for feminist discussion of moral and political agency. The essay proposes constructing that account around a condition ofnormative‐competence. It argues that this view permits insight into why women's labor of reclaiming and augmenting their agency is both difficult and possible in a sexist society.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , Fall 1990 , pp. 47 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by Hypatia, Inc.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Abel, Elizabeth, and Abel, Emily K., eds. 1983. The signs reader. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Baier, Annette. 1986. Trust and antitrust. Ethics 96:231–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benson, Paul. 1987. Freedom and value. Journal of Phibsophy 84:465–486.Google Scholar
Burge, Tyler. 1979. Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Phibsophy 4:73–121.10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Code, Lorraine, Mullett, Sheila, and Overall, Christine, eds. 1988. Feminist perspectives. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
Davis, Angela. 1971. Reflections on the black woman's role in the community of slaves. The Black Scholar 3:3–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dworkin, Gerald. 1970. Acting freely. Nous 4:367–383.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frankfurt, Harry. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68:5–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, Marilyn. 1986. Autonomy and the split‐level self. Southern Journal of Phibsophy 24:19–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gould, Carol C, ed. 1983. Beyond domination. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.Google Scholar
Griffiths, Morwenna, and Whitford, Margaret, eds. 1988. Feminist perspectives in philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grimshaw, Jean. 1986. Philosophy and feminist thinking. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Grimshaw, Jean. 1988. Autonomy and identity in feminist thinking. See Griffiths and Whitford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harding, Sandra, and Hintikka, Merrill, eds. 1983. Discovering reality. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
Hill, Thomas E. 1987. The importance of autonomy. See Kittay and Meyers.Google Scholar
Jaggar, Alison. 1982. Human biology in feminist theory: Sexual equality reconsidered. See Gould.Google Scholar
Jaggar, Alison. 1983. Feminist politics and human nature. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.Google Scholar
Kittay, Eva E, and Meyers, Diana T., eds. 1987. Women and moral theory. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
MacKinnon, Catherine. 1982. Feminism, marxism, method, and the state: An agenda for theory. See Abel and Abel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meyers, Diana T. 1987a. Personal autonomy and the paradox of feminine socialization. Journal of Philosophy 84:619–628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meyers, Diana T. 1987b. The socialized individual and individual autonomy. See Kittay and Meyers.Google Scholar
Meyers, Diana T. 1989. Self, society, and personal choice. New York NY: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Morgan, Kathryn Pauly. 1988. Women and moral madness. See Code Mullet and Overall.Google Scholar
Neely, Wright. 1974. Freedom and desire. Philosophical Review 83: 32–5410.2307/2183872CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheman, Naomi. 1983. Individualism and the objects of psychology. See Harding and Hintikka.Google Scholar
Schoeman, Ferdinand, ed. 1987. Responsibility, character, and die emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Watson, Gary. 1975. Free agency. Journal of Philosophy 72: 205–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wolf, Susan. 1987. Sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility. See Schoeman.CrossRefGoogle Scholar