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Moral “I”: The Feminist Subject and the Grammar of Self-Reference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Abstract

Much recent feminist theory tacitly subscribes to some version of what cognitive and evolutionary scientists are successfully undermining as untenably Cartesian, namely, the view that moral agency is achieved through the transcendence of physical causality guaranteed by self-consciousness. Appealing to Wittgenstein's insights concerning self-reference, I argue that abandoning Cartesian dualism implies abandoning neither subject nor moral agency but rather opens up nonandrocentric possibilities unavailable to the traditional model of mind.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by Hypatia, Inc.

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