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Abstract
In her discussion of Naomi Scheman's “Individualism and the Objects of Psychology” Louise Antony misses the import of an unpublished paper of Scheman's that she cites. That paper argues against token identity theories on the grounds that only the sort of psycho-physical parallelisms that token identity theorists, such as Davidson and Fodor, reject could license the claim that each mental state or event is some particular physical state or event.
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- Copyright © 1996 by Hypatia, Inc.
References
Antony, Louise. 1985. Is psychological individualism a piece of ideology? Hypatia 10 (3): 157–73.Google Scholar
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