Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T03:49:46.798Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Constitutional Challenges to Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Kenneth Mck. Norrie
Affiliation:
University of Strathclyde. The helpful comments of my colleagues Ms Thérèse O'Donnell, Mr Mark Poustie and Ms Jenifer Ross are gratefully acknowleged. Sole responsibility for everything written here remains, of course, with me.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

1999 may well go down in history as a watershed in the legal struggle for gay and lesbian equality. While in the late 1990s many legislatures across the world extended various statutory benefits to same-sex relationships,1 most legal systems continue to make a clear statutory distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples (usually by ignoring the former completely), as well as the more obvious (and deliberate) distinction between married and unmarried couples. Both distinctions have come under increasing challenge and in 1999 decisions from each of the highest courts in Canada, South Africa and Vermont, U.S.A. held legislation to be unconstitutional which treated same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples. In that year too, the British House of Lords held that a same-sex couple could be a “family” for certain statutory purposes,2 and the European Court of Human Rights for the first time accepted that the prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights covered sexual orientation discrimination.3

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2000