1. See Black's Law Dictionary (6th edn, 1990), p.432.Google Scholar

2. A typical “Western democracy” includes the following elements: a system in which political powers are derived directly and/or indirectly from the people, where free elections are held, a competitive party system exists, the protection of fundamental rights is guaranteed, executive, legislative and judiciary powers are separated but subject to checks and balances, and the “rule of law” applies. See Sills, D. L. (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.3 (1972), pp.112, 117–118.Google Scholar

3. See in general Henderson, H., Paradigms in Progress: Life Beyond Economics (1991).Google Scholar

4. Proclamation of Tehran, adopted at the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, Iran, 13 May 1968.

5. GA Res.128, UN GAOR, 41st Sess., UN Doc.A/Res/41/128 (1987).Google Scholar

6. Declaration adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria, 14–25 June 1993, UN Doc.A/CONF.157/24 (1993).Google Scholar

7. See e.g. Mbaku, J. M., “Political Economy of Development: An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the Institutional Framework on Economic Development” (1994) 29 Studies in Comp. Int. Development 3–21Google Scholar (using four sets of national-level data and panel regression analysis to examine the relationship between institutional/governmental framework and various measures of economic development, and suggesting that there is yet no single empirical model of economic development that can be applied to all societies). The same conclusion was reached by the Panel on Democracy, Economics and Security organised by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Stockholm, Sweden, in June 1996. See Newsletter of International IDEA, No.9 (08. 1996), pp.6–7.Google Scholar

8. See World Bank, The World Development Report—The Challenge of Development (1991), pp.133–134.Google Scholar

9. See e.g. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle—Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993) (attributing recent years' rapid growth in East Asian countries to such public policies that improve physical and human capital rather than introducing democratic governmental systems); Cheng, T. and Krause, L. B., “Democracy and Development: With Special Attention to Korea” (1991) 10 J. Northeast Asian Studies 3–25; Zheng, Y., “Development and Democracy: Are They Compatible in China?” (1994) 109 Political Science Quarterly 235–259; Isham, J., Kaufmann, D. and Pritchett, L., Governance and Returns on Investment (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.1550, 1995) (concluding that the type of political regime and the status of more purely political liberties do not appear significantly to affect project performance in spite of a statistical linkage between a country’s civil liberties and the performance of its aid-financed government investment projects).Google Scholar

10. Barro, Robert J., “Determinants of Democracy” (paper presented to the World Bank, 07 1996Google Scholar, based on an analysis of the experience of 100 countries between 1960 and 1995 and arguing that “the net effect of democracy on growth is uncertain” and that “cross-country work finds a non-linear effect of democracy on growth”). See also Lipset, S. M., “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” (1995) 53 American Political Science Rev. 69, 75.Google Scholar

11. See Weede, E., “Political Democracy, State Strength and Economic Growth in LDCs: A Cross-national Analysis” (1984) 10 Rev. Int. Studies 297–312 (asserting that democracy is particularly conducive to steady and stable economic growth).Google Scholar

12. See Sirawy, and Inkeles, , “The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review” (1990) 25 Studies in Comp. Int. Development 126–157Google Scholar (containing case studies with varied conclusions). See also “Democracy and Growth: Why Voting is Good for You”, The Economist, 27 Aug.–2 Sept. 1994, pp.15–17Google Scholar (stating that democracy entrenches economic freedoms and in doing so underpins growth contrary to what believers in the “Asian Way” argue); “Measuring the Price of Politics”, The Economist, 27 01. 1996, p.72Google Scholar (reporting that some economic statistics have found a direct link between growth and the nature of the political regime while others have not and that, while it is uncontested that political factors can affect a country's economic growth, the difficulty lies in measuring them); Chatterji, M., “Political Economy, Growth and Convergence in Less-Developed Countries” (1993) 21 World Development 2029–2038Google Scholar (reporting that various econometric models reveal a positive correlation between political freedom and economic growth); Helliwell, J. F., Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.4066, 1992)Google Scholar; Pourgerami, A., “Authoritarian versus Non-Authoritarian Approaches to Economic Development: Update and Additional Evidence” (1992) 74 Public Choice 365–377Google Scholar and “Political Economy of Development: A Cross-National Causality Test of Development—Democracy-Growth Hypothesis” (1988) 58 Public Choice 123–141 (also arguing that democracy is conducive to economic development).Google Scholar

13. Pye, L. W., Aspects of Political Development (1966), p.34.Google ScholarSee also Bauzon, K. E., Development and Democratization in the Third World; Myths, Hopes, and Realities (1992) (generally noting that there is no best recipe that would guarantee economic development by referring to different experiences in different countries)Google Scholar; Beker, M. and Aarts, P., “Dilemmas of Development and Democratization in the Arab World” (1993) 23 IntJ. Political Economy: A Journal of Translations 87–107Google Scholar; Blaney, D. L. and Pasha, M. K., “Civil Society and Democracy in the Third World: Ambiguities and Historical Possibilities” (1993) 28 Studies in Comp. Int. Development 3–24Google Scholar; Clark, J. F., “Constraints on Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case for Limited Democracy” (1994) 14 Sais Rev. 91–108Google Scholar; Pereira, A. W., “Economic Underdevelopment, Democracy and Civil Society: The North-East Brazilian Case” (1993) 14(2) Third World Quarterly 365–380.Google Scholar See in particular Sorensen, G., Democracy, Dictatorship and Development: Economic Development in Selected Regimes of the Third World (1991).Google Scholar

14. E.g. most OECD countries which lead the list of economies doing well in the world have a democratic governmental system.

15. See Barro, op. cit. supra n.10. See also Huber, E., Rüschemeyer, D. and Stephens, J. D., “Impact of Economic Development on Democracy” (1993) 7 J. Economic Perspectives 71–85 (contending that economic development can indirectly support democratic reform by creating the environment in which ideas of democratic reform can flourish).Google Scholar

16. Cf. Nyang'aro, J. E. and Shaw, T. M., Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa: The Political Economy of Sustainable and Democratic Development (1992).Google Scholar

17. See Kothari, R., “Globalization and Revival of Tradition: Dual Attack on Model of Democratic Nation Building,” (1995) 30 Economic and Political Weekly 623–633 (25 Mar.) (asserting that while globalisation can positively influence democratic development it can also threaten it in that it represents a development which may be too rapid and therefore not give people enough time to digest the changes that come along with it).Google Scholar

18. A recent decision of the ICJ declining to answer a request by the World Health Organization for an advisory opinion highlights the importance of the principle of specialisation of international organisations. See Advisory Opinion No.95, The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (8 July 1996).

19. For the purposes of this article, references to the World Bank include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association.

20. See Art.IV, Section 10, first sentence of the IBRD‘s Articles of Agreement, providing: “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of member or members concerned.” See also Art. V, Section 6, first sentence of IDA's Articles of Agreement, containing an identical statement.

21. See IBRD‘s Arts., idem, second sentence and ID A’s Arts., idem, second sentence.

22. See Art.I of the IBRD's Arts, of Agreement. Art.I of IDA'S Arts, is somewhat shorter in its description but does also emphasise that the institution's foremost purpose is to promote economic development.

23. For more details on the broad mandate of EBRD, see Shihata, I. F. I., The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—A Comparative Analysis of the Constituent Agreement (1990), pp.2, 41.Google Scholar

24. In particular, in transition economies the Bank has financed projects that support the establishment of legal institutions and the “rule of law”. See World Bank, World Development Report—From Plan to Market (1996), pp.87–97.Google Scholar For an explanation of the “rule of law” as defined under the World Bank's mandate see Shihata, I. F. I., The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol.1 (1991), chap.2 (“The World Bank and ‘Governance’ Issues in Its Borrowing Members”), pp.53–96, at p.85Google Scholar (noting that a system of rules and institutions which is based on the “rule of law” for Bank purposes would mean that there is a set of rules which are known in advance, such rules are actually in force, mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the rules and to allow for departure from them as needed according to established rules, conflicts in the application of the rules can be resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial or arbitral body, and that there are known procedures for amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose).

25. For further details on governance issues in the Bank's work see Shihata, ibid.

26. See ibid and idem, Vol.11 (1995), chap.19 (“The World Bank and Human Rights”), pp.567–578, at p.577.

27. On the Bank's participatory approach in development assistance in general see World Bank, The World Bank Participation Sourcebook (1996). For more details with regard to the Bank's participatory approach in the environmental field see idem, Vol.11, chap.5 (“The World Bank and the Environment: Legal Instruments for Achieving Environmental Objectives”), pp.183–236, and for the involvement of NGOs in the preparation and implementation of Bank-financed projects, idem, chap.6 (“The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations”), pp.237–274.

28. For more details see Shihata (1995), op. cit. supra n.26, at p.576.Google Scholar

29. See Art.VI, Section 1 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1948) 16 U.N.T.S. 346, providing: “The Bank… will in the conduct of its activities, have due regard for decisions of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.”Google Scholar

30. This has been recently reflected in a report of a Committee of the Canadian House of Commons for the agenda of the Halifax Summit and in a draft resolution by a Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. See House of Commons, Canada, From Bretton Woods to Halifax and Beyond: Toward a 21st Summit for the 21st Century Challenge, Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the Issues of International Financial Institutions Reforms for the Agenda of the June 1995 G–7 Halifax Summit (1995), pp.38–40. This report called on the Task Force established by the Development Committee to review the work of the Bank (and other IFIs) to consider whether the Arts, of Agreement should be amended for the purpose. See also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Report and Draft Resolution, 7th Committee on Economic Affairs and Development on the Bretton Woods Institutions (Doc.7256, 17 02. 1995). The draft calls for the amendment of the Bank's Arts, of Agreement.Google Scholar

31. An amendment of the Bank's Arts, of Agreement requires the formal approval by Bank members through a process which ultimately needs a majority of 60% of the members having 85% of the total voting power (80% in the case of IDA).

32. See similar conclusions, with respect to the IMF, in Sir Joseph, Gold, Political Considerations are Prohibited by Articles of Agreement when the Fund Considers Requests for the Use of Resources, IMF Surv. 146, 148 (1983)Google Scholar and, more generally, Riesman, , “Through or Despite Governments: Differential Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs” 72 Iowa L.Rev. 391, 395 (1987).Google Scholar