Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T09:06:51.183Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Asymmetrical bargaining in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

P. Terrence Hopmann
Affiliation:
P. Terrence Hopmann is Director of the Center of International Studies and an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Interviews upon which the research reported in this paper was based were undertaken in part while the author was a research fellow under the Fulbright-Hays Act in Belgium during 1975–76. Additional interviews were undertaken in Geneva, Switzerland in 1974, with the cooperation of the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, especially of John Goormaghtigh and Jean Siotis. The author is also indebted to the Office of International Programs at the University of Minnesota for financial support for research and travel in Geneva in 1974. Finally, he would like to express his gratitude to Timothy King and Charles Walcott for their contributions to the development of the theory presented in this paper and to James Caporaso, Raymond Duvall, and Brian Job for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Get access

Extract

Bargaining relationships in formal international conferences and negotiations may involve structural asymmetries. A comprehensive analysis of these asymmetries in bargaining may be found in a synthesis of literature from formal game theory, structural-manipulative approaches to bargaining, social psychology, and the study of political influence. Propositions based on this literature focus on two factors which are likely to contribute to asymmetrical outcomes in negotiations: unequal costs to the negotiators from the failure to agree, and unequal resources available to employ in bargaining or influence attempts. An analysis of bargaining in the section of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) dealing with the issues of European security gave qualified support to these propositions. Influence over the final text in the CSCE agreement is related to a rough index of losses which would have resulted for individual nations from the failure to reach agreement in the CSCE. In addition, influence over the final text is related to each nation's resources, especially military resources. More significantly, the two superpowers exerted considerable asymmetrical influence over what was not included in the CSCE agreement, thus exercising a substantial veto. Thus, the asymmetrical outcomes within the CSCE negotiations were reflective of both differences in “threat potential,” that is, in the losses which actors would receive if no agreement had ensued, as well as differences in resources.

Information

Type
Part II
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable