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Multilateralism with small and large numbers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Miles Kahler
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Extract

Multilateralism, international governance of the “many,” was defined by the United States after 1945 in terms of certain principles, particularly opposition to bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict. Postwar multilateralism also expressed an impulse to universality (John Ruggie's “generalized organizing principles”) that implied relatively low barriers to participation in these arrangements. A ticket of admission was always required, whether acceding to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Nevertheless, the price of that ticket was not set so high that less powerful or less wealthy states could not hope to participate.

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Type
Symposium: Multilateralism
Information
International Organization , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , Summer 1992 , pp. 681 - 708
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1992

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References

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