¹ See Padelford, Norman J., “A Selected Bibliography on Regionalism and Regional Arrangements”, International Organization, 11 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 4)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² For a comprehensive critique of the assumptions underlying regionalism see Furniss, Edgar S. Jr, “A Re-examination of Regional Arrangements”, Journal of International Affairs, 1955 (Vol. 9, No. 2)Google Scholar. Economic regionalism is sharply challenged by Myrdal, Gunnar, An International Economy, New York, Harper and Bros., 1956Google Scholar. Extra-UN regional military arrangements are treated critically by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations, Eighth Report, June 1953.

³ Haas, Ernst B., “Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal Organization”, World Politics, 01 1956 (Vol. 8, No. 2)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Regional Integration and National Policy”, International Conciliation, May 1957.

⁴ For thoughtful recommendations strengthening universal over regional procedures and ties see Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Strengthening the United Nations, New York, Harper and Bros., 1957Google Scholar.

⁵ Deutsch, Karl W., Burrell, Sidney A., Kann, Robert A., Lee, Maurice Jr, Lichtermann, Martin, Lindgren, Raymond E., Loewenheim, Francis L., and Van Wagenen, Richard W., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1957Google Scholar. The conceptual and methodological principles applied in this study are treated in Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication, New York, Wiley, 1953Google Scholar; and Deutsch, Karl W., Political Community at the International Level, Garden City, Doubleday, 1954Google Scholar. The first-mentioned work provides the substance of the discussion of Part II of this article. In my summary and assessment of this work I have used the technical terms employed by the authors in order to avoid doing violence to their definitions and hypotheses.

⁶ Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950–1957, London, Stevens & Sons; and Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958Google Scholar. The otherwise undocumented empirical material on group behavior in western Europe which appears in Part IV of this article is presented in detail in this book. The theoretical conclusions derived from this material, however, appear in print here for the first time.

⁷ The study abstracts its findings from the examination of these cases: United States, 1789–1877; England-Scotland, middle ages to 1707; England-Ireland, until 1921; German unification, early 19th century until 1871; Italian unification, early 19th century until 1860; Hapsburg Monarchy, middle ages until 1918; Norway-Sweden, 1814–1907; Switzerland, 13th century until 1848; England-Wales, late middle ages; English unification, middle ages. The cases were selected to include both pluralistic and amalgamated security-communities, successful and unsuccessful attempts at unity. The authors assumed all their cases to be “closed” historically.

⁸ Deutsch, et al. , op. cit., p. 5Google Scholar.

⁹ Ibid., p. 12–13.

¹⁰ Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System-An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization, London, National Peace Council, 1946, p. 9 and 51Google Scholar; also Mitrany, David and Garnett, Maxwell, “World Unity and the Nations”, London, National Peace Council, n. dGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ It should be noted that the NATO military elite comes very close to meeting the characteristics listed by Morris Janowitz for professional military men “selling” their plans to civilian leaders in a democratic institutional setting. This process implies decreasing differentiation between formerly typical civilian and military tasks, as well as a shift in the basis of military authority away from command and toward discussion, negotiation, and ideological persuasion. See his “Military Elites and the Study of War”, The journal of Conflict Resolution, 03 1957 (Vol. 1, No. 1), p. 9–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² On the basis of a series of different behavioral propositions, Harold Guetzkow comes to the same conclusion. See his “Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations”, ibid., p. 64–67. The motivational hypotheses presented by Guetzkow, in his Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization, Princeton, N. J., Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1955Google Scholar, are strikingly borne out by my findings.

¹³ Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, p. 152–161, 163–213, 219–239Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The briefest, and yet accurate, descriptions of the ECSC and EEC Treaty rules are to be found in Goormaghtigh, John, “European Coal and Steel Community”, International Conciliation, 05 1955Google Scholar, and Serge Hurtig, “The European Common Market”, ibid., March 1058. The economic issues of the common market are analyzed by Bertrand, Raymond, “The European Common Market Proposal”, International Organization, 11 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 4)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the political process of negotiation by Camps, Miriam, The European Common Market and Free Trade Area, Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1957Google Scholar. See also the Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., Britain and Europe, London, 1957Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, p. 283–301, 339–350Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 414–430.

¹⁷ Research hypotheses on differences and similarities in political behavior among western and non-western systems are developed by Kahin, G. McT., Pauker, G., and Pye, L. W., “Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries”, American Political Science Review, 12 1955 (Vol. 49, No. 4)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I consider many of the variables discussed there as applicable to work on international organizations. The same is true of hypotheses and research designs put forward by comparative politics specialists concerned with western systems. See G. A. Almond, T. Cole, and Roy Macridis, “A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics”, ibid., December 1955 (Vol. 49, No. 4). Also Almond, Gabriel A., “Comparative Political Systems”, The Journal of Politics, 1956 (Vol. 18)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ With very few exceptions, all discussions of OEEC are cither institutional or economic in scope and intent. Some indications of political process may be gleaned from Marjolin, Robert, Europe and the United States in the World Economy, Durham, N. C, Duke University Press, 1954Google Scholar; Gordon, Lincoln, “The Organization for European Economic Cooperation”, International Organization, 02 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 1)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sergent, Rene, “Schritt fur Schritt zum Gemeinsamen Markt”, Europa, 10 1955Google Scholar.

¹⁹ To my knowledge, no discussions of political processes in the Arab regional organizations have appeared in English. Much information, however, can be gained from the diplomatic record alone. See Little, T. R., “The Arab League: A Reassessment”, Middle East journal, Spring 1956Google Scholar; Seabury, Paul, “The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement”, International Organization, 11 1949 (Vol. 3, No. 4)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Boutros-Ghali, B. Y., “The Arab League”, International Conciliation, 05 1954Google Scholar.

²⁰ Very little discussion of political processes in OAS, as distinguished from institutional analyses and descriptions of actions in specific crises, is available. See, however, Whitaker, A. P., The Western Hemisphere Idea, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1954Google Scholar, and Travis, Martin B. Jr, “The Organization of American States: A Guide to the Future”, Western Political Quarterly, 09 1957 (Vol. 10, No. 2)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.